

For Harriman and Radziwill it was a meeting of old acquaintances. Harriman owned a chemical factory, a porcelain factory, two coal and zinc mines in Poland. More importantly, Radziwill and Harriman jointly owned a coal and metallurgical complex, which employed up to forty thousand workers. At home, Janusz Radziwiłł was a very prominent political figure, being a senator and chairman of the Seimas Foreign Affairs Committee. In the 1930s he assisted Harriman in acquiring shares in several Polish enterprises in the face of very fierce competition from French and Belgian entrepreneurs. It should be noted that Soviet intelligence began to take an active interest in Radziwill from the mid-30s. After the

Red Army entered the eastern regions of Poland on September 17, 1939, he ended up with us and Beria recruited him as a so-called "agent of influence." Then his father arranged for his return to Berlin, where for some time the residency monitored him and regularly reported to Moscow. He was often seen at that time at diplomatic receptions in the company of Goering, with whom he used to hunt and often came to his estate near Vilnius (then this territory belonged to Poland).

In late 1944 or early 1945, my father was informed that Radziwill had been detained and taken to Moscow. Beria ordered his father to use Radziwill in probing contacts with the Americans on the eve of the Yalta Conference. At that time our relations with Poland were strained. The Pro-Communist Provisional Committee in Lublin declared itself the government of the country in opposition to the Polish government-in-exile in London. Therefore, it was decided to actively use Radziwill to calm the pro-English-minded Poles. British and American authorities meanwhile, as it became known, began to make inquiries about the whereabouts of Radziwill, who had disappeared from their field of vision. The usual check of his pre-war connections showed that Radziwill had business relations with Harriman. Upon learning of this, Beria immediately ordered the transfer of Radziwill from Lubyanka, where by that time he had managed to sit for about a month, to a safe house.

in the suburbs of Moscow under house arrest. Beria decided to use Radziwill as an intermediary in communicating with Harriman.

“At lunch at Aragvi with Harriman and Radziwill,” writes my father, “I was going to speak about our tolerance towards Catholic, Protestant and Orthodox clergy, even those who during the war years collaborated with the German authorities in the occupied territories (I personally received Archbishop Slipyi, one of the hierarchs of the Ukrainian Uniate Church; despite the fact that he worked closely with the Nazis, he was allowed to return to Lvov, but after the Yalta Conference he was arrested and sent to the Gulag on the orders of Khrushchev). I was also going to discuss the fate of the priests of the Russian Orthodox Church over dinner at Aragvi and assure Harriman that the Soviet government did not persecute Orthodox hierarchs. As I spoke about this, Harriman remarked that the recent election of a patriarch of the

Russian Orthodox Church made a very favorable impression on American public opinion. No other questions I had prepared in advance could be discussed - Harriman felt that Radziwill was not an official translator at all, and began to discuss with him possible business prospects regarding the creation of joint ventures in the Soviet Union after the war. According to Harriman, the defeat of Germany could logically lead to the fact that Soviet-American economic cooperation would become real. We need economic help, so we will use American capital to raise the national economy destroyed by the war. Harriman hoped that the American side could make big profits by participating in the restoration of our economy. He mentioned the creation of joint ventures in the coal and mining and metallurgical industries as a form of economic cooperation. I was not prepared for this turn of events. I told the American Ambassador that we are grateful for the information transmitted to us through diplomatic channels about the contacts of American agents with authorized persons of Goerdeler and General Beck in Switzerland. The Americans frankly informed us

of their plans to withdraw Germany from the war. I also mentioned that we informed the US State Department

about their secret contacts with the Finns in order to sign a peace agreement, in which the Wallenberg family played the role of mediators.

In the end, I asked Harriman what the Americans expected from the Yalta Conference. My purpose in doing so was to prepare in advance our position on the most sensitive issues that the Americans would be concerned with. For example, the future of Poland, the post-war borders in Europe or the fate of Yugoslavia, Greece and Austria. Harriman, however, was not prepared for such a conversation. I realized that he needed instructions for this, which he has not yet received. He was more interested in how long Radziwill was going to stay in Moscow. I assured him that Radziwill was free to go to London, but preferred to go directly to Poland as soon as the country was liberated from the Germans.

Harriman, unexpectedly for me, raised the question of attracting Jewish capital to restore our war-ravaged economy. In particular, he made it clear that American business circles support the idea of using Jewish capital to revive the Gomel region in Belarus, a traditional place where Jews live compactly. I tried my best to turn the conversation to personal topics. Thus, I advised

Harriman to pay attention to the behavior of his daughter, whose adventures with young people in Moscow could do her great harm: there is a lot of hooliganism in the city, which is not surprising, given the difficulties of wartime. I expressed my remarks in a soft, friendly manner and specifically emphasized that, of course, our government will try to prevent any actions that compromise both Harriman himself and his family. At the same time, I especially noted that Harriman enjoys the respect of the head of our state. These warnings were neither a threat nor an attempt at any kind of blackmail. On the contrary, our goal was to show him that there could be no question of any provocations against him. The fact that we discussed with him not only diplomatic, but also purely personal issues, moreover, of a rather scrupulous nature, showed only the degree of our confidence. But Harriman did not react to my warnings, showing much more concern about the delivery of vodka and black caviar for the participants of the upcoming conference in the Crimea.

Speaking with Radziwill, Harriman noted that Yalta should give the green light to promising business ventures in post-war Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Continuing the conversation, I said that the meaning of Radziwill's secret stay in Moscow was to rule out all sorts of rumors that Goering's friend was about to appear in Sweden or England as a courier from Hitler with peace proposals. Radziwill not only immediately translated my words, but also supported me on his part, confirming his intention to appear in Europe only after the end of the war. Since I spoke at the meeting as a high-ranking official of the government, on behalf of our leadership I presented Harriman with a gift - a tea set. As is known, my father's conversation with Harriman at the Aragvi, and then at the

Sovetskaya Hotel (at that time, Western delegations visiting Moscow usually stayed there) was recorded on tape. This recording, my father said, was very carefully listened to and analyzed in order to find any additional touches in it to create a psychological portrait of the members of the American delegation at the conference in Yalta.

These psychological nuances were more important for Stalin than intelligence data: the possibility of establishing personal contacts with the heads of Western delegations, Roosevelt and Churchill, seemed to him decisive. It is now well known that the personal relationships of the world leaders played a colossal role in the discussion and adoption of the documents at the Yalta Conference.

In November 1945, while Stalin was on holiday in the Crimea, Harriman tried unsuccessfully to meet with him to discuss plans for economic and political cooperation. He came to Molotov and convinced him that he was our friend, who for several years had invariably discussed the most sensitive issues with Soviet officials and personally with Stalin. However, this time Molotov remained indifferent and purely official. This meant that from now on Harriman is no longer of interest to our side and access to the highest echelons of power is forbidden to him. Harriman left Moscow at the end of January 1946. In the summer of 1941, Harry Hopkins, adviser to

President Roosevelt, proposed to our ambassador in Washington, Umansky, to establish

confidential relationship. This was done on the direct orders of the president. In December 1941, Stalin appointed Litvinov as ambassador to the United States instead of Umansky, and Hopkins immediately established close relations with him. So close that Litvinov often visited Hopkins at home. Litvinov told how once, when an adviser to the American president was ill, he sat by his bed and discussed current problems with him. Both Umansky and Litvinov, whom my father met in Moscow, also said they had established informal relationships with State Department and White House officials. Our residents Zarubin, and later Gorsky, who replaced him, expanded these contacts during the allied relations with America during the Second World War.

Before any official visit, the list of future negotiators was handed over to the NKVD (or NKGB) on a mandatory basis. It contained detailed information about each of the participants, including connections with us and attitudes towards our country. The materials obtained for the preparation of psychological characteristics contained information about personal qualities and a top-secret appendix about the possibility of their undercover cooperation with Soviet intelligence. One US official with whom the NKVD-NKGB had a

confidential relationship was an official member of the American delegation at the Yalta talks. The man's name was Alger Hiss, and he was a confidant of Hopkins. In conversations with Umansky and then with Litvinov, Hiss revealed Washington's plans. In addition, he was very close to some of the "sources" who collaborated with the Soviet military intelligence, and with our active agents in the United States. The Soviet intelligence services knew that the Americans were ready to come to an agreement with Moscow on the future of Europe. On the list, against Hiss's name, it was indicated that he had great sympathy for the Soviet Union and was a supporter

of post-war cooperation between the American and Soviet governments. However, nothing was said about the fact that Hiss, an employee of the US State Department, was an agent of Soviet intelligence.

Hiss became the source of information for our group in Washington in the early and mid-1930s. This group, led by the Russian-born economist Nathan Silvermaster,

included both our agents and those who were the source

confidential information, but whose activities were not recorded in any recruitment documents, since none of them signed any cooperation obligations. In the 1930s, registration and recruitment obligations in contacts with influential people in the West who sympathized with us were of no particular importance. In the 1940s, a strict procedure for documenting cooperation with Soviet intelligence was already introduced. Undercover reports translated into Russian, as a rule, we reported to Stalin or Molotov without any

comments. The only appendix to the document could be a statement that this agent or source is trustworthy or not trustworthy, or that we cannot vouch for the accuracy of the data in the special message. Hiss figured as the source of Mars, but he had no idea about this. When Hiss was accused of spying for the USSR in the late 1940s, no convincing evidence of his guilt was presented, and there could not be any. Hiss was close to people who collaborated with Soviet military

intelligence, perhaps he was the source of information transmitted to our special services, but he was never a Soviet agent in the full sense of the word. On the eve of Yalta, Hiss was prompted to contact the Soviet representatives by Hopkins and Hull, the US Secretary of State, on behalf of Roosevelt, knowing of his sympathies for the Soviet Union. It was important for the American authorities to have Hiss as an intermediate person who could episodically convey important unofficial information to the Soviet ruling circles. In the Roosevelt administration, Soviet intelligence had a very important source of information. This was Roosevelt's intelligence assistant, who was on bad terms with William Donovan and Edgar Hoover, the heads of the OSS (Office of Strategic Services) and the FBI, respectively. Apparently, Roosevelt and Hopkins, for their part, also did

not fully trust the OSS and the FBI. Roosevelt in those years created his own unofficial intelligence network,

whose services he used to carry out delicate missions. Hiss, like Hopkins and Harriman, was part of this narrow circle of confidants. Perhaps that is

why Truman, who replaced Roosevelt, did not immediately dismiss Hiss. The lenient sentence he received, the obscure charges leveled against him, and finally the neutral stance taken by the American government in the case, show that Hiss knew too much that could reflect on the reputation of both Roosevelt and Truman. It is likely that the FBI archives contain much more material on Hiss than was presented at trial, it is possible that there was a tacit agreement between Truman and Hoover to limit the charge against Hiss to only

perjury. Father

explained: "It should be borne in mind that 80 percent of intelligence information on political issues does not come from agents, but from confidential sources. Usually these sources are detected by counterintelligence, but it is always problematic to prove the fact of espionage. The line of Soviet intelligence has always been that members of the Communist Party should not be involved in our intelligence activities. If the source of information was too important for us, then such a person was ordered to leave the party in order to demonstrate his disillusionment with communism.

During the war years, Hopkins and Harriman maintained personal, informal, and diplomatic relations with the Soviet leadership, probably acting on instructions from Roosevelt himself. As for Stalin, he resorted to unofficial diplomacy only in the first period of the war, using Umansky and Litvinov. Once he had established a personal relationship with Roosevelt in Tehran, it was no longer necessary for him to keep Litvinov in America, an experienced diplomat who spoke fluent English, French and German. The appointment of Gromyko as ambassador to America in 1944 indicated that personal contact had been established between Stalin and Roosevelt. He no longer needed strong mediators such as Litvinov or Umansky. Later, Stalin parted ways with everyone who maintained unofficial contacts with Roosevelt's envoys.

Initially, the Soviet leadership seriously considered the participation of the USSR in the "Marshall Plan", referring primarily to the revival of war-ravaged industry in Ukraine, Belarus and Leningrad. The Soviet political course suddenly changed dramatically after the intelligence agencies received important information from an agent codenamed Stuart Donald McLean. As first secretary at the British embassy in

Washington, and acting head of the embassy's office, McLean had access to important secret correspondence. The report stated that the goal of the Marshall Plan was to establish American economic dominance in Europe. The new international economic organization for the restoration of European industry will be under the control of American capital. The source of this information was none other than British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin. This plan predetermined the future difference in the economic development of the countries of Eastern and Western Europe.

Vyshinsky wanted to immediately report this message to Stalin. However, before doing this, he had to make sure once again of the reliability of the agent from whom the information came, and not only in MacLean himself, but also in other agents who were part of the Cambridge group - Philby, Burges, Cairncross and Blunt. Vyshinsky feared that these people were compromised by their past connections with Orlov. Are they now playing a double game? "In 1939, after Orlov defected to the West," my

father said, "it was I who ordered the resumption of contacts with Philby and McLean. Since this telegram was kept in the MacLean file with my signature, Vyshinsky asked me exactly whether it was possible to trust such an agent as MacLean. I replied that I was responsible for the directives I had signed, but that I had information about MacLean's work only up to 1939, and since 1942 I had no information about him at all, while I added: "Every source of important information must necessarily regularly reviewed and re-evaluated, so the Cambridge Group cannot be an exception." At the end of the conversation



I reminded Vyshinsky that Stalin personally ordered that the NKVD should not look for Orlov abroad and persecute its members families.

After my reminder, Vyshinsky seemed convinced that there were no grounds for distrusting the reliability of our agent. which means that the message should be reported to Stalin. If McLean's information was, so to speak, stinky, then Vyshinsky understood that he could wash his hands of it by citing Stalin's order to leave Orlov alone. In addition, our conversation with Vyshinsky took place in the presence of Fedotov, who could be used as a witness against me if McLean's information turned out to be false. McLean's message also stated that the "Marshall Plan" provided for Germany to stop paying reparations. This immediately

alerted the Soviet leadership, since at that time reparations were, in essence, the only source of external funds for restoring the national economy destroyed by the war. In Yalta and Potsdam, the parties agreed that Germany would pay reparations in the form of equipment, industrial machines and machinery, cars, trucks and building materials regularly - for five years. These deliveries

were especially important for the chemical and engineering industries, which needed modernization. Moreover, the use of supplies in the Soviet Union was not subject to international control, which meant that we could use them for any purpose that we deem necessary. According to the Marshall Plan, the implementation of all projects of foreign economic assistance was to be under international, in fact, American control. This plan could be acceptable if it was in addition to the regular flow of reparations from Germany and Finland. The message received from McLean, however, made it clear that the British and American governments wanted, through the "Marshall

Plan", to suspend reparations to the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe and to provide international assistance based not on bilateral agreements, but on international control.

Such a situation was absolutely unacceptable, it would interfere with Soviet control over Eastern Europe. And this meant that the communist parties, already established in Romania, Bulgaria, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, would be deprived of the economic levers of power. It is significant that six months after the "Marshall Plan" was rejected in the USSR, the multi-party system in Eastern Europe was eliminated with the active participation of Moscow. On Stalin's instructions, Vyshinsky

sent a coded message to Molotov, who was in Paris, summarizing McLean's message. Based on this information, Stalin invited Molotov to oppose the implementation of the "Marshall Plan" in Eastern Europe. This plan was opposed in various ways. For example, Vyshinsky personally

negotiated with the Romanian King Mihai about his abdication in exchange for guaranteed living conditions in Mexico. The Soviet leadership awarded him the Order of Victory, the Romanian government set him a high life allowance.

My father also spoke of the unique situation in Bulgaria: "During the war, I often met Georgy Dimitrov, who headed the Comintern before it was dissolved in 1943. During the year he was the head of the International Department of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. When Dimitrov returned to Bulgaria in 1944, he allowed the tsarina and her son, heir to the throne, to leave the country, taking all family valuables with them. Knowing what a threat the monarchical circles in exile could pose, Dimitrov decided to destroy all political opposition within the country: key figures of the former parliament and the tsarist government of Bulgaria were subjected to repression and were eliminated. As a result of this action, Dimitrov became the only communist leader in Eastern Europe who did not have an organized opposition among the emigration that really claimed power. Dimitrov's successors enjoyed the fruits of this position for more than thirty years. General Ivan Vinarov, one of the leaders of intelligence in Bulgaria, who worked under me in the Fourth Directorate during the war years, later, when we

met him in the 70s in Moscow, said: we used your experience and destroyed all the dissidents before they could escape to the West. The situation in

Czechoslovakia was different, my father continued: "By the end of 1947, our resident in Prague, Boris Rybkin, created an illegal residency operating under the guise of an export-import company for the production of costume jewelry, using it as a base for possible sabotage operations in Western Europe and on Middle East. Czech costume jewelry is known all over the world, and this made it easier for Rybkin to create subsidiaries "distributors" in the most important capitals of Western Europe and the Middle East. Rybkin's tasks included using the Kurdish movement against the Shah of Iran and the rulers of Iraq, King Faisal II and Prime Minister Nuri Said. At the end of 1947, Rybkin died in a car accident in Prague, but by this time his organization had already begun to actively operate.

In 1948, on the eve of the transfer of power from Edvard Benes to Klement Gottwald, Molotov summoned me to his Kremlin office and ordered me to go to Prague and, having arranged a secret meeting with Benes, invite him to leave his post with dignity, transferring power to Gottwald, the leader of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. To remind Benes of his close unofficial ties to the Kremlin, I had to show him a receipt for ten thousand dollars, signed by his secretary in 1938, when Benes and his people needed the money to move to the UK. Otherwise, I was instructed to tell him that we would find a way to organize a leak of rumors about the circumstances of his flight from the country and the financial assistance provided to him for this, a secret agreement on cooperation between Czech and Soviet intelligence, signed in 1935 in Moscow, a secret agreement on the transfer to us Carpathian Ukraine and about the participation of Benes himself in the preparation of a political coup in 1938 and an assassination attempt on the Prime Minister of Yugoslavia. Molotov emphasized that I was not authorized to conduct any negotiations on questions of Czech policy: my task was only to convey our conditions, leaving Benes the right to decide how he would fulfill them. Molotov repeated his instructions very clearly, gazing at me through his pince-nez. I replied that I

such a delicate task is more suitable for a person who personally knows Benes and is directly connected with him through his previous work. Such a

person, and my father was well aware of this, could be Zubov. He was a resident of Soviet intelligence in Prague in the prewar years. For his obstinacy, Stalin and Molotov once put him in prison. The fact was that in 1938 he announced the failure of Benes' plan to rely on dubious people in Belgrade and, moreover, refused to give them the money that had been allocated by the Soviet government for the special operation. When the father named Zubov's last name, Molotov replied to this that he personally carried out the assignment with the involvement of the right people, and which ones it was up to him. "It was clear," my father wrote, "that he (Molotov. —

**Auth.)** did not want to take responsibility for what methods I would act with: he was only interested in the result. I had to leave Prague twelve hours after talking with Benes, without waiting for an answer."

Father, together with Zubov (since September 1946, Zubov was retired; after systematic beatings in prison, which the investigator Rhodes subjected him to, he became practically disabled: he limped quite noticeably and walked, leaning on a stick) in January 1948 arrived in Prague by train. They did not stay at the embassy, but at a modest hotel, where they introduced themselves as members of the Soviet trade mission. By this time, a special-purpose brigade was secretly transferred to Prague from Moscow - 400 people dressed in civilian clothes. This group was intended to support and protect Gottwald. "Official Soviet

representatives," my father continued, "already exerted very strong pressure on Beneš, and here we also had to make our contribution. Zubov and I spent a whole week in Prague, and during this time Zubov, who before the war met with Benes in the presence of our ambassador Alexandrovsky, managed, using all his skill and past connections, to meet Benes for fifteen minutes at his residence, located in the very center of Prague. He conveyed the meaning of our message to the president, saying that cardinal changes would take place in the country, regardless of whether

whether the current leadership is retained or not, Beneš was, in his opinion, the only one who could ensure a smooth and bloodless transfer of power. As

instructed, Zubov told Beneš that he was not expecting a response from him, but merely passing him an unofficial message. According to Zubov, Beneš seemed like a broken, sick man who would try to do everything he could to avoid an explosion of violence and unrest in Czechoslovakia.

Having completed our mission, we boarded the Prague-Moscow train. As soon as the train crossed the border, I immediately, using the communication channels of the local regional party committee, sent, as I was ordered, an encrypted code to Molotov and a copy of it to Abakumov, the then Minister of State Security: "Lev received an audience and transmitted the message" (Lev is the code name of Zubov). A month later,

Beneš peacefully ceded the reins of government to Gottwald. The residences of the Soviet foreign intelligence, as mentioned above, were bled to death by the beginning of World War II. According to Pavel Mikhailovich Fitin, head of intelligence during the war years, in the 1930s there was an atmosphere of distrust and suspicion towards many security officers, mainly senior officials not only of the central apparatus, but also of the residencies of the Foreign Department beyond the cordon. They were accused of treason and subjected to repression ... During 1938-1939, almost all residents of the INO were recalled to Moscow behind

the cordon, and many of them were repressed. Dozens of agents were left without communication, they were expressed - albeit in an indirect form - political distrust. The flow of information began to noticeably dry up, but even what was reported was perceived with distrust in the Kremlin: "disinformation", "follow the tastes of bourgeois intelligence", "play along with war provocateurs and Trotskyists". Uncertainty and anxiety reigned in the depopulated residencies, the call to Moscow was perceived as a verdict. The operatives were also disoriented by the self-confident position of Stalin and Molotov: there would be no war in the coming years, the guarantee of this was the Soviet-German non-aggression pact, which "canalized" Hitler's aggression to the We

And yet, despite the constant threat of unmotivated reprisals, the weakened, depleted intelligence continued to send objective information to the Center. Here is a small summary of intelligence reports sent to Moscow from "legal" residencies only on the situation in East Prussia:

"June 12, 1940. In Memel, Tilsit, Königsberg

and Danzig, building materials - cement and iron - are being intensively imported for the construction of fortifications on the border with the USSR. Recently, the number of ships engaged in these transportations has increased significantly. The coast is being strengthened - up to Mendel. In addition to coastal fortifications and anti-aircraft artillery posts,

a significant number of landing sites for aviation.

"August 9, 1940. German officers and soldiers in Memel study Russian, practice Russian colloquial speech, especially in the technique of interrogating prisoners of war.

"August 14, 1940. In East Prussia, there is increased military activity, the construction of auxiliary military facilities is underway, there is an intensive control of passengers heading into the depths of Germany by rail. "June 4, 1941. A two-year course for Russian language

translators has been set up at the University of Königsberg, with 100 students enrolled. At the headquarters of the district command, three-month courses were created, for which about 40 people were recruited. At the beginning of May, people under 60 years old who spoke Russian were called to military assembly points in Königsberg. Such alarm signals came from all "legal"

residencies. It did not require a special analytical gift to see behind the dry, deliberately stingy lines of messages a warning: the country is in danger, it's time to prepare for a rebuff, withdraw troops to the front lines and not lull yourself with naive hopes for the Führer's firm word of "the entire German nation" and pacts that are third the Reich has repeatedly tore and trampled on the iron heel of tank columns.

In March 1938, about 800 communists with higher education, who had experience

leadership work. After studying at the Central School of the NKVD, they were sent to the apparatus and peripheral organs. A large group was selected to work in the 5th (Foreign) Department of the NKVD of the USSR.

They had to go through the hardest trials of the war, adequately and competently represent Soviet foreign intelligence in a time of trials. In his memoirs, P. M. Fitin wrote:

"The leadership of the department first of all focused on the selection of heads of residencies abroad. During 1939–1940, old, experienced scouts were sent across the cordon: V. M. Zarubin, E. Yu. Zarubina, D. G. Fedichkin, B. A. Rybkin, Z. I. Rybkina (Voskresenskaya), V. A. Takhchianov, M. A. Allahverdov, A. M. Korotkoe, as well as young capable Chekists: G. N. Kalinin, A. K. Trenev, A. I. Leonenko, V. G. Pavlov, E. I. Kravtsov, N. M. Gorshkov and many others. When selecting candidates for intelligence work abroad, we had to face great difficulties due to the lack of experience of many comrades in conducting intelligence behind the cordon. In 1941-1942, residencies, including "legal" ones, were not numerous (from

3 to 12 operational workers). There was a shortage of personnel with a good knowledge of foreign languages. Thus, in Japan, employees did not speak Japanese; in the USA, not a single operational worker spoke Spanish, although the residency was also assigned to work in Latin America. China lacked Chinese-speaking workers. There was also no clear organization of work in areas. Literally on the eve of the war, as a result of emergency measures and emergency work, several dozens of "legal" and illegal residencies abroad were staffed,

sending more than two hundred workers to them. Intelligence, like a mysterious Phoenix bird, literally rose from the ashes, interrupted communications with agents were restored, new sources were acquired. An ever stronger trickle of political, military, scientific and technical information again flowed from the residencies. And yet, as a result of the repressions of the 30s, colossal damage was inflicted on intelligence, and only by the end of 1944, at the cost of enormous efforts, this situation was corrected. In 1940-1941, the number of cover departments was expanded. In addition to embassies and trade missions, TASS, Intourist, and VOKS offices began to be used. "Legal" residencies in

England, USA, China,

Iran, Turkey, Sweden, Afghanistan, Japan and Bulgaria (in the first five countries there were several "legal" residencies) received additional fresh personnel. The intelligence leadership understood that it was necessary to hurry, time was running out. During this

period (the situation changed somewhat towards the end of the 1940s), the residencies had a weak material and technical base: no funds were allocated for the purchase of furniture, they had to "negotiate" this with the ambassador and supply manager, not all residencies had radios, there were not enough typewriters, and they were usually borrowed from cover agencies. Of the mandatory inventory, one can also mention photographic equipment - a "watering can", a set of lenses, a photographic enlarger. As a rule, only a resident had a car, and limited funds were allocated for its maintenance. As veterans recall, in order to carry out important events, it was often necessary to "requisition" the personal vehicles of ambassadors. At least they did not fall apart at the most crucial moment of the operation in connection with the agent or separation from surveillance.

"Legal" residencies were located in the premises of the secret encryption departments of embassies or consulates (or in rooms adjoining them). The "whole team" was usually located in one room - both the resident and the operational workers. In violation of the requirements of conspiracy, the results of the conducted or the goals of the upcoming events were discussed there. Often, two or three employees worked at one table, especially on "post days". The rest waited their turn. Perhaps that is why the style of wartime reports, the style of the then residencies, is laconic, almost telegraph. It is no secret that the leadership of

the Soviet Union often saved on foreign intelligence, limiting it to strict financial limits. But "the most inexpensive intelligence in the world" worked wonders. Its "secret weapon" at all times has been people - selfless cadres, forgetting about themselves and their families, giving themselves to "irregular" service and duty irrevocably. And these famous and nameless intelligence officers did everything possible and impossible so that the Soviet government did not remain blind in the most crucial periods of the war.



The following tasks were set before intelligence from a "legal" position: to organize work to identify the military-political and other plans of fascist Germany and its allies; reveal the true plans and intentions of our allies, especially the United States and Britain, on the conduct of the war and attitude towards the USSR; to conduct reconnaissance in neutral countries in order to prevent them from going over to the side of the "axis" countries, to paralyze the activities of Hitler's agents in them and to organize reconnaissance from their territories against Germany and its allies; to carry out scientific and technical intelligence in the developed capitalist countries in order to strengthen the military and economic potential of the USSR.

Each legal residency received its specific task. Veteran intelligence officer A. S. Feklisov wrote in his memoirs "Across the Ocean and on the Island" that Stalin, receiving V. M. Zarubin before leaving for the USA, determined the following tasks for the residency: a separate peace and all together did not go against the Soviet Union; obtain information about Hitler's military plans in the war against the USSR, which the allies had; find out the secret goals and plans of the allies in reality to open a second front in Europe.

In 1941, when our intelligence work in many countries was just getting on the rails of wartime, the main burden of obtaining information was borne by the "legal" residency in England. It consisted of only four operational workers (by 1944 there were 12 of them), the already mentioned D. V. Gorsky was appointed as a resident. The residency provided the Kremlin with access to secret documents from the British military cabinet, to Churchill's correspondence with Roosevelt and other heads of government, Foreign Minister Eden with ambassadors, and information reports from British intelligence. Among the agents was the famous Cambridge Five. Very valuable sources were available in émigré circles in London. They kept our intelligence abreast of the negotiations between Churchill and Eden with the Polish government in exile, with the Yugoslav King Peter and Premier Šubašić, and the Czechoslovak President Beneš. It is estimated that the London residency in the initial period of the war produced approximately 8,000 documents on political matters, 127 on economic matters, 715 on

military, 51 - on the activities of the intelligence agencies of England and other states. The working conditions in

London were truly front-line: Goering's squadrons (and then the FAA rockets) ruthlessly attacked the English capital, and very often the operative, coming to the turnout for the next batch of documentary materials, found there only smoking ruins, firefighters and sanitary vehicles, reinforced police cordon...

And yet, despite the value of the intelligence materials obtained in London and other residencies, they did not fully satisfy the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. Foreign intelligence was required to take a broader approach to covering events, their background and future developments. Probably, it was precisely this dissatisfaction that was reflected in the letters of the Center sent to the "legal" residencies in 1941-1943. What prevailed, writes one of the researchers, was "a pronounced critical approach in evaluating their work." My father recalled that, in order to achieve efficiency in intelligence work, by the complacency of some intelligence officers, it was necessary to support them with friendly advice, to encourage them for their undoubted performance in their work. And this was often not enough. There was no time for sentimentality ...

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struggling

With

Of great importance for intelligence were the measures of the country's leadership (GKO USSR) to improve the work of the intelligence agencies of the Soviet Union abroad, carried out in 1943. The decree of the GKO dated June 5, 1943 noted that in the activities of the intelligence agencies there is a duplication of efforts on some issues, a dispersion of forces and means for solving secondary tasks. The resolution clearly delimited the functions of the GRU of the Red Army, the Intelligence (First) Directorate of the NKGB of the USSR and the Republican People's Commissariat of the Navy of the USSR.

The NKGB RU was entrusted with conducting political intelligence in order to obtain information about the foreign and domestic policies of foreign states, their political and economic situation, political parties, groups and public and political figures, achievements and innovations in the field of science and technology, data on emigration, etc. .

The main focus of intelligence was still to be focused on work against Germany, Japan, Italy and the countries they occupied. "Legal" residencies, along with intelligence work at their place of residence, were supposed to conduct intelligence against one or more belligerent countries. At the same time, the task was set to strengthen intelligence work in England, the USA and Turkey. For reconnaissance from "legal" positions, it was planned to use Soviet organizations abroad even more widely than before, to more actively send career intelligence officers as part of various delegations, procurement commissions and as representatives in international organizations.

"Legal" spies were advised to join various foreign clubs and societies in order to establish contacts and not focus only on acquiring sources from left-wing progressive circles. It should be noted that valuable agents were recruited mainly on an ideological and political basis, the main condition for which was the anti-fascist attitude of the candidate. Recruitment developments were carried out in an accelerated mode, in the form of a direct offer. An acute shortage of time for an operative sometimes led to simplification, the rejection of leisurely classical forms of work. During the war, our "legal" residencies achieved the greatest success in the

allied countries, which is explained by the benevolent, as a rule, attitude towards Soviet workers (especially before the Stalingrad turning point in the war). It is known, however, that many so-called neutral countries, such as Switzerland, Turkey, Iran, provided significant assistance to fascist Germany by supplying strategic raw materials and food. They were confident in the victory of the Nazis, although they did not dare to enter the war on the side of the Third Reich. Intelligence made a significant contribution to solving the problem of preventing these states from entering the war on the side of

Germany. Intelligence timely obtained valuable information about the plans and intentions of the ruling circles in neutral states, which allowed the Soviet government to adjust its policy towards them, and to a certain extent resist German diplomacy in these countries.

One of these residencies was Stockholm. The famous intelligence officer Zoya Rybkina (Voskresenskaya), the author of an interesting book of memoirs, wrote: "Soviet intelligence in Sweden had as its main task to collect information about the political and economic situation of Germany and its military plans. To this end, our intelligence has created several strongholds of reconnaissance groups. Anton's group operated in the ports of Norway. In the north of Sweden, in the border zone with Finland, our intelligence group registered the transfer of German military equipment and military units to Finland. In the southern ports of Sweden, another intelligence group observed mutual German

Swedish supplies.

The materials that were obtained by our "legal" residency in Sweden were repeatedly reported to the Soviet leadership. The documents irrefutably testified that the ruling circles of Sweden were pursuing an openly pro-German policy, passing German troops through their territory to Finland, providing assistance to the Wehrmacht with vehicles, supplying Germany with military-strategic raw materials, especially iron ore and steel, which then "fought" with the Soviet Union.

Zoya Ivanovna wrote little about the difficulties that our foreign intelligence had to face in Sweden. And they, as my father claimed, were considerable: the tenacious Swedish special agencies annoyed, the Allies "curiously" tried to find out what Soviet intelligence was doing in Scandinavia. Of particular danger were the Abwehr and the SD, whose agents were ubiquitous and felt at home in Stockholm (this was reported with exhaustive frankness in a weighty volume of his memoirs by Schellenberg). In none of the neutral countries did our intelligence officers work in comfortable conditions, therefore, as my father argued, even now, after a distance of more than

half a century separating us from those events, it is impossible to talk about the successes and failures of our "legal" residencies in passing, without a serious and comprehensive analysis of the intelligence and operational situation around the residencies of operatives, without taking into account the difficulties of that time. Probably should not be taken today as the ultimate truth and

assessments of the Center, bearing in mind that they were also made in order to "give a pitch", "spur",

"stimulate". When in our special monographs it is mentioned that our "legal" residency in Bulgaria did not work "at full strength", it is somehow forgotten that in Sofia for almost the entire war (Bulgaria did not fight against the USSR) there was only one operative worker, on which the Bulgarian police brought down all their attention. In June 1943, an experienced intelligence officer D. G. Fedichkin arrived to replace Boris, who managed to do more, but we should not forget: it was already a victorious year for us in 1943.

Dramatic events unfolded around the activities of "legal" residencies in Turkey (in Istanbul and Ankara). The center was dissatisfied with the quality of intelligence work, the level of intelligence and operational activities. The Center received political information on Turkey mainly from London. Moscow's discontent was reflected in the disbandment of the residency in Ankara. Were the tasks feasible? For example, to achieve the disruption of the German-Turkish alliance. Or set up illegal residencies in Romania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Greece, recruiting suitable agents in Turkey. The situation in Turkey, with its openly pro-German leadership and draconian police regime, was radically different from conditions in Afghanistan and even Iran, and this was often forgotten in Moscow.

The passionate desire of "legal" spies to get information quickly, promptly, quickly make it known to the Center often affected the observance of the norms of secrecy and security. Such violations were revealed, for example, in the New York residency. American counterintelligence managed to introduce eavesdropping equipment into almost all Soviet institutions in the United States, including the premises of the New York residency. The FBI, with the help of "hearers", revealed the names of some agents, the nature of the type of operations, the content of certain instructions of the Center. Despite allied relations, the activities of Soviet missions were closely monitored in the United States. According to the memoirs of A. S. Feklisov, by the middle of 1943, the FBI basically defeated the residencies of Germany and Italy, interned the Japanese and transferred most of their

forces and means to fight against Soviet intelligence. Almost all residents of the residency began to notice that they were being followed.

In 1943-1945, new "legal" NKGB residencies were created in Egypt, Italy, France, Finland, Romania and Hungary. After exhausting journeys along the most incredible routes, our first "legal" residents reached their destinations in Latin America: Song - to Havana, Rene - to Montevideo, Yuri - to Mexico City. Despite the difficulties and the scarcity of the currency of the war years, foreign intelligence was gaining more and more power and operational scope, and a global plan was already visible in its activities.

A complex set of problems for opening a second front in Europe, obtaining documentation on atomic weapons, the plans of the leading powers of the world for post-war reconstruction - all this was covered in full, and sometimes with an abundance of materials, by Soviet intelligence in 1943-1945. The incredible efforts of the intelligence apparatus brought its fruits...

It is a pity that we still know little about the intelligence officers who carried out decisive blows and "breakthroughs" on the fronts of the "secret war". Researchers and people who are interested in this heroic period in the life of foreign intelligence have no more than three or four dozen names of employees of "legal" residencies in circulation.

The Fourth Directorate, which was directed by my father, made a generally recognized contribution to our victory. Among the twenty-eight Chekists who were awarded the country's highest award - the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, twenty-three were officers and employees of his department. In December 1945, my father was given the rare honor of making an official report at the annual meeting of the NKVD-NKGB staff, dedicated to the next anniversary of the formation of the Cheka. Soon he was elected a member of the party committee of the Ministry of State Security (MGB): in the spring of 1946, the People's Commissariat for State Security (NKGB) became known as a ministry. Back in July 1945, immediately after the end of the war, on the eve of the Potsdam Conference, Stalin signed a government decree on the introduction of

military ranks of state security and internal affairs similar to the Red Army (senior major - colonel; commissar of state security - major general; commissar of state security of the 3rd rank - lieutenant general, 2nd rank - colonel general, 1st rank - army general ; general commissar - marshal). Beria received the rank of marshal in July 1945. Pavel Mikhailovich Fitin and my father were given the rank of lieutenant general by the same government decree, and Naum Eitingon was given the rank of major general. So for the first time the name of my father was mentioned on the pages of our press among the leading workers of the NKVD, who were awarded the rank of general.

In 1947, the Cold War had already taken on a violent character, which led, as we said at the beginning of the chapter, to an important reorganization of the structures of the intelligence agencies. The war showed that the political and military intelligence services were not always capable of evaluating and analyzing all the information they received through their channels. And then V. M. Molotov, who, before the Yalta Conference, several times chaired meetings of the heads of intelligence services, proposed to unite them into one centralized organization. Stalin agreed to this proposal - this is how the Committee of Information was born. In the NKVD itself, it was decided to maintain an intelligence structure in case of war or local military conflicts in the Middle East, Europe, the Balkans or the Far East. A similar special unit was retained in the Ministry of Defense.

In connection with this fact, my father recalled the following: "Looking back at the past, I see that the quite sensible idea of creating a single analytical center for processing intelligence information was not implemented in practice as it should. Operational management of reconnaissance operations should not have been transferred to the wrong hands. As for the new Information Committee, its tasks should have been limited to the analysis of intelligence materials.

The effectiveness and thoughtfulness of foreign intelligence operations of the security agencies and the General Staff of the Armed Forces depended to a large extent on the interaction of these services. The intelligence service of the MGB cooperated with counterintelligence, and the GRU was in contact with the relevant departments of the Directorates of the General Staff. Neither the GRU nor

intelligence of the MGB, distinguished by high professionalism in carrying out tasks of a military or political nature, did not themselves determine the priorities and goals of their activities regarding the penetration of our special services and the introduction of our agents to enemy targets. Under the new system, any requests for assistance from the high military command or the Ministry of State Security first went to Stalin, and then to Molotov as the head of the Information Committee, and this naturally increased the flow of bureaucratic paperwork and inevitable approvals, making the decision-making process more difficult. The former Intelligence

Directorate of the NKVD-NKGB, which was the main tool for ensuring the interests of state security abroad, has essentially turned into an appendage of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, whose main activity is diplomacy, not intelligence. Like the Information Committee, the ministry was under the control of Molotov. As a result, such operations, which were previously successfully carried out by the NKVD-NKGB, such as infiltrating emigre organizations, infiltrating our agents into British and American intelligence services, and cooperating with counterintelligence agencies in suppressing nationalist movements in the Baltic states and Western Ukraine, began to noticeably lose their significance. The Information Committee was established at the same time as the formation of the CIA in the United States. It was an attempt—deeply wrong!—respond in a similar way to the ongoing changes in America.” Already after the collapse of the Soviet Union,

my father repeatedly emphasized that the effective functioning of the special services depended on their close cooperation with the security agencies. Without a solid operational independent base for the work of, say, the tax police, the customs service, etc. (in the West, all these services have serious levers of control over important areas of society), you will not achieve anything worthwhile. It is clear that in Russia these services are just being born, their actions are often unprofessional and therefore, as they say, not always in the law.

My father was convinced that the body for the analysis and evaluation of intelligence should act independently, directly serve the leadership of the country, and not be subordinate to bureaucrats and certain influential politicians or heads of special services. To such



the conclusion was not reached immediately, but gradually, by 1951, more precisely, by 1952, when Stalin ordered that all operational intelligence work be again concentrated in the Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense and the new First Main Directorate (foreign intelligence) of the Ministry of State Security. The

Information Committee began to play the role of only an analytical center for processing military and political intelligence materials.

It was there, his father recalled, that Burgess and McLean began to work when they managed to hide in the Soviet Union. Apparently, for this reason, in the 1960s, Khrushchev created the Department of International Information under the Central Committee of the CPSU to analyze and process materials on foreign economic and foreign policy issues. After the well-known events of August 1991, the so-called "velvet" bourgeois-democratic revolution, or rather, the coup, Gorbachev and Yeltsin made the same, to put it mildly, mistake: instead of developing a mechanism for social democratic and parliamentary control over the activities of the special services, they united political and operational work and created the Foreign Intelligence Service, which, in its foreign activities, cannot but rely on counterintelligence materials. The lack of effective coordination of actions with internal security agencies, tax police and customs remains a weak point in its work. The Committee of Information mentioned above was headed first by Molotov, then for three

months by Vyshinsky, and after him by Zorin, later our representative in the United Nations. "I," my father recalled, "had a chance to attend several meetings under Vyshinsky: until the last day of his tenure as

chairman of the committee, he managed not to personally sign a single document of any importance, shifting all responsibility to his deputies. At the same time, he invariably repeated: "In such a serious matter, I am completely incompetent."

According to him, he twice spoke to Comrade Stalin about his incompetence in matters of intelligence activities. Every time he visited Stalin, Vyshinsky took his deputy with him. He quite frankly wanted someone else to share with him.

responsibility for decisions: this gave him the opportunity, in case of failure, to shift the blame to another. By the way, Vyshinsky was much more competent than he tried to imagine. Somehow, in an informal setting, he admitted that intelligence, as a rule, is associated with troubles, and not with success in work. He was right: in our business it is really impossible to rely only on success - the risk is always quite high. In the end, he convinced Stalin that he should be freed from this burden of worries. Vyshinsky's request was granted by appointing Zorin to the post of chairman of the Information Committee. Even before these changes, in June 1946, unexpectedly for many employees, Merkulov was dismissed from the post of

Minister of State Security. Conversations around this event were different. They hinted, though vaguely, that the secret services, they say, failed to cope with their duties, having made mistakes in holding the traditional May Day demonstration. It was about the traffic jams that arose during the celebration of May Day on the streets of the capital. Soon, my father recalled, it became clear to everyone that this was just a pretext to remove Merkulov. After the end of the war, the problem of reorganizing the Armed Forces came to the fore. Following this, Stalin suggested that the Politburo review the activities of the state security agencies

and set new tasks for them.

"Later," my father writes in his memoirs, "Mamulov and Lyudvigov told me that Merkulov was required to submit a plan for the reorganization of the Ministry of State Security to the Politburo. At the meeting, Beria, according to them (both of them, as I mentioned, headed the secretariat of Beria), attacked Merkulov for failing to determine the direction in the work of counterintelligence in the post-war period. Stalin joined him, accusing Merkulov of complete

incompetence.

At the meeting, where Merkulov's deputies were present, they were supposed to discuss the new tasks of the Ministry of State Security. Military counterintelligence (SMERSH), which during the war years was under the jurisdiction of the People's Commissariat of Defense, headed by Abakumov and controlled by Stalin, returned to the Ministry of State Security again, since Stalin stopped

head of the People's Commissariat of Defense. Bulganin, a purely civilian man who had no military education, was appointed Minister of Defense - he was urgently promoted to marshal, after which this followed.

appointment.

Then, at the meeting, an interesting scene occurred. Stalin asked why the head of military counterintelligence could not simultaneously be deputy minister of state security. Merkulov immediately agreed with him that Abakumov be appointed First Deputy Minister. At the same time, Stalin sarcastically remarked that Merkulov behaved like a double-dealer in the Politburo and it would be advisable to replace him as Minister of State Security. It looks like Merkulov made a mistake by agreeing so easily with Stalin's proposal, but in fact Stalin was just looking for a suitable excuse to remove him. Stalin already had a candidate ready for the post of minister. It was Ogoltsov. He was a decent man, but a provincial who had never worked in the Center. It

is always difficult for such people to start work in large departments. He was in Moscow for only six months, he was transferred from the Krasnoyarsk State Security Department. Father recalled that Ogoltsov begged Stalin not to appoint him to this position. "As an honest communist," he declared at a meeting of the Politburo, "I am completely unsuitable for such a high post, because

I lack the necessary knowledge and experience for such responsible work." Then Stalin immediately proposed to appoint Abakumov as minister. Beria and Molotov remained silent, but Politburo member Zhdanov warmly supported the idea. "A week later," my father writes in his memoirs, "Eitingon and I were summoned to Abakumov. "Almost two years ago," he began, "I made the decision never to work with you. But Comrade Stalin, when I offered to release you from your duties, said that you should continue to work in your former position. So, -

the new minister concluded, - let's work together. At first, Eitingon and I felt relieved—his sincerity won us over. However,

subsequent events showed that we should not indulge in too much complacency. A few days later we were summoned to a meeting of a special commission of the Central Committee of the CPSU,

which was chaired by the new curator of the security agencies, Secretary of the Central Committee A. A.

Kuznetsov. The commission considered "criminal mistakes" and cases of negligence committed by the former leadership of the Ministry of State Security. This was a common practice: whenever there was a change of leadership in the ministries (defence, security or foreign affairs), the Central Committee appointed a commission to review the activities of the old leadership and transfer cases.

Among the issues that the Kuznetsov commission studied was the following: Merkulov's suspension of the criminal prosecution of Trotsky's supporters in 1941-1945. Unexpectedly, suspicious connections between me and Eitingon surfaced with well-known "enemies of the people" - the heads of intelligence of the OGPU-NKVD in the 30s. Abakumov directly accused me and Eitingon of "criminal fraud": we rescued our "buddies" from prison in 1941 and helped them avoid the punishment they deserved. What was said outraged me to the core: it was about slandering the heroes of the war, people devoted to our cause. Furious, I cut him off abruptly. - I will not allow boots to trample on the memory of the heroes who died in their homeland in the

fight against fascism. In the presence of a representative of the Central Committee, I will prove that the cases of these Chekists were fabricated as a result of Yezhov's criminal activities, "said

I'm in a frenzy.

Kuznetsov (he knew me personally - we met at the neighboring dacha, at the widow of Yemelyan Yaroslavsky), intervening hastily to say that the matter was closed. The discussion ended there and I left.

Returning to my office, I immediately summoned Serebryansky, Zubov, Prokopyuk, Medvedev and other employees who were arrested and dismissed in the 1930s to the office and suggested that they immediately resign. The position of Zubov and Serebryansky, whose affairs were conducted by Abakumov at one time, was especially vulnerable. In July

1946, for the first time in eight years, my father took a vacation and our whole family went near Riga, to the Baltic resort of Majori. At first we lived in a military sanatorium, but the famous Latvian writer Vilis Latsis, who at one time was the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of Latvia and then the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, invited us to his residence.

When we returned to Moscow, the head of the secretariat of the Ministry of State Security, Chernov, informed my father that the Fourth Directorate, which was headed by my father, was disbanded.

"Since our unit no longer existed," my father recalls, "I was instructed by the minister to submit to him my proposals for the use of personnel. In fact, I had no room for maneuver: on the one hand, Molotov, who intended to create an Information Committee, and on the other, Abakumov, the Minister of State Security.

I was still head of the Intelligence Bureau of the Government's Special Committee on the Atomic Problem. I learned from Ogoltsov: Abakumov was annoyed that I still hold this post and have direct access to the Kremlin. He could do nothing about it, since the atomic problem was not his area of expertise.

The new Information Committee was supposed to combine military and political intelligence, which could not but affect the work of the Special Intelligence Bureau on the Atomic Problem, which coordinated the activities of the GRU and the MGB to collect intelligence related to nuclear weapons. What should this unit be doing now? At the end of 1946, this question was on edge, and I still could not manage to talk to Beria, who was the deputy head of the government and a member of the Politburo. In the end, I called him and asked what the status should be and to whom the intelligence bureau of the Government's Special Committee on Problem One in connection with the organization of the Information Committee should report.

His answer, I will not hide, puzzled me. "You have your own minister to deal with such issues," he said sharply and hung up. I understood that if I still have Minister Abakumov, he would never support me. That is why I immediately proposed that the functions of the 2nd Intelligence Bureau be transferred to the Committee of Information. Given the importance of the atomic problem, these issues were to be dealt with by an independent department of scientific and technical intelligence. I recommended that Vasilevsky be appointed to the post of head of the scientific and technical intelligence department. Fedotov, who first replaced Fitin as head of intelligence at the MGB, and then became

Molotov's deputy in the Information Committee, agreed, but Vasilevsky worked for only a few months ... "I know that Vasilevsky was

removed from the Information Committee during the persecution of Jews holding high official positions, although he was allowed to retire in 1948 with the rank of colonel after long service years. My father's official position was determined only

in the autumn of 1946, when by the decision of the Central Committee and the government, a special intelligence and sabotage service was created under the Minister of State Security of the USSR (since 1950 it was called the Bureau of the MGB No. 1 for sabotage work abroad), and he was appointed head, and Eitingon - deputy. Their task was to organize an independent service, which in the event of war would be transformed in the shortest possible time into a body directing combat work. Father retained his position as head of an independent unit in the system of the Ministry of State Security. Abakumov showed enough tact not to deprive him of the privileges that he received during the war years: his father was kept the state dacha, he continued to be included in the list of persons who received a monthly monetary remuneration in excess of their official salary, and also had the right to special services and meals in the Kremlin canteen . My father's position had changed in only one respect: he was no longer invited to the regular meetings of department heads chaired by the minister, as was the case during the war years. It is interesting that the board in the MGB under Stalin was never created. Father practically did not communicate with Abakumov. But on one of the usual working days, as his father said, he "suddenly heard on the phone the demanding and confident, as usual, voice of Abakumov:

"I have heard rumors that your sons are planning  
assassination attempt on Comrade

Stalin. - What do you have

in mind? "What I said," Abakumov replied.

- Do you know how old they are? I asked. "What  
difference does it make?" the Minister replied.

— Comrade Minister, I don't know who reported this to you, but such accusations are simply unbelievable. After all, my youngest son is five years old, and the eldest is eight.

Abakumov hung up. And during the year I did not hear a single word from him on topics that did not concern work. He never met with me even though I was under his direct supervision. All issues were resolved only by phone. In late 1946 -

early 1947, a serious reorganization of the intelligence department continued: in July 1946, as mentioned above, the Fourth Directorate was liquidated; in late 1946 - early 1947, the Intelligence Directorate of the MGB was transferred to the Information Committee, created only in March 1947 - for six months there was a "section of the intelligence apparatus." Fischer, who had worked in the Fourth Directorate under my father throughout the war and was in charge of the radio intelligence service, was transferred to the Information Committee. With the help of Ogoltsov, Abakumov's first deputy, Sudoplatov managed to convince Fedotov, Molotov's deputy, that his service needed its own radio center. The decision that the committee and the bureau should use the services of the same radio center did not please the father. In the committee, Korotkov was

appointed head of the department for working with illegal immigrants - it was he who developed a plan to use Fischer (later to become famous under the pseudonym Rudolf Abel) as the head of a network of illegal immigrants in the United States and Western Europe. Korotkov's plan had to first get my approval, since one of his main tasks was to penetrate military bases and installations in Bergen (Norway), Le Havre and Cherbourg (France). My father said he was categorically against it, because he thought it would be more useful if Fischer, working abroad, improved our radio communication system, instead of taking unnecessary risks managing a network of illegal immigrants. Illegal radio operators and illegal agents must either be husband and wife, or work separately from each other, communicating with the help of a liaison, in order to minimize the risk of being captured together and thereby ruin the entire network. It was the non-compliance with this rule that led to tragic losses in the Red Chapel during the war years. Short, in essence, insisted

that Fischer combined the management of the agent network and control over the radio operators.

The decision to send Fischer abroad was made only at the end of 1947. Father suggested to Fedotov that he be sent to Western Europe and North America in order to check on the spot what our intelligence network had in France, Norway, the United States and Canada. Fisher was supposed to provide access to military installations, warehouses and ammunition depots:

“We desperately needed to know how quickly the Americans could send reinforcements to Europe if the Cold War turned into a hot one.”

Eitingon, in turn,

suggested that Fischer obtain US citizenship and establish his own radio communication system with Moscow and personally maintain it. According to legend, he had to lead a free lifestyle and not make himself dependent on a radio operator. He himself was a very highly qualified radio operator. His father recalled that he agreed with Eitingon, emphasizing that Fischer should never rely on old sources of information:

“He must establish new confidential contacts, and then check the people we used in the 30s and 40s: in each individual case, he himself will decide whether to get in touch with them or not, that is, we will not become them. report the appearance of their new curator in the West. The priority in the United States was the West Coast for us - it was there, on Long Beach, that military installations were located. Fischer was instructed to report to us about American military deliveries to the Chinese Nationalists, who at that time were still fighting fierce battles with the Chinese People's Liberation Army. Fisher managed to create a new intelligence network that

united agents in California and illegal immigrants hiding under the guise of Czechoslovak emigrants in Brazil, Mexico and Argentina. His people reported on the movement of military equipment and ammunition, which were sent from American ports on the Pacific coast to ports in the Far East. Illegals quite often came from Latin America to the United States on business related to their business, which was an excellent cover for them. All of them, according to the father, were real experts in



conducting sabotage operations, who gained extensive experience during the partisan war against the Germans. This Latin American group included Grinchenko, Filonenko, and Trotsky's former secretary Maria de Las Heras (code name Patria). Having received an appropriate order from the Center, they could also attract California agents for sabotage operations.

Colonel Filonenko and his wife, an intelligence major, lived with their three children in Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay, posing as Czech businessmen who had fled Shanghai from the Chinese Communists. If necessary, the Filonenkos could use the Chinese living in California to smuggle explosives onto American ships carrying military supplies to the Far East. To minimize the risk, Filonenko preferred regular visits to the United States over permanent residence there. Fortunately, the order to carry out sabotage on American ships never came.

Fischer's other spy network was made up of German immigrants on the East Coast of the United States. In particular, Kurt Wiesel, a former assistant to Ernst Wollweber, a specialist in sabotage in pre-war Europe. In America, he managed to advance his career and take the position of chief engineer of a shipbuilding company that gave access to classified information. He had extensive connections in the German colony there. With the help of dockers and service personnel who needed additional funds, Wiesel created a reliable group to carry out acts of sabotage. In 1949–1950, he had several safe houses located in close proximity to the port facilities. Father later noted in his memoirs: “In the late 1940s, some people had a considerable temptation to supply Wiesel and Filonenko with explosive devices, but I

categorically objected to this proposal, believing that there was no need to expose our people to unjustified risk. When the crisis in the Korean War reached its climax in the autumn of 1950, our specialists came from Latin America to the United States, who could assemble explosive devices on the spot. They spent two months in the United States, but in practice they used their abilities in such a way

and it didn't happen, because the order from the Center did not follow, and our officers returned safely to Argentina, and from there through Vienna to

Moscow ... "During his stay in Moscow, Fischer, who came on vacation, either Abakumov, or Molotov raised the question of searching for Orlov. The father resolutely objected, recalling that the Central Committee of the party forbade him to be persecuted. In addition, Orlov was a highly professional intelligence officer. He will immediately notice surveillance or any attempts by our agents to find approaches to his relatives. In a word, everything here was not as simple as it seemed to some. The idea of using Fischer to search for Orlov was submitted by Korotkoe (codename Long) - at one time it was assumed that he would be Orlov's assistant in managing the intelligence network in France, and he was aware of plans to use Fischer as a radio operator with Orlov, which were never

implemented in the 30s. Later, it was Korotkoe who was responsible for Fischer's failure. In 1955, he sent an agent, Reino Heihanen, a Finn by origin, to Fischer as an assistant. He liked to drink and, having wasted operational funds, violated the rules of conspiracy, and when they decided to recall him to Moscow, he remained in America and betrayed Fischer

(Rudolf Abel). Since the plans for sabotage in the United States during the Korean War were never carried out, Fisher was transferred to the Bureau of Illegal Intelligence of the Committee of Information, although his father still had certain interests in him.

"In 1951 or 1952," says my father, "the new Minister of State Security, Ignatiev, ordered that my bureau, together with the GRU, prepare a plan for sabotage operations on American military installations and bases in case of war or a possible limited military conflict near our borders. We identified one hundred targets, breaking them down into three categories: military bases hosting strategic air forces with nuclear weapons; military installations with depots of ammunition and military equipment intended to supply the American army in Europe and the Far East; and, finally, oil pipelines and fuel storage facilities to support American and NATO forces stationed in Europe.

military units, as well as their troops located in the Middle and Far East near our borders. By the early 1950s we had agents

at our disposal who could infiltrate military bases and installations in Norway, France, Austria, Germany, the United States and Canada. The plan was to establish constant surveillance and control of NATO strategic installations, recording any of their activity. Fisher, our chief illegal resident in the United States, was to establish permanent, reliable radio contact with our combat teams that we held in reserve in Latin America. If necessary, all these people were ready to cross the Mexican border to the United States under the guise of seasonal workers. In Europe, meanwhile, Prince Gagarin, our longtime agent, who posed as an anti-Soviet emigrant and served in Vlasov's army during the Second World War, moved from Germany to France. His task was to create a base for sabotage operations in seaports

and military airfields, as well as a group of militants who, in the event of war or increased tension along our borders, would be able to disable the communication system and communications of NATO headquarters, located in Fontainebleau is a suburb of Paris. In Moscow, I was given a group of specialists in oil, oil refining and fuel storage, with whom we discussed the technical characteristics and location of the main oil pipelines in Western Europe. Then we gave our officers the task of recruiting agents serving the saboteurs of the personnel of oil refineries and oil pipeline facilities.

from numbers

In 1952, I received a message that Fischer had received US citizenship and thus gained a reliable "roof". Now he could engage, quite officially, in one of his professions, which he indicated - an artist or a free artist. He managed to equip three radio apartments: between New York and Norfolk, near the Great Lakes and on the West Coast. This is the last thing I heard about him before my arrest and until the moment when he was exchanged for the American military pilot Powers, who was serving his sentence in the Vladimir prison, where I was at that time.

Ignatiev, who replaced Abakumov as Minister of State Security, and Minister of Defense Marshal Vasilevsky in 1952 approved a plan of action directed against American and NATO strategic military bases in the event of war or local conflicts that got out of control. The plan provided that the first action in the event of a military conflict in Europe should be the destruction of the communications of the NATO headquarters. This plan was signed by my father and the then chief of the GRU, General Zakharov. However, the proposal to expand the base of operations of agents

in Paris quite unexpectedly ran into serious difficulties. Here is how my father writes about this: "Khokhlov (code name Svistun), one of our veteran agents, who actively worked during the war years, suddenly turned out to be "illuminated" by the enemy's counterintelligence, later he fled to the West. Khokhlov was a professional actor, had a pleasant appearance (blond with blue eyes) and also spoke fluent German, which made him a very valuable intelligence agent for Maklyarsky and Ilyin. Before the war, Khokhlov basically "worked" among the Moscow intelligentsia. We planned to use him as a liaison for the intelligence network that was being created in Moscow in case the Germans occupied it. Later, in Minsk, he acted as a German officer on leave. He managed to make acquaintance with the female servants in the house of the German Gauleiter of Belarus. In 1943, a mine with a clockwork was planted under the mattress in the master's bedroom, and Gauleiter Kube died during the explosion. I took Khokhlov with me to Romania, so that after living there for some time he would adapt to life in the West. Returning to Moscow, Khokhlov was in the

reserve of the MGB in a group of secret agents who were planned to be used for "deep penetration" into the West. For everyone, he led the life of an ordinary Soviet student, actually receiving a salary in my bureau, where he worked in the secret staff as a junior intelligence officer. His studies at the institute were interrupted by the war, and without entrance exams I got him a job at the philological faculty of Moscow State University. True, I could not help him get a good apartment, and, having married, he continued to live in his old place, where it became especially crowded after he was born

son. Since 1950, Khokhlov began to travel regularly to the West. We provided him with forged documents in the name of Hofbauer. In my bureau, Khokhlova was supervised by Tamara Ivanova, head of the department for the training of illegal immigrants. She successfully worked in Hungary and Austria, in 1945 she participated in the recruitment of Germans in the Berezino operation, but in 1948 she was withdrawn in accordance with the directive to stop work and return all illegal immigrants

from the socialist countries of Eastern Europe. Khokhlov traveled several times to Germany, Austria and Switzerland. I wanted him to use his appearance as well as his artistry to get to know a ballerina of Georgian origin who danced at the Paris Opera, who was often seen in company with American officers and staff at NATO headquarters. His good manners and gregariousness helped him set up an intelligence gathering team and, more importantly, organize a combat reserve for emergencies.

Khokhlov himself knew nothing about these plans. To my regret and indignation, he made an unforgivable mistake, which he himself did not take seriously at first. In my eyes, however, this ended his entire illegal career.

And here was the thing. Khokhlov tried to smuggle an accordion bought in Switzerland to Austria. The customs officers detained him, carefully checked his documents and took away his passport for several hours. As soon as Khokhlov reported what had happened to the Center, it became clear to me: the legend of Herr Hofbauer was over."

The oversight made by Khokhlov and expressed in a seemingly insignificant incident on the border, in fact, was serious for a professional intelligence officer. Khokhlov, one must understand, attracted the attention of the authorities and probably got on the list of suspicious persons. From now on, Western intelligence services, even with a routine check, would no longer leave him alone. "It

is clear," continued the father, "that he was no longer fit for the preparation of military operations according to this legend. Khokhlov himself asked to be released from his duties, and I granted his request. His personal file should contain a report signed by me on his expulsion from the bureau.

His further fate was unhappy. He was sent as an operative and translator to the Soviet mission in Germany, and in 1954, after his father was arrested, Khokhlov was assigned to lead a group of militants to eliminate Okolovich, the head of the Russian nationalist organization NTS, which actively collaborated with the Germans during the war years. But Khokhlov "failed." He was detained by the Americans, after which he was recruited by the CIA. He had no way back. He soon became a "celebrity": the Americans used him as a "star" in an anti-Soviet propaganda show. He was forced to play the role imposed on him. In the press, he was presented as an ardent supporter of the West, which is why he decided to open up to Okolovich and told the Americans about the impending assassination. The scandal erupted at a press conference in Frankfurt

hosted by the CIA, where Khokhlov publicly made revelations. Everyone was especially struck by the statement that his wife begged him not to carry out the task he had received. She was immediately arrested in Moscow, and she spent a year in prison with her son, after which she was exiled to Siberia for five years. Khokhlov described her as an anti-Soviet woman, who, they say, inspired him to escape. He also said that she was a deeply religious person. All this was not true. In 1957, he claimed that the KGB attempted to poison him by adding radioactive thallium to a cocktail, from which Khokhlov was saved by CIA doctors. In May 1992, Khokhlov briefly appeared in Moscow after Yeltsin signed a decree pardoning him,

but soon left for the United States again. Lord Batel of the European Parliament asked to speak with my father about the Khokhlov case, and after the permission of the prosecutor's office, which reopened the investigation into Khokhlov's escape to the West, this conversation took place. His article appeared in the Daily Telegraph newspaper and in the Novoye Vremya magazine, but it lacks a number of very important details that my father spoke about: "One of Khokhlov's last bosses, Hero of the Soviet Union Mirkovsky, my former deputy, told me that his ward did not want to go on the last

assignment. They sent him not to liquidate Okolovich, but to prepare this murder, to carry out

which was supposed to be a group of German agents. Khokhlov also did not want to take his wife and son with him to Austria. This meant that he had no intention of fleeing to the West at all. At a press conference held at the CIA, however, he said that he and his wife only dreamed of escaping. He gained notoriety in the Western press for his appeals to the governments of the "free world" to get his wife and son to go to him. Mirkovsky believes that it was a mistake on our part to allow Khokhlov to appear in the West with a passport, which once already attracted the attention of the special services. We assume that he fell into the hands of the CIA, and he was forced to cooperate, but in this desperate situation he still managed to send a conditional postcard to his wife. Although it was reviewed by the CIA, it still contained a warning signal that he was operating under "hostile control." He was not lucky - this signal was not noticed in time. Two other agents sent by us to work with Khokhlov were captured by the Americans: they forced him to issue."

In his book *In the Name of Conscience*, Khokhlov speaks of himself as a specialist in conducting partisan operations during the war years, but does not at all refer to an unsuccessful career in intelligence. By the way, while working for the CIA under special contracts (he taught the tactics of anti-guerrilla operations in Taiwan and South Vietnam), he also failed, because he had only the experience of an illegal agent, a recruiter of attractive women and informants, and not a specialist in combat operations. Khokhlov did exactly the right thing, subsequently choosing a scientific career and saying goodbye forever to the life of a scout. His family suffered from Khokhlov's transition to the West, his wife had a particularly hard time. She never said anything to her son about his father, who had defected to the West. The Khokhlovs' son became a professor of biology at Moscow University and traveled to the United States as a scientific expert. However, he met his father for the first time only when he appeared in their Moscow apartment in May 1992. The strength of the agreements reached at

Yalta and Potsdam along the western border of the USSR began to be tested already a few months after the end of the Second World War. The transition from cooperation during the war years to confrontation between the main

the powers of the anti-Hitler coalition was associated, on the one hand, with the dramatic changes in Europe in 1944-1945 in favor of socialism, which caused extreme anxiety in the leadership of the leading powers of the West. Instead of the anti-Soviet

"cordon sanitaire" of the countries - members of the Baltic Entente, the Warsaw Pact of 1922, the Little Entente, a belt appeared, consisting of new Soviet republics, as well as countries whose governments included members of the Communist Parties. In Germany and Austria, for which Verty and Clemenceau feared so much in connection with the threat of the spread of the "red infection" to them in 1919, units of the Red Army now stood. The rise of democratic forces and the influence of the communists in Italy, France, Belgium and other countries of Western Europe, which became part of many governments, called into question the strength of European capitalism. At the same time, the appearance in the United States in the summer of 1945 of a powerful new

weapon of mass destruction - the atomic bomb - created the conditions for a quick review of the decisions of the Big Three, which suited the Western allies as long as the USSR bore the brunt of the war with Nazi Germany and was ready help in the victory over militaristic Japan. On March 5, 1946, the former Prime Minister of England, W. Churchill, speaking in the city of Fulton (Missouri) in the presence of US President G. Truman, announced that Europe

was divided by an "Iron Curtain" that had descended from the Baltic to the Adriatic. He called for the unification of the forces of the West against the USSR and a change

position behind the Iron Curtain.

The change in the balance of power in the world was also noted by Hitler's former loyalists who remained in the former occupied territory. There were many of them, despite their urgent exodus from these countries before the arrival of Soviet troops, and then the mass arrests among collaborators carried out by the NKVD.

According to historians R. Misiunas and R. Taageper, in the Baltic States, Soviet control over the territory was partial and superficial. In the forests there were many scattered groups of Germans, Baltic units of the German army, Lithuanian nationalist partisans, as well as Estonian veterans of the Finnish army, who opposed both the Germans and the Russians ... During the period of the highest



rise in their ranks participated from 0.5 to 1 percent of the total population. In Lithuania, by the spring of 1945, about 30,000 armed men roamed the forests. Indirect data from Latvia suggest that between 10,000 and 15,000 people were in the forests during the period when armed resistance was at its peak. A similar situation was in Estonia, where the "forest brotherhood" at times numbered up to 10 thousand people.

Analyzing the composition of the members of the underground armed groups in the Baltics, R. Misiunas and R. Taagepera note that the first wave consisted of willing or involuntary accomplices of Germany and employees of the German army, members of the anti-German national underground and former members of the Finnish army (in Estonia). It is quite obvious that the first group, mentioned by the two authors, was the most numerous in the composition of the Baltic population. Mannerheim's army veterans numbered several thousand. As for the "anti-German national underground", during the occupation, their activity was limited to the dissemination of literature in their own circle, and this group could hardly represent a fighting force.

"Soon," according to two historians, "they were joined by people who had fled the conscription to the Red Army and deserters. The new additions were the result of dissatisfaction with the redistribution of land and other social adjustments. The social

base of illegal armed formations was those sections of society that suffered the most from the transformations of society, and above all the wealthy peasantry, whose lands were again cut after the reform of 1945–1947. The new land redistribution carried out after the war was more radical than the 1940–1941 reform. The maximum size of land plots was limited to 20 hectares (not 30 hectares, as in 1941), and the lands of those who collaborated with the German occupiers were reduced to 5–7 hectares. The lands of those who fled to the West were divided. The crude methods of arbitrariness practiced by the authorities in those years significantly expanded the mass base of the rebels. It is unlikely that R. Misiunas and R. Taagepera greatly exaggerate when they write that the persecution of the NKVD and the NKGB in 1944–1945 affected not only the rich or German collaborators. The target could

the workers turned out to be social democrats... Anyone who complained about some aspects of the Soviet bureaucracy or could not adapt to its requirements (for example, grain suppliers in the countryside) became such a target. The combination of random and sloppy in the actions of the repressive units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the MGB, the lack of proper order in fact made everyone a potential target, especially because the Soviets regarded anyone who survived the German occupation as a German accomplice.

The Catholic Church played an important role in the ideological leadership of the insurgent movement. In Lithuania, religion contributed its own characteristics to the development of resistance. The Catholic communities were the basic organization covering the majority of the population. The threat to their existence from the Soviets in itself contributed to the resistance. Some priests were leaders of the underground movement in Lithuania. There was nothing similar in Estonia and Latvia. There, the Lutheran Church could not become a spiritual and national support for unity because of its centuries-old connection with the Baltic Germans. This difference may explain the relative strength of the Lithuanian

rebels.

The high authority of the Catholic Church in Lithuania and the Uniate Church among part of the population of Western Ukraine (and these churches took an uncompromising position against the Soviet regime) explains the particular tenacity of the armed resistance in the forests of these regions, as well as the support of the underground by some of the local residents, especially in the countryside. The inflexible atheistic propaganda, the readiness to see in the clergy only blind executors of the will of the Vatican, the unwillingness to recognize the reality of the Uniate Church on the part of the Soviet authorities only intensified the anti-state activities of many representatives of the Church, strengthened their alliance with the separatists.

In addition to the appeals of the Catholic Church, the belief in an imminent armed conflict between the USSR and the West played an important role in maintaining the spirit of armed resistance. In parts of the Lithuanian Activist Front, faith in the West increased significantly when the news of the atomic bomb reached Lithuania.

Those days when hundreds of thousands of residents of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were sacrificed for a demonstration of US atomic power - 6 and 9

August 1945 were days of great hope for the LFA command. On August 20, a special meeting was called to discuss the international situation. Its participants listened with great interest to the BBC report on the power of the atomic bomb. The explosion of the first atomic bomb caused lively discussions among freedom fighters in Lithuania. The general conclusion was that the West should present the Kremlin with an atomic ultimatum and force the Soviets to liberate the enslaved countries.

The belief in an imminent war, in which the Soviet Union could be turned into an atomic wasteland, inspired the former soldiers and officers of the SS legions and made them stubbornly wait for powerful new allies who were supposed to restore the pre-Soviet order. "...People were attracted to the 'forest brotherhood' by the expectation of an imminent war between the West and the Soviet Union... From this point of view, it was only important to hold out for a few years... Although such an assessment raised morale, it also led the rebels to exaggerate the military aspect of the struggle." Established on June 10, 1946, the Lithuanian rebel organization - the United Democratic Resistance Movement - announced the struggle "for a world government and the creation of an international democratic welfare state." Hopes for comprehensive outside

assistance contributed to the development of contacts between the underground and the Western powers. These connections were established through persons who left the Baltic states after 1941 and remained outside the USSR. In 1945, the LFA command managed to establish contacts with Lithuanian organizations of displaced persons in Great Britain, France, Sweden and Germany. Representatives of the underground knew how to visit their compatriots, and the envoys of organizations of displaced persons crossed the border and arrived at home.

The leaders of the emigrant organizations, among whom former accomplices of Hitler prevailed, saw in the armed struggle of the LFA, the Ukrainian Underground Army (UPA) and other "armies" an opportunity to restore the system that had been overthrown with the advent of the Red Army. However, for the sake of the situation, they declared themselves supporters of Western democracy and, as their positions in the countries of emigration strengthened, they put pressure on government

in order to increase support for the armed underground. These efforts coincided with the general direction in the policy of the leading Western countries—the deepening of the Cold War and the preparation of an armed attack on the

USSR. Western intelligence services established regular contacts with the Baltic underground as early as 1945. One of the prominent leaders of the rebels, Juozas Luksha-Daumantis, was in the West for a long time, seeking to increase assistance to the “forest brothers”. In order to advertise this movement, he wrote the book "Partisans Behind the Iron Curtain". American intelligence parachuted Luksha and other representatives of the partisans in 1949-1951 back to Lithuania, where Luksha soon died. The

Lithuanian underground created the "Council of the Republic" and elected its president. The soldiers of the armed detachments were declared "freedom fighters". Subsequently, on February 16, 1949, the armed organization created its own structure called the “Movement of Lithuanian Freedom Fighters”. The republic was divided into three military districts (North-East, North-West and Neman). In Estonia, the rebels were led by the Estonian National Committee with several local branches ... The communications headquarters of the Latvian partisans operated in Riga on Matiss Street until 1947.

The desire to combine the organization of combat units with a widely branched underground, capable of conducting intelligence, propaganda activities among the population, sabotage and sabotage at work, terrorist acts against Soviet activists and measures of intimidation of neutral and passive, was characteristic of the activities of the rebels in the Baltics. Groups of so-called "forest brothers" varied in size, from 800 people to individuals who hid in bunkers near their farm or even under the floor of their house. “Some “forest brothers” returned to the cities with forged documents to conduct reconnaissance and passive resistance work or to leave the forest life forever ... As the organized parts of the rebels suffered losses, some of their supporters switched to active actions ... Therefore, it is impossible draw a precise line between rebels and non-rebels.

The average duration of participation in the "forest brotherhood" was two years. During 8 years of intense fighting (1945–1952), about 100,000 people participated in the Lithuanian insurrectionary movement. Lithuanian and Estonian "forest brotherhoods" included 40 thousand and 30 thousand, respectively. Armed detachments

committed sabotage, explosions, and arson of administrative Soviet institutions. Much less often, and even then at the first stage of their activity, they entered into armed clashes with the Soviet troops. Judging by the report of the Lithuanian underground, from April 1945 to May 1946 there were six battles with the troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The main activity of the

underground was terror against all those who supported the Soviet regime. As R. Taagepera and R. Misiunas admit, "the main efforts of the insurgents and passive resistance were aimed at disrupting the work of the administration ... Employees of local Soviets were intimidated, they were forced to be double agents, and if they showed excessive zeal in cooperation, they were killed ... For checking the recruits, the "forest brothers" gave them tasks - to execute those who collaborated with the Soviet authorities ... From 1945 to 1952, from 4 to 13 thousand people who collaborated with the Soviet authorities or suspected of such cooperation were killed.

Obviously, this is a very underestimate. According to information announced at the Latvian conference of historians in July 1988, in 1944–1952, the "forest brothers" killed about 25,000 Soviet citizens in Lithuania alone. According to Estonian historians, only in Estonia, the rebels killed "several hundred Soviet people" in just 1948 and early 1949. Intimidation of members of the CPSU(b) and VLKSM in the Baltic States led to the fact that some of them "surrendered their party or Komsomol cards, or showed passivity in their work, or refused it under the threat of death."

The Lithuanian underground "publicly announced that it would severely punish those who accepted from the Soviet authorities land and livestock that was taken from farmers who had plots of 100 acres or less.

Togo".

Mass intimidation of the population by constant and invisible observation of every word and deed of a person, supported by

frequent and merciless reprisals against anyone who even slightly deviated in their behavior from the standard set by the secret leaders, deformed public consciousness. It is characteristic that the "forest brothers" attached great importance to the psychological treatment of the population, including those outside the combat areas. The newly revived organ of

the former Baltic Entente, the Baltic Review, whose creation in 1940 was regarded by the Soviet government as evidence of the anti-Soviet course of the regimes of Pääts, Ulmanis, Smetona, convinced in June 1948 that "in Ukraine, in the Baltic states, Belarus, the struggle continues ... The distant raids of the UPA - in the vicinity of Kiev, west of Kharkov, north of Odessa - give the impression of a big uprising in Ukraine ... A big uprising must and can happen not only in Ukraine, but simultaneously in all countries under Russian occupation.

These plans resonated with the West as well. Eminent US statesman George F. Kennan wrote in 1947: "In the bowels of the Soviet Union are hidden elements that in one night can change, change the state of this country from present power to extreme weakness." On March 25, 1948, the newspaper Die Weltwoche (Zurich) published an article entitled "Ukraine - a forgotten barricade", which promoted the idea of restoring the anti-Soviet "cordon sanitaire" and called for support for the anti-Soviet underground.

Nevertheless, the West could not provide more effective assistance to the "forest brothers" without starting armed operations against the Soviet troops stationed in Germany, Austria, Hungary, Romania and Poland. Without the defeat of the Soviet Army and its allies in Central and South-Eastern Europe, the dream of reviving the "cordon sanitaire" or anti-Soviet barricade had no chance of being realized. Everything depended on the readiness of the United States to unleash a war against the

USSR. In the plans for an anti-Soviet war, great importance was attached to encouraging a split both among the socialist countries and within the USSR. Directive NSC-58, approved by US President G. Truman on September 14, 1949, read: "For us, a practically feasible course is to promote the heretical process

satellite branches ... We must increase all possible assistance and support to pro-Western leaders and groups in these countries. The beginning or intensification of a psychological, economic and underground war will greatly increase the chances of a quick and successful end to the war, for it will help to overcome the will of the enemy in the fight, and will support the morale of friendly groups in enemy territory.

Each new war plan, born in the bowels of the Pentagon, provided for more and more massive atomic bombing of the USSR. Thus, the Chariotir plan of 1948 proceeded from the need to drop 133 atomic bombs on 70 Soviet cities in the first 30 days of the war and another 200 atomic bombs in the next two years.

However, a special committee of the highest ranks of the army, navy and air force, chaired by Lieutenant General X. Harmon, in its report of May 11, 1949, concluded that although "atomic bombings may stimulate dissent and hope for liberation from oppression," they do not can guarantee success. The committee concluded that even if 6.7 million

Soviet citizens were killed in the first month of the war, Russian morale would not be undermined, and the will to fight would only increase. The absence of reliable guarantees of an easy victory for the United States under the conditions of their nuclear monopoly held back the implementation of plans to attack the USSR. Doubts about the success of an atomic attack on the USSR in the American military headquarters increased after the successful test of the first Soviet atomic bomb in September 1949.

And although in 1949 the sending of American agents to the USSR increased, including to the areas of operations of underground armed formations, the West did not give the inhabitants of the forests hope for an early start of hostilities on the European continent. Meanwhile, the protracted armed struggle was exhausting the forces of

the underground. In a special appeal of the Lithuanian underground to Pope Pius XII in mid-1949, the Western powers called for decisive action until the USSR eliminated the US atomic monopoly: "The possession of atomic energy has lulled the world. Soon Bolshevism will have a weapon of the same power... We were thrown to death in Yalta and Potsdam. Now they are repeating the same mistake. When

But the refusal of the West to bombard the USSR with atomic bombs, the "freedom fighters" demanded at least radio propaganda in the Lithuanian language.

Since 1951, regular radio broadcasts of the Voice of America began in Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian. On August 17, 1951, the U.S. House of Representatives passed an amendment to the Mutual Security Act, introduced by Congressman Kersten, which provided for the allocation of funds for persons from "the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Albania, Latvia, and Estonia, or areas of Germany and Austria under communist control, or other countries absorbed by the Soviet Union." These funds were intended to "create from such persons the national elements of the armed forces of NATO or for other purposes, when appropriately decided by the President that such assistance is necessary for the defense of the North Atlantic region and the security of the United States." The Kersten Amendment marked an unprecedented violation of international law when, without declaring war, a country allocated funds to form military units from citizens of foreign countries for possible military actions against these

countries. However, when Congress allocated such funds, in the forests stretching south from the Gulf of Finland to the Carpathians, there were already few people who were ready to protect the interests of the United States and other countries of the North Atlantic region. The armed forces of the Ukrainian and Baltic nationalists were melting away. Although the Soviet Armed Forces played a significant role in the defeat of the UPA and the "forest brothers", its main reason was the loss of support among the village population by the anti-Soviet underground. Despite the fact that the harsh methods of the administration and violations of the law provoked opposition to Soviet power in many Western republics, the defeat that the underground ultimately suffered was primarily a consequence of its vicious political course. No matter how unattractive the socialist system was in the Baltics and Western

Ukraine, the OUN and the "forest brothers" could not offer any real alternative, except for merciless terror and the prospect of nuclear war. This is also forced to be recognized by the apologists of the "forest brothers" R.



Misiunas and R. Taagepera, who noted that the rebels ... lost the political struggle as a result of a miscalculation, not even

noticing this.

The crisis of the underground movement in the Baltics began already in the period of the land reform of 1945-1947. Although the reform hurt wealthy peasants, it aroused the support of those who benefited from it. The latter now had an obvious economic interest in the preservation of the Soviet regime (as long as collectivization was not heavily leaned), even if this conflicted with their national, and in Lithuania, with their religious feelings. "The resistance came out very energetically against the land reform... The power of affirmative action was in

Soviet hands. Resistance to any Soviet event at first looked eminently patriotic, but as the years went on, it could not be distinguished from social obscurantism... As the Soviet regime held on, more and more people came to the conclusion that stable work and service were much more better secured by collaboration. The more people cooperated, the more targets of rebel counter-terror appeared, and the families of the victims sided with the Soviets. More and more people joined the Komsomol and the Soviet militia. As the chances of victory for the rebels (with the help of the West) faded, their halo of national liberators was replaced by the image of rioters who attacked and fled, leaving the civilian population alone with the angry powers that be. People are tired of living between two terrorisms."

Even the repetition in 1947-1949 on the Baltic land of the sad experience of collectivization of 1929-1932, which caused an explosion of discontent among broad sections of the peasantry of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, only temporarily restrained the crisis of the armed underground. By the spring of 1949, about 60 thousand "dispossessed" were deported from Estonia, 50 thousand from Latvia, 150 thousand from Lithuania.

However, the deportation and collectivization of 1949 were the Pyrrhic impulse for the insurrectionary war. The supply system of the partisans was destroyed. Moreover, their relations with the rural population have become antagonistic. Instead of relying on donations from farmers, the rebels

began to raid collectivized cattle and grain, which the rebels, in their frivolous rapture, considered Soviet property. However, the peasants had to survive and fulfill the inexorable norms of state delivery of products. Increasingly turning their activities into a struggle for their own survival, the "freedom fighters" began to live up to the label "bandit" that the Soviet authorities tried to stick to them. The local population was increasingly involved in the struggle against the "forest brothers" and the UPA, creating self-defense units. If immediately after the end of the war, some part of the population saw the armed

underground as defenders of national interests, connected the goals of this struggle with the desire to return a peaceful, stable life, then the continuation of the activities of the LFA, OUN and others more and more showed their inability to constructive activity. This looked like a sharp contrast compared with the efforts made by the population of the western territories to restore the destroyed economy. At the same time, it became more and more obvious that the Soviet government was a reliable ally of the local population in restoring a peaceful, prosperous life and developing national culture.

The enormous assistance of the entire Soviet country to the devastated western territories with machines, raw materials, fuel, foodstuffs, industrial products, the selfless labor of workers, engineers, technicians, scientists who moved from the east to the western regions of the country, made it possible to restore the national economy of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldavia, Western Ukraine, Western Belarus in the shortest possible time. For example, already in 1948 Lithuanian industry reached the pre-war level.

Under these conditions, the armed underground more and more isolated itself, turning into an internal emigration that did not understand the real needs and aspirations of its peoples and could offer them nothing but blind hatred and destruction. In the early 1950s, the underground could only count on emergency assistance from outside. By 1949, the Lithuanian rebel groups could no longer paralyze the activities of the local Soviets. In Latvia and Estonia, this ability was largely lost by the end of 1946. By the end of 1949, the Latvian resistance movement

was largely defeated, although even in February 1950, about 50 rebels participated in the battles in Okta in Courland. Skirmishes continued in Estonia until 1953.

The terror of the "forest brothers" has already ceased to intimidate the population. If in the summer of 1946 in Estonian schools and universities only 15 percent of schoolchildren and students joined the pioneers and the Komsomol, then by 1950 44 percent of all students in Estonia were pioneers or Komsomol members, and even in Lithuania there were 28 percent of them.

The number of Lithuanian resistance was reduced to 5,000 by the end of 1950 and to 700 by the end of 1952, when the unified command ceased to exist, announcing demobilization and transition to passive resistance. Most of the remaining rebels went into civilian life with clandestine documents, and many took advantage of the 1955 amnesty. The 1956 amnesty offer indicated that the rebels still existed. Individual arrests and executions continued into the late 1950s and even beyond. "Tiesa" reported on the capture of a group of rebels in 1961. In 1978, the surviving rebel August Sabe drowned himself in order not to surrender in the forests of South Estonia. The last leader of the Lithuanian movement, Adolfas Ramauskas Vanagas, was assassinated in 1956. The transition to "peaceful" methods of struggle was the collapse of hopes to raise the peoples of the Baltic states to a general uprising against the Soviet regime. However, this

meant only a delay in the plans of the separatists. The struggle took on a protracted character. Among other things, it took years for the living memories of the terror of the "forest brothers" to be forgotten, and the images of bandits to fade. Then it would be easier to spread the provocative legend about the noble fighters for the cause of the freedom of the peoples who fought in the forests in the 1940s and 1950s.

The cessation of armed resistance in the forests of the Baltics and the Carpathians took place at a time when calls for the "liberation" of all peoples "enslaved by communism" were intensifying in the United States and other Western countries. The headquarters of the imperialist countries adopted the policy of resolutely abandoning the principles of the post-war system and restoring the pre-war order, when the vanguard of the revanchist forces, fighting on the front line, realized the doom of this struggle. This was further evidence of the extreme

unrealistic policy adopted by the ruling circles of the West in the early 1950s.

The author of the "doctrine of liberation" D. F. Dulles became in January 1953 the US Secretary of State and a propagandist for an active offensive against the countries of socialism. An integral element of the new policy was the attempt to create armed formations from the population of the socialist countries. At the same time, great importance was attached to the "psychological-sabotage war", "total propaganda offensive".

In early 1953, the US Congress passed a resolution proposed by President Eisenhower expressing the hope that "the peoples under Soviet despotism should regain the rights of self-determination." This intensified the actions of the US legislature in relation to the Soviet republics.

On May 7, 1953, in his speech to Congress, Kersten, the author of the amendment to the Mutual Security Act, emphasized that "The United States never recognized the forcible incorporation of the independent nations of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia into the USSR. We still maintain diplomatic relations with the free governments of the Baltic nations, although their home countries are consumed by the communist conspiracy." On the same day, the US

House of Representatives, at the suggestion of Kersten, passed a resolution establishing a committee to investigate the elections that took place in 1940 in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, and "other circumstances that led to the inclusion of these countries in the Soviet Union." The theme of revising history, restoring the pre-

war status in the former countries of the "cordon sanitaire" began to constantly sound in the foreign policy statements of American leaders. Attempts to revise the post-war structure in Europe, to change the Soviet western border and the socialist system in the west of the country ruled out the possibility of achieving a turn towards the normalization of relations between East and West. That is why the "spirit of Geneva" turned out to be so ephemeral, which arose after the first meeting of the heads of government of the four great powers: N. I. Bulganin, D. Eisenhower, A. Eden and E. Faure - in July 1955 in Geneva.

The origin of the Cold War is closely linked to the West's support for armed nationalist uprisings in the Baltic countries and Western Ukraine. Basically, the fight against them was carried out by local security agencies, but Moscow kept these operations under its control, providing weapons and advisers to help local authorities. My father was involved in the whirlpool of events in Western Ukraine - his experience in the fight against Ukrainian nationalists was taken into account:

“One day in the summer of 1946, I was summoned together with Abakumov to the Central Committee of the Party on Staraya Square. There, in the office of the secretary of the Central Committee, Kuznetsov, who, despite our acquaintance, was unusually official, I saw Khrushchev, the first secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine. Kuznetsov informed me that the Central Committee agreed with the proposal of Kaganovich and Khrushchev to secretly liquidate the leader of the Ukrainian nationalists, Shumsky. According to the Ministry of State Security of Ukraine, Shumsky established contacts with émigré circles in the West, conducted behind-the-scenes intrigues in order to join the provisional government being formed in exile - the Ukrainian Head Rada. It was also known that in conversations with his friends, he showed disrespect towards Stalin, allowed Stalin to challenge Stalin's opinion of himself and put forward his own version of the discussion with Stalin on the composition of the Ukrainian government in the late 1920s and early 1930s.

Shumsky was famous in nationalist circles as a man who was subjected to repression in the early 1930s in the course of the intra-party struggle. His name was anathematized at all party congresses in the republic, and he was released only because he was partially paralyzed and had to be released from prison for health reasons.

Shumsky was foolish, while in exile in Saratov, to make contact with Ukrainian cultural figures in Kyiv and abroad. According to Kuznetsov, he clearly overestimated his authority among Ukrainian émigrés and wrote a defiant letter to Stalin, threatening to commit suicide if he was not allowed to return to Ukraine. Khrushchev, for his part, added that, according to his information, Shumsky had already bought a train ticket and intended to

return to Ukraine to organize an armed nationalist movement or flee abroad and join the Ukrainian government in exile. To this, Abakumov remarked that, since I am an expert on

Ukrainian affairs, I should trace Shumsky's connections with the nationalist underground and Ukrainian emigrants. Abakumov also said that he would send a special group to Saratov to liquidate Shumsky, and it is my task to make sure that his supporters do not guess that he was liquidated. Mairanovsky, at that time the head of the toxicological laboratory of the Ministry of State Security, was

urgently summoned to Saratov, where Shumsky was in the hospital. The poison from his laboratory did its job: it was officially believed that Shumsky died of heart failure. By the way, we did not manage to establish his foreign connections. In Moscow, this operation was given unprecedented importance. The deputy minister of the MGB, Ogoltsov, to whom Mairanovsky was subordinate, and Kaganovich, who personally knew Shumsky, went to Saratov.

The Soviet leadership's assurances to Roosevelt on the eve of Yalta that Soviet citizens enjoy freedom of religion did not at all mean the end of the confrontation with Ukrainian Catholics, or Uniates. Grigulevich, an NKVD agent in Rome who acquired Costa Rican citizenship and became Costa Rica's ambassador to the Vatican and Yugoslavia after the war, informed the Kremlin that the Vatican intended to take a firm stand against Moscow because of the persecution of the Ukrainian Catholic Church. As for the Uniate

Church itself, it was in a very peculiar position: being subordinate to the Vatican, the Uniates held services in the Ukrainian language. The well-known nationalist Metropolitan Andrei (aka Roman) Sheptytsky, a Polish count and a former officer in the Austrian army, headed the Church. He was appointed head of the Ukrainian Uniates by the Pope even before the First World War and sacrificed his military career for the sake of the Church. During the First World War, he collaborated with Austrian intelligence, was arrested by the tsarist military counterintelligence and exiled, and in 1917 he was released by the Provisional Government and returned to Lvov, where a Ukrainian military nationalist organization was created, headed by Colonel Konovalts.

In 1941, when the war began and the Germans occupied Lvov, Sheptytsky sent congratulations from the Uniate Church to Hitler, hoping for the liberation of Ukraine from the Bolsheviks. He went so far as to give his blessing to the SS Galicia Division, created in November 1943, a special Ukrainian formation under the command of German Gestapo officers. The division swore allegiance to Hitler and was used for punitive actions against civilians and Jews who were exterminated in Ukraine, Slovakia and Yugoslavia. Sheptytsky appointed Archbishop Joseph Slipy as the chaplain of the division.

Separate units of this division were captured by the British in Italy and Austria, and in May 1947 the commanders of these units were sent to England. In 1951, the Intelligence Service used them as saboteurs and parachuted into Western Ukraine, where they were to lead the resistance movement.

In 1944, Sheptytsky was already old and near death. Concerned about the fate of the Ukrainian Uniate Church, he, having shown wisdom, sent a mission to Moscow, which included his younger brother, Archbishop Joseph Slipyi and Archbishop Gabriel Kostelnik. Through the Presidium of the Supreme Council, they asked to receive their Patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church, which had never been on good terms with the Uniates. The Presidium of the Supreme Council, however, sent a delegation to the NKVD to clarify the issue of cooperation between the leaders of the Uniate Church and the Germans.

My father and General Mamulov, head of the NKVD secretariat, were ordered to receive the Ukrainian church delegation. To their surprise, the father told them in the Western Ukrainian dialect about the cooperation of the leadership of the Uniate Church with the Germans and, as ordered by the leadership, assured them that if they repented and it turned out that the hierarchs of the Church had not personally committed war crimes, they would be

prosecuted. will not. Subsequent events developed tragically. After the death of Metropolitan A. Sheptytsky, in 1945, a fierce conflict broke out among the Uniate clergy. The fact is that within the Uniate Church there has long been a strong movement for unification with the Orthodox Church. Those priests in

entourage of A. Sheptytsky, who opposed such an alliance, were seriously compromised by their cooperation with the Germans. Archbishop Gavriil Kostelnik, who for nearly three decades had spoken out in favor of unification with the Orthodox Church, took the lead in this movement. We often heard that he was an agent of the NKVD, but this statement has no basis. In fact, two of his sons were involved in the Bandera movement and both died in battles with NKVD units. In 1946, Kostelnik gathered a congregation of Uniate clergy who voted for reunification with the Orthodox Church. Archbishop Joseph Slipy was arrested and exiled. The reunification dealt a decisive blow to the Ukrainian partisan nationalist movement led by Bandera - after all, most of their commanders were from the families of Uniate priests.

Trying with all his might to preserve the nationalist Movement, Bandera resorted to terror, which has become a daily occurrence in the life of Western Ukraine. Local authorities have essentially lost control over the countryside. Nationalist leaders forbade young people to go to recruiting stations for service in the Red Army; Bandera's people slaughtered the families of conscripts and burned their houses in an attempt to establish OUN authority over rural areas. The murder of Kostelnik on the steps of the Lvov Cathedral, when he was leaving after the service, was the culmination of a campaign of terror. The killer was surrounded by a crowd of believers and shot himself; he was identified as a member of a terrorist group led by Bandera's deputy Shukhevych, who had led the Ukrainian underground for seven years. During the war, Shukhevych had the rank of Haupt Sturmführer and was one of the commanders of the Nachtigal punitive battalion. The battalion was commanded mainly by the Germans, and it consisted of Bandera. After the mass execution in July 1941 in Lvov of Jews and many representatives of the Polish intelligentsia, Bandera proclaimed the creation of a government of independent Ukraine headed by Stetsko. However, the German

authorities immediately disbanded this government. A number of OUN politicians were interned, including Bandera. Hitler considered the OUN movement only



as a police force in establishing German domination in Slavic territory. The Germans supported Ukrainian nationalism only in the creation of local governments under their control and until 1944 categorically did not recognize the OUN as a political force. Later, in 1945, part of the Nachtigal battalion joined the

elite punitive unit of the armed forces of Nazi Germany - the Galicia division.

Information received by Moscow in 1947 from abroad that the Vatican was seeking the support of the American and British authorities to assist the Uniate Church and the Bandera formations closely related to it was transmitted not only to Stalin and Molotov, but also to Khrushchev, the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party Ukraine. Khrushchev turned to Stalin with a request to allow him to secretly liquidate the entire Uniate church elite in the former Hungarian city of Uzhgorod. In a letter sent to two addresses - Stalin and Abakumov - Khrushchev and Savchenko, the Minister of State Security of Ukraine, claimed that the archbishop of the Ukrainian Uniate Church, Romzha, actively cooperates with the leaders of the Bandera movement and maintains contact with the secret emissaries of the Vatican, who are actively fighting the Soviet regime. and provide all possible assistance to Bandera. They also wrote that Romzha and his group posed a serious threat to political stability in the region that had recently become part of the Soviet Union. In addition, Khrushchev knew that

Romzha had information about the situation in the leading circles of Ukraine and the planned measures to suppress the Ukrainian nationalist movement. Information came from Uniate nuns who were in close contact with the wife of Turenitsa, the first secretary of the regional party committee and the chairman of the regional executive committee. He held both positions at the same time and enjoyed great respect and love of the population. On the slogans and banners hung in Uzhgorod for the November holidays, it was written: "Long live the 30th anniversary of the October Revolution and Ivan Ivanovich Turenitsa!" Information about the situation in the Ukrainian

leadership through Romzha leaked abroad, and from there boomerang to Moscow. All

this posed a real danger to Khrushchev. Unable to cope with the situation, Khrushchev initiated a secret physical reprisal against Romzha. The Minister of State Security of

the USSR Abakumov then showed my father a letter from Khrushchev and Savchenko and warned him not to render any assistance to the Ukrainian state security organs in this action until a direct order from Stalin was received.

Stalin agreed with Khrushchev's proposal that the time had come to destroy the "terrorist nest" of the Vatican in Uzhgorod.

However, the attack on Romzha was poorly prepared: as a result of a car accident organized by Savchenko and his people, Romzha was only wounded and taken to one of the hospitals in Uzhgorod. Khrushchev panicked and again turned to Stalin for help. He claimed that Romzha was preparing for a meeting with high-ranking contacts from the Vatican.

My father went to Uzhgorod with his group in order to identify Romzha's connections and contacts, because he personally knew all the leadership of Ukrainian nationalists from the time he was introduced to the headquarters of the

OUN. He spent almost two weeks in Uzhgorod. Savchenko and Mairanovsky, the head of the toxicology laboratory, arrived there a week later with orders to liquidate Romzha. In Kyiv, at the station, in his railway car, Khrushchev received them, gave clear instructions and wished them success. Two days later, Savchenko reported to Khrushchev by telephone that everything was ready for the operation, and Khrushchev ordered the action to be carried out. Mairanovsky handed over an ampoule with curare poison to an agent of local security agencies - it was a nurse in the hospital where Romzha was lying. She made the fatal injection.

As a result of this operation, Savchenko received a promotion, a year later he was transferred to Moscow and appointed Molotov's deputy in the Information Committee ...

apartment in Lviv. The events that followed my father

described it like this:

“After the liquidation of Romzha, for about a year, I had no contact with Abakumov, but one day at about four in the morning the phone rang.

At ten, be ready for an urgent task. Departure from Vnukovo. I arrived at the

airport with Eitingon, who accompanied me. Lieutenant General Selivanovsky, Abakumov's deputy, was already waiting here. Only when we flew up to Kyiv, he said: the ultimate goal of our journey is Lvov. However, thick fog prevented the plane from landing in Lvov, and it returned to Kyiv, from where we had already left by train for Lvov. On the way, Selivanovsky spoke about the villainous murder of Galan by Bandera. Comrade Stalin, according to him, is extremely dissatisfied with the work of the security agencies in the fight against banditry in Western Ukraine. In this regard, I was ordered to focus on the search for the leaders of the Bandera underground and their liquidation. It was said in an unquestioning tone. It became clear to me that my future depended on the fulfillment of this task.

In Lvov, we immediately got to the party activist, which was conducted by Khrushchev, who had specially arrived from Kyiv to take personal control of the search for the murderers of Galan. At the meeting, I had an argument with Khrushchev. He was clearly out of sorts: the threat of Stalin's disgrace hung over him because of the failure to put an

end to rampant banditry in Western Ukraine. I pissed him off even more when I objected to the proposal to introduce special passports for residents of Western Ukraine. Khrushchev also proposed to mobilize young people to work in the Donbass and study in the factory schools of Eastern Ukraine and to deprive the Bandera formations of replenishment in such a peculiar way. I firmly stated that the introduction of special passports and the de facto resettlement of young people in order to cut off all contact with nationalist parents and friends is a clear discrimination; this may further embitter the local population. As for the youth, evading forced expulsion, they will certainly go into the forests and join the ranks of armed bandit formations. Khrushchev angrily said that it was none of my business, since my task boiled down to one thing

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behead the leadership of the armed underground, and other issues will be decided by those who are supposed to.

My intervention, however, turned out to be very timely, and the idea of special passports was buried, and plans for the mobilization of young people were partially realized - only to study at the FZU. The amnesty announced soon extended to those who agreed to voluntarily hand over their weapons to the police station or to local security agencies: this step turned out to be especially effective, and already in the first week of the new, 1950, eight thousand people handed over their weapons. The vast majority of them were not really persecuted. By the way, as we managed to find out, out of these eight thousand, about five were young people from fifteen to twenty years old who fled from home to gangs after they heard about forced labor in the mines of Donbass.

According to our information, the armed resistance was also coordinated by Shukhevych. From 1943 to 1950 he headed the Bandera underground in Ukraine. This man possessed outstanding courage and had experience in secret work, which allowed him to engage in active subversive activities even seven years after the Germans left. While we were looking for him in the vicinity of Lvov, he was in a cardiology sanatorium on the Black Sea coast near Odessa. Then, as we know, he showed up in Lvov, where he met with several prominent cultural figures and even sent a wreath on his behalf to the funeral of one of them. His risky gesture caused talk in the city, and our agent, a former actress of the Berezhil theater in Kharkov, who wrote for Izvestia, confirmed the presence of Shukhevych in the Lvov region. We, in turn, managed to identify four of his female bodyguards, who were also his mistresses. At that time, the armed resistance of the Soviet authorities enjoyed the support of the population living in the Lvov region. Together with Lebed, in the past a major figure in the OUN, we went to a remote village in the Lviv region. Lebed's

relatives were found there - two of his nephews led a local bandit group. Previously, Lebed's cousin was shot dead by Bandera for agreeing to become the chairman of the collective farm, although

they were well aware that his daughter and two sons were active participants in the anti-Soviet underground. Lebed wanted to convince them to give up armed struggle. The daughter of the shot chairman of the collective farm, despite the shock, considered the death of her father as retribution for the fact that he went to cooperate with the Soviet authorities.

I stayed in Lviv for half a year - although the denouement was inevitable, but, as often happens, it still turned out to be unexpected. Shukhevych relied too much on his old wartime connections and let his guard down. Meanwhile, we contacted the family of Gorbovoy, a lawyer and an influential member of the Bandera movement. As it turned out, Gorbovoy and his family wanted to compromise with the Soviet authorities and did not want to personally participate in the killings. I managed to find an approach to Gorbovoy and his friends and suggested on behalf of the Soviet leadership: the war must be ended as soon as possible and people returned to normal life. I promised to get Gorbovoy's niece released from a camp in Russia, where she was sent only because she was his relative. I kept my promise - after my personal call to Abakumov, Gorbovoy's niece was immediately released and taken by plane to Lvov. In response, Gorbovoy pointed out to us the places where Shukhevych could be hiding. By that time, we had

managed to win over to our side the connected Shukhevych, a player of the local Dynamo football team. Gorbovoy and his like-minded academician Kripyakevich, whose son actively participated in the Bandera movement, repented and publicly declared the fallacy of their political views; they were not repressed. Shukhevych, meanwhile, made another fatal mistake. When a policeman showed up at the house where he lived with one of his

bodyguards, Daria Gussyak, for a routine check of documents, his nerves gave out. Shukhevych shot the policeman, and all three - himself, Daria and her mother - fled. Our search led to a remote village, where we found only Daria's mother. Shukhevych was not there, but the presence of this woman indicated that he could not have gone far. Later, when Daria was arrested, she testified that she had begged Shukhevych not to kill her mother: she had a wooden prosthesis and he was afraid that it would be difficult to escape with her. Then they left her in the village.

Our group to capture Shukhevych settled down in the house where Daria's mother lived. Pretty soon, a pretty young medical student from Lvov, Daria's niece, showed up there. She came to see her relatives and speak, as she said, on behalf of the institute committee of the Komsomol, with talks about the dangers of nationalism. During our friendly conversation (I introduced myself as the new deputy chairman of the district executive committee), answering my cautious question where her aunt is now, the girl replied that she lives in the dormitory of her institute and from time to time visits the Forest Academy, where she plans to enter soon.

Surveillance group quickly established which "academy" Darya went to: she made regular trips to a village near Lvov, where she stayed for hours in a cooperative shop. This led us to assume that Shukhevych was there at that time. Unfortunately, the young officers conducting surveillance in March 1950 were inexperienced and tried to woo her as a cover. When Lieutenant Revenko extended his hand to Darya and said in Ukrainian that he would like to get to know such a charming woman better, she sensed a trap and, without hesitation, shot him point-blank. She was immediately seized, but not by my people, but by local residents who witnessed the murder committed before their eyes. My people managed to recapture her from the crowd and take her to the local

branch of the MGB. Half an hour later, the leader of the group, my closest assistant, was already there, he immediately ordered a rumor to be spread in the market that the woman had killed the lieutenant and shot herself on the basis of love. Daria was securely isolated, and I, General Drozdov and twenty operatives surrounded the general store in order to block Shukhevych's possible escape routes. Drozdov demanded that Shukhevych lay down his arms, in which case he was guaranteed his life.

In response, an automatic burst sounded. Shukhevych, trying to break through the encirclement, threw two hand grenades from hiding. A shootout ensued, as a result of which Shukhevych was killed.

After Shukhevych's death, the resistance movement in western Ukraine waned and soon died down. We managed to find out that Shukhevych created a very dangerous agent network. Six months before the events described, in June 1949, Daria, as it turned out, had two

lived in Moscow for a week at the Metropol Hotel on a passport in a false name. She had explosive devices in her room. During these two weeks, she repeatedly visited Red Square in search of a suitable "target". It was assumed that this explosion would impress the West and the OUN would receive financial support."

Archival materials of the Bandera movement were secretly taken by nationalists from Lvov to Leningrad and hidden in the department of rare manuscripts of the Public Library named after M.E. Saltykov Shchedrin.

The collapse of the "Ukrainian epic" came a year later. The Chekist authorities and personally Khamazyuk, an operative from his father's group, managed to send an agent to the Bandera detachment that still survived, which by that time had moved from Ukraine to Czechoslovakia, and from there to Germany. British intelligence, having reached out to these people, transported them to England for training in subversive activities. Our man was introduced to the Bandera people as one of the activists close to Shukhevych. While in Munich, he maintained contact with the Center, but as soon as the group moved to England, it was decided not to take risks and not get in touch with the agent for the time being. OUN leaders abroad were very worried because of the lack of radio contact with Shukhevych. They, supported by the British, decided to send the head of the OUN security service, Matviyko, to Ukraine. He was instructed to find out about the fate of the silent Shukhevych and to activate the underground movement. Our agent was immediately instructed to send an encrypted postcard to Germany at the specified address with a message about the route of the

Matviyko group. It was assumed that Bandera's emissaries would land in the area of the city of Rovno. Our air defense service was instructed not to shoot down the British plane, which was supposed to take Matviyko's group, fly from Malta, and then drop everyone by parachute near Rovno. This was done not only to protect our agent, who was part of a group of saboteurs, but also to capture everyone alive. The members of the group were

warmly welcomed at the safe house by the people of Raikhman, the deputy head of counterintelligence, who skillfully played the role of underground workers whom Matviyko hoped to find there. After drinking - sleeping pills were mixed into alcohol - "guests"

peacefully fell asleep and woke up already in the inner prison of the regional

department of the MGB. All this

happened in May 1951. "At three in the morning," my father recalls, "the phone rang in my apartment. Abakumov's secretary called: I had to urgently appear in the minister's office. Abakumov was interrogated by Matvieyko, which was conducted by the minister himself and his deputy Pitovranov. At first, I acted as an interpreter, since Matvieyko spoke only in the Western Ukrainian dialect. The interrogation lasted two hours. Then Abakumov ordered me to take care of Matvieyko myself. I worked with him for about a month. These were not interrogations, but conversations, that is, no protocols

were kept. Our conversations took place in the office of the head of the inner prison, Mironov, where Matvieyko even had the opportunity to watch TV. I remember how he was struck by the opera "Bogdan Khmelnytsky" in Ukrainian. This performance was part of the decade of Ukrainian art in Moscow. Neither in Poland, nor in Western Ukraine, Matvieyko has ever been to opera performances performed in his native language. It seemed unbelievable to him, and in order to finally convince him of the authenticity of what he saw, I took Matvieyko with me to the theater for the Ukrainian decade, however, accompanied by an "escort".

After talking with me, he became convinced that, apart from, perhaps, the names of a few secondary agents, we, in fact, knew everything about the Ukrainian emigre organization and the Bandera movement. He was shocked when I began to present the biographies of all the leaders of the Ukrainian nationalists known to him, to give details of their personal lives, to talk about their mutual strife. After assuring Matvienko that I was not going to recruit him, I explained: the most important thing for us is to stop the armed struggle in Western Ukraine. With the permission of Abakumov, I called Melnikov, the first secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine, who replaced Khrushchev in this post, and asked to receive Matvienko in Kiev and show him that Ukraine, and in particular Western Ukraine, is not a territory occupied by Russians, but free lands where people live free people.

I never met Matvieyko again. In Kyiv, he was placed in a safe house under house arrest, while being given the opportunity to move freely around the city. Then he was transferred to



Lviv, where he lived in a mansion. From there he fled. What a commotion arose in Kyiv and Moscow! An all-Union search was announced. The Minister of State Security of Ukraine immediately ordered the arrest of everyone who was responsible for protecting Matvieyko. It turned out that he left quite simply: he left the gates of the mansion, said goodbye to the guard, who over the past ten days had gotten used to the fact that Matvieyko freely came and went (albeit accompanied by state security officers), and did not stop him, although there was no escort on this time it

wasn't. These days he lived in the apartment of his old acquaintance, not connected with Bandera. Matvieyko told him that he had come from Moscow on business and would not stay long with him. During this time, he bypassed the Bandera appearances and checked the Lvov connections, about which he did not give any evidence in Moscow. To his horror, he discovered that their spy network did not exist: two addresses turned out to be incorrect, and people associated with the underground were fictitious. All this was a fantasy of the compilers of reports about the exaggerated successes of the Bandera movement, sent to the headquarters of the OUN in London and Munich. Matvieyko was an experienced intelligence officer enough to understand that the remaining turnouts were probably under the supervision of Soviet counterintelligence, they were kept only to be used as traps for unlucky visitors

from abroad. Three days later, Matvieyko surrendered himself to the security forces in Lvov. At a press conference hosted by the Ukrainian leadership, he condemned the Bandera movement. Using his authority, Matvieyko called on the emigration and the OUN, who fought in bandit detachments, to reconcile. Subsequently, he began a new life - he worked as an accountant, married, raised three children and died peacefully in 1974.

The story with Matviyiko acquires a new meaning in the light of the proclamation of Ukrainian independence. The West never realized that after the revolution of 1917 Ukraine for the first time in its history gained statehood within the Soviet Union. A real flourishing came in the national art, literature, education system in the native language, which

it was absolutely impossible to imagine either under tsarism or under Austrian and Polish domination in Galicia.

Ukrainian party leaders, unlike their counterparts from other Soviet republics, were always met with special honor in Moscow, and they had a significant influence on the formation of the domestic and foreign policy of the Kremlin leadership. Ukraine was a permanent reserve for the promotion of personnel for leadership work in Moscow. The Ukrainian Communist Party had its own Politburo, which was not in any republic, was a member of the United Nations. Until 1992, Ukraine was not a fully independent state, but the weight that Ukraine had, the strengthening of its prestige in the USSR and abroad, became a prelude to its acquisition of a completely new status of an independent state after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

In 1946 or 1947 armed groups of Kurds under the command of Mullah Mustafa Barzani entered into battle with the Shah's troops, crossed the border of the USSR with Iran and ended up on the territory of Azerbaijan. The father

describes these events as follows: "Barzani I was introduced as Matveev, deputy general director of TASS and official representative of the Soviet government. For the first time in my life I met a real nobleman-feudal lord. At the same time, Barzani impressed me as a very shrewd politician and experienced military leader. He said that over the past hundred years, the Kurds had raised eighty rebellions against the Persians, Iraqis, Turks and the British, and in more than sixty cases turned to Russia for help and, as a rule, received it. Therefore, according to him, it is quite natural for them to turn to us for help at a difficult time for them, when the Iranian authorities liquidated the Kurdish Republic. Shortly before these events, the leaders of the Iranian Kurdish rebels fell into a trap arranged by the Shah:

they were invited to Tehran for negotiations, captured there and hanged. Only Barzani escaped this fate. When the Shah invited Barzani himself to negotiate, he replied that he would come only if the Shah sent members of his family as hostages to his headquarters. While preliminary negotiations with

Shah, Barzani transferred most of his forces to the northern regions of Iran, closer to the Soviet border. We, for our part, were interested in using the Kurds in our line of weakening British and American influence in the countries of the Middle East bordering the Soviet Union. I announced to Barzani that the Soviet side had agreed that Barzani and some of his officers would receive special training in our military schools and academies. I also assured him that the resettlement in Central Asia would be temporary until conditions were ripe for their return to Kurdistan. Abakumov forbade me to inform the leader of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan, Bagirov, about the content of the negotiations with Barzani, and especially about Stalin's agreement to allow Kurdish officers to be trained in our military schools.

The fact is that Baghirov sought to use Barzani and his people to destabilize the situation in Iranian Azerbaijan. However, Moscow believed that Barzani could play a more important role in overthrowing the pro-British regime in Iraq. And besides, what is especially important, with the help of the Kurds, we could disable the oil fields in Iraq for a long time, which were then extremely important in supplying oil products to the entire Anglo-American military grouping in the Middle East and the Mediterranean.

After negotiations with Barzani, I flew to Tashkent and informed the Uzbek leadership about his upcoming arrival. Then he returned to Moscow. Barzani, along with

his disarmed detachments and members of their seed, was sent to Uzbekistan. Five years later, in March 1952, I was sent to Uzbekistan to meet with Barzani near Tashkent to resolve the problems that had arisen. Barzani was not satisfied with the position of passive waiting and the attitude of the local authorities. He turned to Stalin for help and demanded the fulfillment of the promises made to him earlier. He insisted on the formation of Kurdish combat units. Barzani also wanted to maintain his influence and control over his fellow tribesmen settled on collective farms around Tashkent.

The meeting with Barzani took place at a government dacha. My interpreter was Major Zemskov, who, like Barzani, spoke English fluently. Barzani told me how the Americans and

the British wanted to bribe him to put pressure on the Iraqi, Iranian and Turkish governments.

The plan I developed on behalf of the new Minister of State Security, Ignatiev, was to form a special brigade from the Kurds - one and a half thousand people - for sabotage operations in the Middle East. It could also be used for the planned overthrow of the government of Nuri Said in Baghdad, which would seriously undermine the influence of the British in the entire Middle East region. (With the help of the Kurds, this was accomplished in 1958, when I was already in prison.) The Kurds also had a role to play in our plans to disable oil pipelines in Iraq, Iran and Syria in the event of an outbreak of hostilities or direct threat of a nuclear attack on the USSR.

Barzani agreed to sign a cooperation agreement with the Soviet government in exchange for our guarantees of assistance in the creation of the Kurdish Republic, which Barzani saw primarily in the area densely populated by Kurds at the junction of the borders of northern Iraq, Iran and Turkey. After listening to Barzani, I replied that I did not have the authority to discuss an agreement of this kind. However, we did not object

to the establishment of a Kurdish government in exile. The responsible officer of the International Department of the Central Committee of the Manchukuo Party who accompanied me, who participated in the negotiations, proposed the creation of a Democratic Party of Kurdistan headed by Barzani. According to the Manchukuo, the party was to coordinate the activities of representatives of the Barzani government in all areas of the Kurdish population. The headquarters of the party could, according to him, be located in the board of the collective farm, located fifteen kilometers from Tashkent.

I did not intervene in this conversation, but listened attentively. When the conversation ended, Barzani invited me to a meeting with the officers of his headquarters. At our appearance, about thirty people who were in the room, stretched out at attention. Then, as if on cue, they all fell on their knees and crawled towards Barzani, begging to be allowed to kiss the hem of his robe and boots. Naturally, all the illusions about a democratic Kurdistan that I could harbor until then,

immediately evaporated. It became quite clear to me that this was yet another ideological initiative that arose in the depths of the Central Committee on Staraya Square.

In April 1952, Barzani, surrounded by members of his family and fellow tribesmen, settled in a large collective farm near Tashkent. In Moscow, it was decided that the Kurds would be given the status of an autonomous region. The Ministry of State Security was ordered to organize military training for the Kurds and assist in establishing ties with foreign compatriots. Our attempts to introduce our own people into Barzani's entourage and recruit any of the Kurds were successfully blocked by their security service. True, Zemskov, who had considerable experience in dealing with the Kurds, managed to recruit one junior officer who studied at our Military Academy, but after returning to Tashkent, he soon disappeared without a trace. We could not find him and came to the conclusion that he was liquidated on the orders of Barzani.

In the spring of 1953, a curious incident happened to me that violated the rules of conspiracy. Barzani attended lectures at the Military Academy, where I studied. One day he saw me there in the uniform of a lieutenant general. With a sly wink at me, he said through his interpreter, a young lieutenant: "Glad to deal with the representative of the Soviet government

in

such a high military rank.

For my part, in response, I wished him success in mastering military disciplines.

The last time I accidentally met Barzani on the eve of my arrest was on Gorky Street. I was in civilian clothes. He noticed me and apparently wanted to approach, but this meeting was of no use to me in my position, and I preferred to pretend that I did not see him, and quickly got lost in the crowd. Barzani was smart

enough to understand that the future of the Kurds depends on how they manage to play on the contradictions between superpowers that have their own interests in the Middle East. Casting a retrospective glance, you see that the superpowers did not at all strive for a just solution to the Kurdish problem. The fate of Kurdistan from the point of view of its interests has never been considered in the Kremlin, as, indeed, in London and Washington. Both the West and us

one thing was of interest - access to oil fields in the countries of the Middle East, no matter how cynical it looks. Suslov, who was later assigned to deal with the Kurdish issue, promised Barzani all-round support in the struggle for autonomy only in order to overthrow Nuri Said in Iraq with the help of the Kurds. The Americans, for their part, also promised Barzani support in order to overthrow the pro-British leadership in Iraq with his help and replace him with their proteges, but at a critical moment they took a wait-and-see attitude, agreeing with the British. In a word, they played with the fate of the Kurds as best they could."

In the 1940s and 1950s, the Kremlin leadership had the goal of using the Kurdish movement in confrontation with the West in the context of the Cold War. The idea of creating a Kurdish Republic allowed the USSR to pursue a policy aimed at weakening the British and American positions in the Middle East, but large sections of the Kurdish population were indifferent to actions directed against the British and Americans in this region.

Until the second half of the 1950s, the Kurds were Moscow's only allies in the Middle East. When the regime of Nuri Said was overthrown as a result of a military coup with the support of the USSR, we acquired such allies as Iraq, Syria, Egypt, which, from the point of view of the geopolitical interests of the Soviet Union, were much more important than the Kurds. Iraq and Syria have come to play a major role in our Middle East policy and confrontation with the West in this turbulent region. The tragedy

of Barzani himself and his people was that in the interests of the USSR and the West (to a certain extent also the Arab states and Iran), the Kurds were considered as a kind of intimidating force in the region or a bargaining chip in the conflict clashes of Turkish, Iranian and Iraqi rulers.

A reasonable solution to the Kurdish problem, as my father believed, could be the provision of international guarantees of autonomy, no matter how limited it may be. In essence, no one in the West or in the countries of the Arab East wanted the oil fields of Mosul to be on the territory of an independent Kurdish state and under its control.

In 1963, when our country had complications with the government of Kasem and the Iraqi nationalists who replaced it, my father, while in prison, sent from there his proposals for possible contacts with Barzani and was notified that his proposals were accepted. Help was sent to the Kurds - weapons and ammunition - to protect their lands from the punitive expeditions of the Iraqi army. However, our attempts to make the Kurds our strategic allies in order to be able to influence events in Iraq have not been successful.

## Chapter

# 20 THE MYSTERY OF "LABORATORY-X"

The name of Raoul Wallenberg, a Swedish diplomat widely known around the world for his work in saving Jews during World War II and who disappeared in 1945, is one of the mysteries of the 20th century that have not yet been solved. It is

known that Wallenberg was detained by the military counterintelligence SMERSH in 1945 in Budapest and secretly liquidated, as my father suggests, in the inner prison of the MGB in 1947.

Nearly half a century has passed in fruitless investigations by both KGB officials and journalists, but the Wallenberg case has never been discovered. Recently, a letter was found

from the head of the Intelligence Directorate of the NKGB of the USSR, Fitin, to SMERSH, which arrested Wallenberg, demanding that he be transferred to intelligence for operational purposes. However, Abakumov rejected this idea, apparently trying to attribute the laurels of successful work with Wallenberg to his apparatus. Raoul Wallenberg belonged

to a well-known family of financial magnates who, from the beginning of 1944, maintained secret contacts with representatives of the Soviet government. Although my father was not assigned to develop Wallenberg and his connections with the German and American intelligence agencies, he was well aware of the contribution that the Wallenberg family had made in concluding a separate peace with Finland. The nature of the military counterintelligence reports about Raoul Wallenberg and the contacts of the entire family suggested that the diplomat was a suitable target for recruitment or the role of a hostage. The arrest of Wallenberg, the interrogations, the circumstances of his death - everything confirms that there was an attempt to recruit him, but he refused to cooperate with the NKVD. Perhaps the fear that an unsuccessful recruitment attempt would become known if Wallenberg was released, forced him to liquidate. My father, in his memoirs,

did not ignore the Wallenbergs and described the interest of Soviet intelligence in them as follows: "During the war years, our residency in Stockholm re



instructions to find influential people in Swedish society who could become intermediaries in negotiations with the Finns on the conclusion of a separate peace. That's when we established contacts with the Wallenberg family. Stalin

was concerned that Finland, an ally of Germany since 1941, might sign a peace treaty with the Americans without taking into account our interests in the Baltics. The Americans, in turn, feared that we would occupy Finland. However, we did not have such a need: the neutrality of the nearest neighboring country was important to us in order to use it to our advantage through agents of influence in the main political parties in Finland. These people agreed to cooperate with us if we ensured the neutrality of the Finnish state. In addition, they wanted to play the role of an intermediary between East and West. It is significant that in the 1970s and 1980s, influential political circles

in Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and also in the Baltic republics, who advocated the revival of their state independence, sought to follow the Finnish example. These attempts by both sides - those who made and prevented them - called finlandization. My father recalled how in 1938, a year before the outbreak of the Soviet-Finnish war, Stalin ordered the transfer

of two hundred thousand dollars for the political support of the Finnish Smallholders' Party, so that it would play a certain role in shaping the government's position on the settlement of border issues. The money was given to the Finns by Colonel Rybkin, who was then the first secretary of the Soviet embassy in Finland and known there under the name Yartsev. I have already said above that Boris Rybkin and his wife Zoya Rybkina (Voskresenskaya) were close friends of our parents and always, when the opportunity arose, they visited us at home and in the country.

So, I. V. Stalin personally instructed Rybkin how to talk with politicians who received money from us, as well as on the preparation of secret negotiations with representatives of the Finnish government in order to conclude a non-aggression and cooperation pact, planned with the participation of a confidant Soviet government, personally known to Mannerheim. This confidant was Count Ignatiev, the author

book "Fifty years in the ranks", who knew Mannerheim at the Academy of the General Staff of the tsarist army.

Mannerheim rejected the proposals submitted by Yartsev (Rybkin) to the Finnish government, but informed Hitler about the unusual proposal of the Soviet side. Thus, the German leadership, when deciding to start negotiations with us on the conclusion of a non-aggression pact, knew very well that their proposal could not be considered by Moscow as completely unexpected and unacceptable.

During the war years, the Rybkins led our residency in Stockholm. One of their tasks was to maintain contact with the Red Chapel network in Germany through Swedish channels. A large amount of work fell to the lot of Zoya Ivanovna. In the diplomatic circles of Stockholm and Moscow, this Russian beauty was well known. She shone not only with beauty, but also with an excellent knowledge of German and Finnish. Rybkin, a tall, well-built, charming man, had a subtle sense of humor and was an excellent storyteller. The couple were very popular among diplomats in the Swedish capital, which allowed them to keep abreast of German probing attempts to find out the possibility of a separate peace agreement with the United States of America and Great Britain without the participation of the Soviet Union. By the way, for provocative purposes, German intelligence spread rumors in Stockholm in 1943-1944 about possible secret negotiations between the USSR and Germany on a separate peace without the participation of the Americans and the British. The working style of the Nazi leadership was sometimes not very flexible. In solving political problems, they could go ahead. The Rybkins took an active part in the preparation and execution of secret economic agreements. In 1942, with the help of our agent, the famous Swedish actor and satirist Karl Gerhard, they managed to conclude a barter deal: we received

high-quality Swedish steel, essential for aircraft construction, in exchange for platinum. Sweden's neutrality was grossly violated, but the bank that made the deal made a handsome profit. The Wallenberg family owned a controlling stake in the bank.

“Karl Gerhard,” we read in my father’s memoirs, “maintained friendly relations with Raoul’s uncle Markus Wallenberg and, according to the plan approved in Moscow, introduced Zoya Rybkina to him at the reception. Zoya charmed Marcus Wallenberg. They met again on a weekend at a luxurious hotel owned by the Wallenberg family near Stockholm. The conversation was about how to arrange a meeting of diplomats of two countries - the USSR and Finland - that are at war, at which they could discuss the conclusion of a separate peace treaty. Zoya Rybkina told Wallenberg that it was necessary to bring to the attention of the Finns: the Soviet side guarantees full state independence at the end of the war, but in view of the continuation of hostilities in the Baltic theater, it expects to receive the right to a limited military presence in the ports of Finland and a limited deployment of naval and air forces. bases on its territory. The Wallenberg family, in turn, had financial interests in Finland and were very interested in a peaceful settlement of Soviet-Finnish relations.

It took Markus Wallenberg just a week to arrange a meeting between Zoya and the representative of the Finnish government, Juho Kusti Paasikivi, who later became president, replacing Carl Gustav Mannerheim in this post. The Soviet side at the talks was represented by Alexandra Kollontai, our ambassador to Sweden, who for a long time remained the first and only woman in the rank of ambassador. Only in the 1970s did a woman return to the rank of ambassador - Zoya Mironova, who headed the Soviet mission to international organizations accredited in Geneva.

Consultations continued throughout the summer, and finally on September 4, 1944, a peace treaty was signed between the USSR and Finland.

After Raoul Wallenberg was in our hands as a hostage or an object of possible recruitment, Stalin and Molotov probably expected to use the position of the Wallenberg family to obtain lucrative loans in the West.

In 1945, the Soviet leadership spread rumors that a Jewish Autonomous Republic would be created in the Crimea, where Jews from all over the world, especially from Europe, would be able to come.

victims of fascism. Stalin bluffed, pursuing several goals. First, with this bait - the Jewish Republic - he hoped to appease the British allies, who feared that a Jewish state would be established in Palestine, which was under their protectorate. Secondly, Stalin sought to find out the possibilities of attracting Western capital to restore the national economy destroyed by the war. From Beria, my father was instructed to probe the Americans on this issue during

conversations with their ambassador in Moscow, Harriman. In 1945, he met with him under the name Matveev. By the time of his arrest by military counterintelligence, Raoul Wallenberg was known for his activities in rescuing and transporting Jews from Germany and Hungary to Palestine. The NKVD knew about Wallenberg's high reputation among the leaders of international Zionist organizations. Arresting him, like any Western diplomat, without a direct order from Moscow was unthinkable. Even if we assume that he was detained by accident (at the same time, more than thirty diplomats of some European countries were detained, almost all of them were released a few months later in exchange for prisoners of war and servicemen of the Soviet Army who remained in the West), then the heads of military counterintelligence in Budapest should have been sure to report this to Moscow. It is now known that the order to arrest Wallenberg was signed by Bulganin, Stalin's deputy for the People's Commissariat of Defense, and the order was immediately carried out.

My father's former colleague, Lieutenant General Belkin, at one time deputy head of SMERSH, was familiar with the Wallenberg case. He told his father that in 1945 the SMERSH front-line agencies received an orientation on Wallenberg, which indicated that he was suspected of collaborating with German, American and British intelligence, and ordered to establish constant surveillance over him, track and study his contacts, primarily with German intelligence agencies. "The work of Wallenberg," as my father recalled, "was

reported by our agent Kutuzov (he belonged to the family of the great commander), an emigrant attracted to cooperate with Soviet intelligence back in the early 30s. Kutuzov worked for the Red Cross mission in Budapest and participated in the development of Wallenberg. According to Kutuzov,

Raoul Wallenberg actively cooperated with German intelligence. Kutuzov interpreted his behavior as a double or even triple game. Of course, in such a risky business - the salvation of the Jews - it was necessary to maintain close contacts with officials and German secret services. I remember that Belkin told me about several recorded meetings between Wallenberg and German intelligence chief Schellenberg.

Circumstances developed in such a way that Wallenberg found himself in the sphere of increased attention of Soviet intelligence agencies. Perhaps, as we have already said, through him the Soviet leadership hoped to achieve closer cooperation between the Wallenberg family and representatives of Moscow in the Scandinavian countries in order to gain the confidence of international capital to obtain loans. It is possible that the plan to recruit or use him as a hostage in a possible political game arose because Wallenberg was seen as an important witness to the behind-the-scenes ties between the business circles of America and Nazi Germany, as well as the secret services of these countries during the war years. When the allies reached a secret agreement on the range of charges that would be brought against the leaders of the Third Reich at the Nuremberg trials, the need for Wallenberg disappeared - he was destroyed. My father said that Raoul Wallenberg was detained (in fact, it was an arrest) in his apartment: counterintelligence officers came

to him and offered to go to the headquarters of a group of Soviet troops. Wallenberg then said to one of his friends: "I don't know who I will be

guest or prisoner.

He was taken to Moscow under guard, but in the sleeping car they were treated like a "guest", food was brought from the dining car. Kutuzov was also taken to Moscow, separately from Wallenberg. Soon Kutuzov, unlike Wallenberg, was released from prison and allowed to travel to the West, of course, on the condition that he continue active cooperation with Soviet intelligence. He eventually settled in Ireland, where he died in 1967. In Moscow, Wallenberg was placed in a special block of the internal prison on Lubyanka,

where especially important persons were detained, who were persuaded to cooperate; if they refused, they were eliminated.

The protocols of Wallenberg's interrogations were regularly forwarded to the German intelligence department of the NKVD. Perhaps the investigators intimidated him, accusing him of having links with the Gestapo.

From the materials published in the press, it is clear that Wallenberg was kept in Moscow in two prisons - in the inner one at Lubyanka and in Lefortovo. Employees of the MGB-KGB recall that after interrogations "with passion" in Lefortovo, Wallenberg was again transferred to a special block of the inner prison in Lubyanka.

My father described in detail the special block of the inner prison on Lubyanka - it was more like a hotel. The rooms in which the prisoners were kept could only be called cells conditionally: high ceilings, normal furniture. Food was brought from the canteen and restaurant of the NKVD, in quality it, of course, was very different from the prison. However, the place was sinister.

This building housed the commandant's office of the NKVD-MGB. where in 1937-1950 sentences were carried out against persons sentenced to death, as well as those whom the government considered necessary to liquidate in a special, that is, non-judicial, manner. In

Varsonofevsky lane, behind the Lubyanka prison, there was a toxicological laboratory directly subordinate to the Minister of Internal Affairs and the commandant's office of the NKVD-MGB and a special chamber attached

to it. The toxicological laboratory was established in 1921 under the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars V. I. Lenin, long before Beria, and was called the "Special Cabinet". It is possible that Lenin asked Stalin to get him poison from the stocks of this "office" laboratory. The first head of the laboratory in the 1930s was Professor Kazakov, he was shot in 1938 in the process of Bukharin. Research work on the topics of the laboratory was carried out by specialists from the Institute of Biochemistry, headed by Academician Bach. The toxicological

laboratory was called "Laboratory-X" in official documents. The head of the laboratory, Colonel of the Medical Service, Professor Mairanovsky was engaged in research on the effect of deadly gases and poisons on malignant tumors. Professors are highly regarded in medical

circles. In 1937, Mairanovsky's research group from the Institute of Biochemistry was transferred to the NKVD and reported directly to the head of the special department of operational equipment at the commandant's office of the NKVD-MGB. The commandant's office was responsible for guarding the NKVD building, maintaining secrecy and security, and for carrying out death sentences. In the 1960s and 1970s, "Laboratory-X" was named Special Laboratory No. 12 of the Institute of Special and New Technologies of the KGB.

In his memoirs, my father spoke about this laboratory as follows: "All the work of the laboratory, the involvement of its employees in the operations of special services, as well as access to the laboratory, which was strictly limited even for the leadership of the NKVD-MGB, were regulated by the Regulations approved by the government and orders from the NKVD-MGB. Neither I nor my deputy Eitingon had access to the "Laboratory-X" and the special cell. The work of the laboratory was directly supervised by the Minister of State Security or his first deputy. There are still a lot of monstrous rumors about this laboratory.

An audit carried out under Stalin, after the arrest of Mairanovsky, and then under Khrushchev in 1960, for the purpose of anti-Stalinist revelations, showed that Mairanovsky and members of his group were involved in the execution of death sentences and the liquidation of objectionable persons by direct decision of the government in 1937–1947 and 1950, using poisons for this. I know that such actions were carried out by our intelligence abroad also in the 60-70s. Major General of the KGB Oleg Kalugin also spoke and wrote about this.

My father's archive also contains his notes on the "Wallenberg case": "Wallenberg's interrogations were conducted by intelligence officers, most often by Lieutenant Colonel Kopelyansky, who spoke German fluently. He was fired from the authorities in 1951 because of his Jewish origin. Although Kopelyansky's participation in the interrogations was documented - his name appears in the prison register of the prisoner being summoned for interrogation by the investigator - he denied this and said that he did not remember the person under investigation with that name. However, these journal entries show that it is

Kopelyansky summoned Wallenberg from his cell for interrogation the day

before his death. The Wallenberg case reached a dead end by early July 1947. He refused to cooperate with Soviet intelligence and was no longer needed either as a witness to secret political games or as a hostage - the Nuremberg trials were over.

It appears that Wallenberg was transferred to a special cell at Lab X, where he was given a lethal injection under the guise of medical treatment. But at the same time, the country's leadership continued to assure the Swedes that they knew nothing about the whereabouts and fate of Wallenberg. The prison medical service had no idea about this, and his death was ascertained in the usual manner. However, Minister of State Security Abakumov, apparently aware of the real cause of Wallenberg's death, forbade the autopsy of the body and ordered him to be cremated.

There was a special practice of cremation of those who were destroyed by a special government decision: no autopsy was performed, the ashes were to be buried as unclaimed in a common grave. Later, the authorities were very reluctant to admit that the ashes of such famous people as Tukhachevsky, Yakir, Uborevich, Meyerhold and others were buried in this common grave. The crematorium of the Donskoy Monastery was then the only one, therefore, perhaps, the ashes of my boss, friend and mentor Shpigelglas and one of the leaders of Serebryansky's intelligence service lie in the same grave. It is very likely that the ashes of Wallenberg and Beria are buried there." As follows from the

memoirs of former employees of the MGB-KGB, a journal of special records of all liquidations with references to the relevant decisions of higher authorities in a sealed envelope with the inscription "Do not open without the permission of the minister" and the stamp "Top secret" after Beria's arrest was sent to Sukhanov, Malenkov's assistant, Head of the Special Sector of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU. In 1966, Colonel Studnikov, who immediately replaced my father as head of reconnaissance and sabotage work abroad, immediately after my father's arrest, his deputy Gudimovich and Colonel Vasilevsky confirmed to the Central Committee that this package had been removed from the safe at Lubyanka and transferred to the Special Sector of the Presidium



Central Committee. Since then, it has been in the bowels of the archives or destroyed at the direction of the top leadership, as it contains evidence of direct responsibility for the actions carried out by "Laboratory X", not only Yezhov, Beria, Abakumov, Merkulov, but also the country's top leadership - Stalin, Molotov, Malenkov, Bulganin, Khrushchev. In June 1993,

Izvestia published Maksimova's article Wallenberg is dead. Unfortunately, there is enough evidence", and the newspaper "Segodnya" - Abarinov's article "Laundering not only money, but also versions". Both articles contain excerpts from documents relating to the fate of Wallenberg.

From Vyshinsky's memo, sent to Molotov in 1947, it is clear that at the end of 1944 the Swedish government turned to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the USSR "with a request to take under the protection of the first secretary of the Swedish mission in Budapest, Raoul Wallenberg."

In 1945, at the beginning of January, the Swedes were informed that Wallenberg had been discovered and taken under the protection of Soviet military units. In fact, Wallenberg was arrested by military

counterintelligence in Budapest. After some time, the Swedes notified the Foreign Ministry that Wallenberg was not among the members of their mission who had left Budapest, and asked to be found. On this issue, they sent eight notes to the Soviet authorities and made five oral inquiries. In 1946, the Swedish ambassador to Moscow, Söderblom, turned to Stalin - and was received by him - with a personal request - to find out the fa

In turn, the Foreign Ministry also asked SMERSH and the Ministry of State Security several times about Wallenberg. Finally, in February 1947, the Foreign Ministry was informed that Wallenberg was at the disposal of the MGB.

In the memo mentioned above, Vyshinsky wrote: "Since the Wallenberg case continues to remain without progress to this day, I ask you to oblige comrade. Abakumov to submit a statement on the merits of the case and proposals for its liquidation.

Father remarked on this occasion that for him there was no doubt about the ominous meaning of Vyshinsky's last words. He doesn't offer

close the case (then there would be a different wording - "stop the case"), but almost "demands" that Abakumov submit proposals for the destruction of Wallenberg as an undesirable person for the Soviet leadership.

So, Vyshinsky made such a request - this is extremely important - being Molotov's deputy and for intelligence work, which was carried out in those years by the Committee of Information. Fedotov, who informed Vyshinsky that Wallenberg was in prison, was also one of the leaders of the Information Committee at that time. Molotov's resolution on Vyshinsky's note is also of great importance: **"Comrade. Abakumov. Please report to me.**

**May 18, 1947.**

My father claimed that it was in fact an order from the deputy head of government and head of intelligence to submit proposals on how to eliminate Wallenberg. This was the usual practice of those years. By the way, not so long ago, a document was published and shown on television, sent to Stalin and Molotov in 1947, concerning an American citizen, NKVD agent Isaac Oggins, who was suspected of a double game. This document contains the same wording. After the proposal was considered, Stalin or Molotov gave their consent orally, and

sometimes in writing. If verbally, then Abakumov, as was established during the checks and the investigation of his case, made a note on such documents: "Consent of Comrades. Stalin, Molotov received"- and put down the date. It is clear from official documents that Wallenberg died on July 17, 1947. However, on August 18 of the same year,

Vyshinsky informed the Swedish ambassador that the Soviet government had no information about Wallenberg and that he could not be detained by the Soviet authorities, but most likely became an accidental victim of street fighting in Budapest. And in January 1945, Moscow informed the Swedes that Wallenberg was under the protection of Soviet military units.

In March-May 1956, during the Soviet-Swedish talks held in Moscow, the Swedish side provided our government with materials relating to Raoul Wallenberg. At the same time, the Central Committee of the party decided to check and clarify the circumstances

death of a Swedish diplomat. This decision of the Central Committee of the CPSU has not yet been

published. In 1957, the Central Committee of the CPSU approved a draft memorandum of the Soviet government on the fate of Wallenberg, prepared by the Foreign Ministry (Foreign Minister Shepilov) and the KGB (Chairman Serov).

The Soviet government informed the Swedish government that the competent authorities had studied and verified the materials submitted by the Swedes about Raoul Wallenberg. Thorough searches in the archives of the internal prison at Lubyanka, Lefortovo, as well as Vladimir and other prisons turned up nothing: no information was found about Wallenberg's stay in the Soviet Union. But in 1947, this information was: the Foreign Ministry was informed that Wallenberg was at the disposal of the MGB. After that, the competent authorities checked all archival

documents of auxiliary services, and as a result, in the documents of the medical service of the internal prison on Lubyanka, they found a report by the head of this service, Smoltsov, addressed to the former Minister of State Security Abakumov. The report stated that the prisoner Wallenberg personally known to the minister died unexpectedly in his cell on the evening of July 17, 1947. The cause of death is a heart attack. The memorandum ended, as it should be, with sincere regrets and deep condolences on the death of Raoul Wallenberg. An important detail is noteworthy: on Smoltsov's

report dated July 17, 1947, an addition was made that Wallenberg's death was reported personally to the minister and the body was ordered to be cremated without an

autopsy. The father explained: "I believe that the destruction of archival materials on the Wallenberg case began in the process of preparing the memorandum. This was apparently due to the fact that the direct initiators of his arrest and

murder - Molotov and Bulganin - were still in power and occupied a leading position in the country's leadership. Bulganin, who signed the order to arrest Wallenberg, was the head of government, and Molotov, who ordered the liquidation of the Swedish diplomat, was a member of the country's top leadership.

Our government officially acknowledged Wallenberg's arrest, imprisonment and death from a "heart attack" ten years after his death. It also stated that Raoul Wallenberg had been illegally arrested on the orders of Abakumov, who had received the most severe punishment for the crimes he had committed, including the arrest of Wallenberg.

It was a cynical lie. During the trial and the investigation, no such accusation was brought against Abakumov." Until

now, a note from Abakumov to Molotov has not been found in the KGB archives, which, probably, should have outlined the essence of the Wallenberg case and, apparently, contained proposals initiated by Vyshinsky, fatal to his fate. Although the note was not found, my father assumed that traces of it, apparently, could be found in the correspondence of the Ministry of State Security and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the chairman of the KGB with the leadership of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the government during the specified period of time. The registration log of the Molotov secretariat has a code number by which the passage of

this document can be traced. But in the archives of the KGB, as it was announced already in the autumn of 1994, they managed to find a document from which it follows that the chairman of the KGB, Serov, asked Molotov to accept him in the Wallenberg case in February 1957, when a draft memorandum was being prepared to the Swedish government recognizing the arrest of V

So far, Serov's note, known to my father, has not been found, in which he was supposed to inform Khrushchev and Bulganin about what really happened to Wallenberg before an official memorandum of the Soviet government was prepared.

The father testifies in his notes: "Knowing Khrushchev's habits, I affirm that he kept Serov's note in his archive, which certainly contained serious compromising information on Molotov. For Khrushchev, this note was of significant importance in the context of the intensified struggle for power in early 1957, which ended, as you know, with the defeat of the so-called anti-party group of Molotov, Kaganovich, Malenkov and Shepilov, who "joined" them. However, for reasons unclear to me, Khrushchev did not use the Wallenberg case against Molotov. I remember how the investigators were very persistent in obtaining information from me about participation

Molotov in secret deals with Western industrialists and diplomats, and I understood that their questions were far from random. However, Wallenberg's name did not appear then. Serov had to apply to

Khrushchev for permission to destroy the materials on the Wallenberg case. It is likely that after that they were destroyed. The reason is clear to me: Molotov was still in power in February 1957 and remained a very influential figure in the leadership. He, like other statesmen who were directly involved in scandalous and criminal actions, was interested in documentary evidence disappearing.

Another letter from Serov must also be preserved, in which he is obliged was to report to Khrushchev that the Wallenberg case had been destroyed.

The Wallenberg case was last investigated on the orders of Gorbachev under the supervision of Bakatin, the chairman of the KGB. A new investigation has confirmed that Wallenberg did indeed die in prison. It was also established that his investigative-archival and prison files had been destroyed.

Unfortunately, archives, as

well as manuscripts, alas, burn and are destroyed. But traces remain. Some finds are completely random and unexpected. So, a technical officer in the KGB archive, who had nothing to do with the investigation of the Wallenberg case, found his diplomatic passport and personal belongings in a package that had fallen out of a hefty bundle of unsorted documents.

My father recalled this: "After the loud scandal caused by the publication of my book in the West, in May 1994, at the request of the Russian-Swedish commission on the Wallenberg case, I wrote an explanation to the accounting and archival department of the Federal Security Service. My son (of Anatolia. - **Auth.**) talked with Swedish representatives: finding out the truth about the Raoul Wallenberg case depends to a large extent on the Swedish side, which stubbornly refuses to make public the data of his reports on contacts with German and American intelligence services in 1941-1945.

I think that someday researchers will still get to our and foreign archival materials, as happened with the Katyn case, and put an end to the tangled and tragic history of Wallenberg."

The attempt of our authorities, not without success, I must say, to hide the truth about Wallenberg is reminiscent of the case of the execution in 1940 of groups of Polish prisoners of war in the Katyn forest near Smolensk and other places. It was only in 1992 that the archive materials of this case were published in the press, in particular, the report of the former KGB chairman Shelepin about the destruction of documents related to the criminal action. It became known that Shelepin in 1959 turned to Khrushchev to obtain permission to destroy them. All this suggests that the same was done with the Wallenberg

case. Although President Boris Yeltsin handed over the documents to Lech Walesa and the case of the Polish prisoners of war seems to have been closed, the veil of secrecy has not yet been completely thrown off. The documents extracted from the KGB archives do not contain information about how this action was planned and carried out. Even those who were actively involved in the recruitment of Polish officers had no idea what fate awaited the prisoners of war who refused to cooperate with the NKVD. My father assumed

that Reichman, who was involved in Polish affairs, knew about this. An official government report stated that the Polish prisoners of war in the camps fell into the hands of the Germans and were shot. Indeed, some Polish officers were killed by German weapons. Then many, including

my father, believed this version. "For the first time," my father wrote, "I heard that we shot Polish prisoners of war from KGB Major General Kevorkov, Deputy General Director of TASS in the 80s. He said that Falin, who headed the International Department of the Central Committee of the CPSU, had been reprimanded by Andropov in the 1970s for showing interest in the Katyn case and suggesting that a new investigation be started. I was struck that, according to Kevorkov, the Central Committee was most concerned about how to hide the fact that the destruction

of Polish officers was carried out by decision of the Politburo. Speaking about the criminal mass extermination of Polish prisoners of war and the attempts of Khrushchev and Gorbachev to hide this tragedy, it should also be noted that, perhaps, the execution of Poles in 1940 was a kind of revenge, settling scores with ardent anti-Soviet, Polish officers, for the destruction of forty thousand ( according to different documents, differ

prisoners of war in Polish concentration camps after the defeat of the Red Army in 1920 near Warsaw. This option is not excluded, since the Poles stained their hands with the blood of many Russian people, both in the Civil War and after it, not to mention the Soviet-Polish war.

Here I consider it necessary to cite the following excerpts from my father's memoirs: "In 1953, Eitingon and I were accused of organizing the liquidation of people objectionable to Beria with the help of poisons in special safe houses, in country residences, and these murders were presented as death from accidents. Abakumov was also accused of killing people he didn't like. Contrary to the requirements of the law, the names of "our victims" did not appear in either the indictment or the verdict in our cases. And it was not an accident or the result of careless work of investigators, no, they knew their business. There were simply no casualties, there were none. Neither I nor Eitingon took part in the settling of personal scores between Beria and Abakumov and their opponents. All secret liquidations of double agents and political opponents of Stalin, Molotov, Khrushchev in 1930-1950 were carried out by order of the

government. That is why the specific combat operations carried out by my subordinates together with the employees of "Laboratory-X" against enemies that were really dangerous for the Soviet state, as it seemed then, were not blamed either on me or on Eitingon. Abakumov, who personally gave orders on behalf of the government to conduct operations, they were also not blamed. Beria, in 1945-1953, had nothing to do with these Cases and did not even know about them.

As for the entire work of "Laboratory-X", not only scientific, it must be assumed that it was well known both to those who were investigating the case of Beria and Abakumov, and to the government and the Central Committee of the party, who observed and directed the course of the investigation in these cases and determined its content.

The indictment in my father's case alleged that it was he who oversaw the work of a top-secret toxicology laboratory that experimented with poisons on prisoners sentenced to death between 1942 and 1946.

Today it is well known that this is not the case at all, since this charge was dropped upon his rehabilitation. In the archives of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the KGB, they found a regulation approved by the government that regulated all the activities of this laboratory and the procedure for reporting on its work. "Laboratory-X" was out of my father's control. He could neither give orders to her boss Mairanovsky, nor use poisons against anyone, much less conduct experiments with them on people, although this "fable" went for a walk after the testimony knocked out from Mairanovsky, allegedly a participant in Zionist conspiracy in the MGB, which, by the way, never existed. In a word, all the speculation with these "testimonies" was aimed at discrediting the father and Eitingon. Moreover, this was done by people who are well aware that the use of testimony against rehabilitated people that has lost legal significance exposes them in an unsightly light. In 1951, a great rout was carried out in the MGB in

connection with the disclosure of the Zionist conspiracy. Mairanovsky, together with Eitingon, Raikhman, Matusov and A. Sverdlov, were arrested and charged not only with illegal possession of poisons, but also with the fact that they are participants in a Zionist conspiracy, the purpose of which is to seize power and destroy the top leaders of the state, including Stalin. Ryumin, who headed the investigation into this case, managed to extract fantastic confessions from Mairanovsky (he retracted them in 1958) and deputy head of the secretariat Abakumov Broverman. When, at the end of 1952, Ryumin, being Deputy Minister of State Security Ignatiev, was removed from his post. The investigative unit could not present the indictment against Mairanovsky in the form in which Ryumin had prepared it. The testimony of the head of the toxicological laboratory was not supported by the confessions of the doctors arrested in the Abakumov case, who had no idea about this laboratory. None of the arrested doctors knew anything about Mairanovsky's secret activities: he himself conducted experiments with poisons on

those sentenced to death in accordance with the procedure established by the government and the Ministry of State Security. Record in full the confession of Mairanovsky was



too risky, because he referred to the instructions of higher authorities and the awards he received. That is why his case was submitted for consideration to an extrajudicial body - a Special Meeting under the Minister of State Security. Apparently, there were some plans to use Mairanovsky in the future as a witness against someone in the top leadership. He was allowed to live and in February 1953 was sentenced to ten years in prison for illegal possession of poisons and abuse of office.

position.

Mairanovsky was convicted shortly before Stalin's death. When Beria again headed the security agencies, Mairanovsky sent him a huge number of applications for release, wrote about his innocence and referred to work under his direct supervision in 1938-1945. Beria, apparently, was going to release him, but was soon arrested himself. The prosecutor's office immediately used Mairanovsky's statements against himself, against Beria, Abakumov and Merkulov. Now Mairanovsky was presented as Beria's accomplice in his mythical plans to eliminate the Soviet leadership with the help of poisons.

From my father's book, I know about four facts of the liquidation of dangerous enemies of the Soviet state, as such people were then called, carried out with the participation of Mairanovsky in 1946-1947. We are talking about well-known Ukrainian nationalists - Shumsky and Romzha, as well as foreigners - Samet and Oggins. Samet, a Polish engineer of Jewish

nationality, interned by the Soviet secret services in 1939, was engaged in top-secret work on the use of captured German equipment on our submarines. This equipment allowed the boats to spend more time underwater. Samet contacted the British. His goal was to go to Palestine at all costs. Eitingon was sent to Ulyanovsk, where everything was happening, in order to introduce an agent into Samet's entourage and control his connections with foreigners. Mairanovsky, who arrived later, together with an agent, a doctor at the factory polyclinic, injected Samet with curare poison during a preventive examination.

As for Oggins, his father writes about it this way: "In 1992, General Volkogonov submitted to the US Congress a list of Americans who died in the Soviet Union during the Second World War, as well as the Cold War, and expressed regret on behalf of President Yeltsin in connection with their death. Oggins was also on that list. Eliminated Oggins, according to Volkogonov, so that he could not tell the truth about Soviet prisons and concentration camps. In the West, by that

time, the Gulag was quite well known, and the reason why Oggins was destroyed is not as simple as it was written in our newspapers. Judging by the publications, Oggins was illegally arrested by the NKVD and sentenced by the Special Conference to eight years in prison, allegedly for anti-Soviet propaganda. In fact, Oggins came to the Soviet Union on a fake Czechoslovak passport - there was not a word about this in the press.

He really sympathized with communist ideas and was an unofficial member of the US Communist Party. Oggins was also an old Comintern and NKVD agent in China, the Far East and the USA. His wife Nora was part of the NKVD intelligence network in America and Western Europe and was responsible for maintaining our safe houses in France and the USA in 1938-1941. Oggins was arrested in 1938 on suspicion of a double game. His wife returned to the US in 1939. At first, she believed that her husband was in the Soviet Union for operational reasons, but then she realized that he was under arrest.

We had reason to believe that Nora began to cooperate with the FBI and other American and Japanese intelligence agencies. She tried, perhaps on the instructions of American counterintelligence, to restore ties with our agents in America that had been interrupted since 1942. At the end of the war, Nora Oggins turned to the American authorities to help find her husband, hoping to secure his release. During the period of our good relations with America, an employee of the American embassy in Moscow was allowed to meet with Oggins in Butyrka prison, pursuing his own goals - to find out what the Americans knew about his activities.

After the failure of our intelligence network in the United States and Canada in 1946-1947, Molotov feared that if Oggins was also released, the Americans might involve him in the Commission of Inquiry

anti-American activities and used as a witness against the US Communist Party. In addition, according to our intelligence services, Nora Oggins' contacts with the US authorities and cooperation with the FBI have already caused serious damage to our intelligence positions in the US

and France. What follows must be understood as follows: Abakumov, knowing about all this, proposed to liquidate Oggins. The decision to liquidate was made by Stalin and Molotov. In 1947, Mairanovsky, during a medical examination, gave Oggins, who was in prison, a fatal injection. Father and Eitingon were instructed to organize his funeral at the Jewish cemetery in Penza and issue a burial date of 1944 or 1945.

Remembering this incident, my father, as I know, felt sincere regret. But then, during the years of the Cold War, he said, neither we nor the Americans thought about the moral aspects of eliminating dangerous opponents, double agents. In the 60-70s

and in 1990, the prosecutor's office, the KGB and the Party Control Committee under the Central Committee of the CPSU investigated cases of the use of poisons in the operations of special services. It was established that Mairanovsky was involved in the use of poisons by the secret services in 1937-1947. Since 1952, the use of poisons resumed without the participation of Mairanovsky and, as always, was regulated by the relevant government instructions. None of those who really led all the actions on the use of poisons, either from the KGB commandant's office or from the Operational and Technical Directorate, were even brought to administrative responsibility. They made my father and Nahum Eitingon the scapegoats. These two honored generals, who did a lot, at the risk of their lives, for the security of the USSR, were anathematized and expelled from active life for many years. They did not count on such "gratitude". But as they say, do not renounce fate, money, prison. The gloomy fame of the laboratory continued to excite the

imagination of Soviet leaders. In 1988, Major General Shadrin of the KGB told his father, his father's memories testify to this, that the top leadership of the country, that is, Gorbachev, is interested in the practice of eliminating political rivals in

old times. It was then that rumors spread that the chairman of the KGB, Semichastny, in 1964 allegedly refused to carry out Brezhnev's hint-order to secretly eliminate Khrushchev. However, Semichastny, according to Shadrin, refused to provide a written explanation on this issue. Father writes: "In 1990, Oleg Kalugin and I were

summoned to the prosecutor's office. I was interrogated in the case of Oggins, Kalugin in the case of Markov, a Bulgarian dissident killed in London, where he worked for the BBC in 1978. Kalugin confirmed to the prosecutor what he had said in his speeches to the press. He, holding the post of head of the KGB Foreign

Counterintelligence Service, advised the Bulgarian intelligence in carrying out the operation to eliminate Markov with the help of poison. obtained from the Special Laboratory, which was previously headed by Mairanovsky. Markov died from an injection with an umbrella made in this laboratory. Kalugin's participation in the operation carried out by the Bulgarian

intelligence corresponded to his official duties: he was responsible for measures to combat Western intelligence agencies abroad and had to assist the intelligence services of the socialist countries. Markov was considered at that time a prominent agent of British intelligence. As I was told, the Bulgarian government awarded Kalugin an order and a Browning for this operation. Not so long ago, Kalugin said that he received the Order of the Red Banner for another liquidation - the abduction in Vienna of a Soviet defector, Navy officer Artamonov, carried out using toxicological drugs, from which Artamonov died in his arms.

Kalugin's explanation of his participation in the liquidation and abduction of people objectionable to the Soviet government was similar to mine. Another question: for our so-called "democratic community" Kalugin is a fighter for justice and human rights, and I, to put it mildly, am an odious person. Kalugin and the press that

supported him rightly raised the question of control over the work of the toxicological divisions of the special services. However, in my opinion, it's not just about control. Toxicology laboratories will always be part of the services

technical support for the activities of state security and intelligence agencies.

## Criminal

abuses in this area have also been established in CIA operations. In 1977, Ogorodnik, a Foreign Ministry official who was a CIA agent, committed suicide by swallowing a vial of poison at the time of his arrest. However, before that, with the sanction of the CIA, he liquidated, with the help of a hidden poison manufactured in the USA, an innocent woman, a Soviet citizen, who had some reason to suspect him.

in espionage.

The question arises: is the use of drugs or poisons justified in the fight against terrorism? Of course, the death sentence or the destruction of a terrorist must be carried out in strict accordance with the requirements of the law.

Unfortunately, the legal aspects of the actions of special services in a combat situation, for example, in the forced liquidation of dangerous terrorists, have not been developed either here or abroad. However, the danger lies in the fact that such a

powerful weapon can be used by the ruling regime to destroy unwanted people, political opponents and rivals, as has already happened in our history. Of course, the toxicological service must obey strict rules and be controlled. But, I repeat, it's not just about control - the status of the staff is important.

I think that employees of the toxicological units of the special services should not be on active military service. This will allow to control their actions within the real prosecutor's supervision. Not being military personnel, they will not have to obey in their actions the requirements of the disciplinary Charter of the Armed Forces, according to which the order of the chief is the law for the subordinate, and the highest official who issued it bears criminal liability for illegally issued military order. Maybe this will become some kind of guarantee against abuses in the use of toxicological services in the political struggle. What I told on the pages of my book will seem schematic to some, an attempt to hide from the public the mechanism of the terrible work of "Laboratory-X". Verification of falsified

The accusations against me that I controlled the work of the laboratory and gave orders to its head showed that I, like the heads of other independent services and departments of the MGB-KGB, had the most general idea of the work of the laboratory and did not take any part in the activities of the toxicological unit.

For the first time this material, but, of course, in a different form, I submitted to the Central Committee of the CPSU in the 60s, in my statements, seeking first release from prison, then rehabilitation. It is in vain that so-called democratic journalists try to accuse me of concealing unfavorable circumstances, but at the same time they use facts from my book published in the West, without reference to it (for example, Waksberg's publication of the Oggins case in Literary Gazette) ".

## Chapter

# 21 THE JEWISH QUESTION

In 1942-1945, the so-called Jewish question, in the light of relations with the allies, acquired significant significance in the foreign and domestic policy of the Soviet state.

In the Kremlin, as already mentioned above, they really hoped to receive significant funds for the restoration of the national economy under the guise of providing assistance to the Jewish population of the USSR, which had suffered from the Nazi invasion. The government, continuing the old line of flirting with Zionist circles, sought to use the "Palestinian question" as a trump card in negotiations with the British, who feared for their positions in the Middle East and prevented the mass resettlement of Jews in Palestine and the formation of a Jewish state there.

In the early 1920s, when Soviet power was just getting on its feet, there were quite a few people with Jewish surnames among leaders at all levels. At that time, there were no passports, so no one officially divided people along ethnic lines.

In 1922-1923, many Jewish and other nationalist organizations were liquidated in the country and their leaders were arrested. One of the most active groups of this kind was, for example, "Poalei Zion" in Odessa, members of this underground organization, having managed to neutralize the surveillance service, lured several operatives to an abandoned cemetery and severely beat them. Another underground group, Khatana, originated in Zhytomyr, but, ironically, it was the GPU employees working in this city - the Jews who were assigned to lead the operation against this Jewish nationalist group. Among the defeated Jewish organizations was the Bund, which was part

of the socialist International. The Jewish Communist Party, which had previously broken away from the Bund, was also dissolved. This was in line with our policy of eliminating any factions of communist parties built on a national basis, both within the AUCP(b) and outside it. Then they dismissed

called party. The Communist Party of Ukraine (Bolsheviks) became the sole ruling party in the republic.

The leaders of liquidated Jewish organizations were either expelled or gone abroad. They were allowed to do this.

Until 1928, there were virtually no obstacles to traveling abroad in the country, and the procedure was very simple. The Soviet Jews no longer had their own nationalist organizations, and gradually there was what can be called an intense process of assimilation. If we talk about the Jewish intelligentsia, then it has completely lost its political significance. In 1933, in connection with collectivization, a

passport system was introduced to strictly control urban residence and simplify the recording of population movements. The Jews were singled out as a separate national group, although they did not have their own state education.

In all major departments, Jews at that time occupied an influential position. Father recalled: "In 1939, we received an oral directive obliging us — this happened after the mass repressions — to monitor what percentage of people of a particular nationality are in the leadership of the most responsible, from the point of view of security, departments. But this directive turned out to be much deeper in its design than I expected. For the first time, the quota system came into effect. Fortunately, most of my comrades in arms had by this time achieved great success, proved their loyalty to the party and did not fall under this new directive. Father noted that the formation of the Jewish Autonomous Region with the center of Birobidzhan was

undertaken by Stalin to strengthen the border regime in the Far East by creating a kind of barrier there, and not at all as a step towards the creation of a Jewish state. The border in these places was often violated by Chinese and White Guard terrorist groups. Stalin's idea was to put a barrier in their path in the form of settlements, whose inhabitants are hostile to the white emigrants, and especially to the Cossacks. The status of the region was farsightedly defined as an autonomous region, and not a republic, which meant: there would be no



its own legislature, no supreme court, no ministerial-level administrative structures. Although the region had autonomy, it was only a border special territory, and not a political center.

Before the war, there was an idea at the top to use the leaders of the socialist Bund, Henrik Erlich and Viktor Alter, for foreign policy purposes. My father writes

the following about this: "The former deputy head of the Second Counterintelligence Directorate, General Reichman, told me in 1970 that these Bund leaders were arrested by us in Eastern Poland in September-October 1939. When the war with Germany began, they were released in September 1941. At a meeting with Beria, they were offered to create a Jewish anti-Hitler committee: it was originally planned that Erlich would be the chairman of the committee, Mikhoels would be his deputy, and Alter would be the executive secretary. The plan had to be abandoned because Erlich and Alter knew too much about Stalin's intentions to use them to extort money from the West. In December 1941, Alter and Ehrlich were again arrested, although no charges were brought against them. On December 27, 1941, Erlich addressed the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, M. I. Kalinin, protesting against the arrest and proving that he was a supporter of the Soviet government and was ready to cooperate with the NKVD. From this letter, as we see, it is absolutely clear that it was the NKVD who

sought to initiate the creation of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee (JAC) through Erlich. The main task of the committee, the letter said, should be intensive propaganda among the Jewish communities of the United States and England of the position of the Jews in the Soviet Union in order to obtain the maximum assistance needed by the USSR in the struggle against Hitler's aggression. In general, such an approach to solving the problem was in the hands of the Soviet leaders, so all the JAC proposals were fully approved. The NKVD was instructed to find a suitable location for the headquarters of the committee. At the head of the JAC were: the chief director of the Jewish State Theater Mikhoels, the poet Fefer, the publicist and literary critic Epshtein. Erlich answered his letter like this

and did not receive. The archives testify that in December 1941, Beria ordered that Erlich and Alter be transferred to solitary cells. These prisoners were known under numbers 41 and 42, and it was forbidden to interrogate them or fill out registration cards for them in the Kuibyshev prison of the NKVD, where they were held. General Reichman later told his father that there

was a special order according to which even the prison staff had no right to know their real names. These instructions came from Stalin, Molotov and Beria. In 1942, the prominent American politician Windell Wilkie and the president of the American Federation of

Labor William Green sent an inquiry to the USSR about the fate of Erlich and Alter through the Soviet ambassador to America, Litvinov. The Polish ambassador to Moscow, Stanislaw Kot, also addressed the NKID of the USSR with a similar request. Vyshinsky, Deputy People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, hinted in his reply to Cat that Erlich and Alter were pardoned by mistake: both of them, as established, secretly colluded with the Germans. At the end of 1942, Willkie turned to the USSR with a new request, but did not receive any answer until February 1943. Molotov, meanwhile, instructed Litvinov to announce that on December 23, 1941, Erlich and Alter were shot, because in October and November of that year they systematically engaged in treacherous activities, undertook to disseminate hostile information in the Soviet Union aimed at ending hostilities and signing a peace treaty with the fascist Germany. It was, to put it mildly, not true. Erlich committed suicide by hanging himself in <sup>attempts</sup> his cell on May 14, 1942. Alter, remaining in solitary confinement until February 17, 1943, was secretly executed by order of Beria.

"During the events described," says the father, "I knew nothing about their fate. Everything I write about them took place before Mikhoels' visit to the United States.

Only in September 1992, from a publication in the weekly newspaper of the Ministry of Internal Affairs "Shield and Sword", did the true fate of Erlich and Alter become known. They were destroyed in order to hide the secret unofficial contacts of the Soviet leadership with influential representatives of foreign Jewish communities. Erlich and Alter were eliminated also because

Stalin was afraid of their political influence outside the Soviet Union. Immediately after the formation of the Jewish

Anti-Fascist Committee, Soviet intelligence decided to use the connections of the Jewish intelligentsia to obtain additional economic assistance in the fight against Nazi Germany through Zionist organizations of the USA, Western Europe and Palestine. Serebryansky managed to create a particularly extensive network of agents in the Zionist movement in the early 1930s. Now the JAC could be a cover for the restoration of agent positions in the Zionist movement, lost in 1938 in connection with the arrest of almost the entire operational staff of the Serebryansky group. To this end, Mikhoels and Fefer, our trusted agent, were assigned to probe the reaction of influential foreign Zionist organizations to the creation of a Jewish republic in the Crimea. This task of special reconnaissance sounding

- establishing contacts with the American Zionist movement in 1943-1944 under the direction of our residency in the USA - was successfully completed. By the way, in the same period, the Soviet leadership really thought about the possibility of creating a Jewish republic in the Crimea on the basis of the three national Jewish regions that existed there before the war. At the suggestion of Molotov, the leadership of the JAC prepared a letter addressed to Stalin with a proposal to create a Jewish republic in the Crimea. This letter was first partially published in 1993 in Literaturnaya Gazeta. The letter, in particular, stated that the creation of a Jewish Soviet Republic in accordance with Bolshevik principles and in the spirit of the Leninist-Stalinist national policy would once and for all solve the problem of the legitimate statehood of the Jewish people and the further development of its centuries-old culture. No one has been able to solve this problem for centuries. It can finally be resolved only in our great socialist country. This letter, recorded in the registration books kept in the party archives, is still

has not yet been fully declassified. It was not shown even when, during Yeltsin's visit in 1992, JAC archival materials were shown in Washington. On February 15, 1944, a

draft letter was presented to Molotov. At his direction, Lozovsky, Molotov's deputy, edited this document. The letter was forwarded to Molotov and a new date was set - February 21. Three days later it was registered with the secretariat of the government of the USSR under the number M-23314 and on the same day sent to the secretary of the Central Committee Malenkov, the secretary of the Moscow City Party Committee and the head of the Main Political Directorate of the Armed Forces Shcherbakov and the chairman of the State Planning Commission Voznesensky with instructions to consider this issue.

On this occasion, my father wrote: "I must note that Litvinov, being ambassador to the United States during the war years, in his correspondence with Molotov and the NKVD strongly opposed ties with the Zionist movement, as well as against our active participation in solving the Palestinian problem. I do not remember the exact motivations for Litvinov's position, but its meaning was that our possible influence on the Zionist movement would be extremely insignificant. Therefore, Litvinov considered it expedient to entrust all contacts with Zionist circles exclusively to employees of the Soviet special services or especially verified agents. There is nothing surprising in these recommendations: heading the militant underground organization of the Bolsheviks before the revolution, Litvinov had a very extensive experience in intelligence and operational work, including in attracting people from circles hostile to it to cooperate with the Bolshevik Party. Kheifetz, our intelligence

operative, who was very successful in obtaining materials from the United States on the atomic bomb, told his father that the letter in question was, in essence, a proposal for the formation of a Jewish republic in the Crimea, where Jews from all over the world could come. This, of course, would require the resettlement of the inhabitants of the Crimea. In March and April 1944, the Crimean Tatars were deported. One hundred and fifty thousand people were evicted from the Crimea and transported to Uzbekistan. The fact that the letter, on the one hand, and the deportation order, on the other, are practically dated on the same date (February 15 and 14 respectively) is

coincidence. Stalin's order to expel the Crimean Tatars, who were accused of mass cooperation with the Germans, was signed earlier, but it got to Beria's execution the day before the letter from the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee was received.

The coordination and execution of Stalin's plan to attract Jewish capital was entrusted to Heifetz and Zarubin, a Soviet intelligence resident in Washington, who organized Mikhoels' trip to America in 1943.

Before going to the United States, Mikhoels summoned Beria to the Lubyanka and instructed him on how to establish extensive contacts with American Jews. Our plan was to enlist the support of the American public and obtain the loans needed to develop the steel and coal industries. Mikhoels and Fefer brilliantly coped with their mission.

The success of Mikhoels' trip to America immediately made him suspicious in Stalin's eyes. No wonder, because he, a representative of Jewish culture, became a true hero, known throughout the world, so he was destined for the fate of Erlich and Alter. The role

of Mikhoels and Fefer was also significant, my father said, in the intelligence operation to reach out to the circles of specialist scientists close to Einstein, who were developing at that time an unknown "superweapon". These people met with the Konenkovs, Russian emigrants close to the Einstein family, and through them, though verbally, we received important information about the prospects for a new "superweapon" discussed at Princeton with the participation of Fermi and Oppenheimer. In addition to the Zarubins, Kheifets and Pastelnyak coordinated all this work through our intelligence in the United States.

It was rumored that Mikhoels might be offered the post of chairman of the Supreme Soviet in the Jewish Republic. Apart from Molotov, Lozovsky and several senior officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mikhoels was the only person who knew about the existence of Stalin's plan to create a Jewish state in the Crimea. In this way, Stalin expected to receive 10 billion dollars from the West to restore the war-ravaged economy.

Beria was aware that our initiative was supported by the American side, or rather, by the Jewish organizations of the United States, since he personally received both Mikhoels and Fefer after a trip to America. My father viewed the discussion

of establishing a Jewish republic within the Soviet Union as a kind of probing from the West to find out how far their plans to provide us with economic assistance after the end of the war would go. However, the decision on the establishment of a Jewish republic was postponed until the end of the war, and the letter lay dormant for four years. There were various rumors about its contents. Then, already in 1948, Malenkov used it to conduct a campaign against members of the JAC, and later against the old guard in the leadership of the country. Molotov, Mikoyan, Voroshilov, Voznesensky and, finally, Beria himself, involved in the discussion of the creation of a Jewish republic on the territory of Crimea, themselves, due to the fact that they had Jewish relatives, were vulnerable during this campaign.

The plan to attract American capital was, as my father already mentioned, connected with the idea of creating a Jewish republic in the Crimea, the so-called "Crimean California." This idea was widely discussed in American Jewish circles, as Heifetz told him. According to him, the president of the American Chamber of Commerce, Eric Johnston, was especially interested in the project; Johnston painted a very rosy picture for Stalin, saying that large long-term American loans would be made available to the Soviet Union after the war for this purpose.

The idea of creating a Jewish socialist republic in the Crimea, with the blessing of the American imperialists, who, apparently, did not care what the Jewish republic would be, was openly discussed in Moscow not only among the Jewish population, but also in

the highest echelons of power.

It is known that Mikhoels, as chairman of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee, relied heavily on Fefer, a major NKVD agent (Mikhoels,

of course, did not know about it), which was "led" by the Commissar of State Security Reichman. It happened that Beria himself received Fefer at the safe house to discuss the issue of creating a Jewish republic in the

Crimea. Until June 1945, it seemed that this project remained in force and would already be implemented. During the preparations for the Yalta Conference, Harriman, according to his father, asked him and Molotov's assistant Novikov about how things were going with the formation of the Jewish Republic in connection with future American loans

for this project. Immediately after the war, Stalin discussed with a delegation of American senators a plan to create a Jewish republic in the Crimea and to revive the Gomel region, the place of compact residence of Jews in Belarus. He asked them not to limit loans and technical assistance to these two regions, but to provide it without being tied to specific projects.

Then, in June 1945, after Yalta and the victory over Nazi Germany, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR adopted a decree: Crimea became an administrative region within the RSFSR. Meanwhile, before the war, Crimea was an autonomous republic with a significant representation of the Tatar population in all administrative structures. In November 1945, when Harriman attempted to contact Stalin through Molotov to discuss matters of economic cooperation, his request for a face-to-face meeting was denied at Stalin's direction.

After the war, Stalin preferred to pursue a different line: to intensify attempts to penetrate the ranks of the Zionist movement, because, as a person with a sharpened instinct, he understood that it was in him that a huge destructive potential was laid, especially opposed to states with strong central power. Until 1948, Great Britain had a mandate from the League of Nations to administer the territory of Palestine. Stalin and Molotov hoped to calm the British, who were afraid of being thrown out of Palestine after the creation of a Jewish state there. The project of Jewish autonomy in the Crimea was supposed to divert the attention of the leaders of world Jewry from Palestine as the only option for solving the Jewish problem. When at the end of 1945 it became clear that Stalin did not consider

connected with the former unofficial sounding, the British and Americans organized an Anglo-American Committee on Palestine without the participation of the Soviet Union. This contradicted the previously reached agreement on joint consultations of the military allies on the Palestinian problem.

And in April 1946, as my father recalls, Deputy Foreign Ministers Dekanozov and Vyshinsky sent a memo to the government, emphasizing that the interests of the Soviet Union were ignored: the Palestinian issue would be resolved without the participation of our state. In this document, they proposed a policy of favorable attitude towards the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine.

With the consent of Molotov, Vyshinsky published under a pseudonym an article in the journal *Novoye Vremya*, in which he emphasizes the need to create a democratic Jewish state in the mandated territory of Palestine. The calculation was to strengthen the Soviet position in the Middle East and at the same time undermine British influence in the Arab countries that opposed the emergence of a new state, showing that the British were not able to stop the Jews in their desire to create their own state.

Simultaneously with the political steps being taken, in 1946 the Kremlin received instructions to send our agents to Palestine via Romania. They were supposed to create an illegal intelligence network in Palestine, which could be used in combat and sabotage operations against the British. "For this purpose," my father

recalls, "I singled out three officers: Garbuz, Semenov (real name Taubman, he was Grigulevich's assistant in the Lithuanian underground and helped liquidate Rudolf Klement in Paris in 1938) and Kolesnikov. Garbuz and Kolesnikov had experience of guerrilla warfare in Ukraine and Belarus, where they participated in operations against the German occupation authorities. Semenov and Kolesnikov settled in Haifa and created two intelligence

networks, but did not take part in sabotage against the British. Kolesnikov managed to organize the delivery from Romania to Palestine of small arms and anti-tank grenades captured from the Germans. Semyonov, for his part, tried



renew contact with our agent in the Stern organization. It was an anti-British terrorist group, where Serebryansky managed to send his man in 1937. Garbuz remained in Romania, selecting candidates there for future resettlement in Israel. From the very beginning it was clear to me that

while helping the Jews, it would seem, we actually set ourselves the task of creating our own network of agents within the Zionist political and military structure. Jews aspired to independence and were closely associated with America. But we were not sure that we would be able to influence them, as in Eastern Europe. However, we considered it extremely important to indicate to a certain extent our presence there. As Kheifetz told me, back in 1943, Litvinov, in his message to Molotov from Washington, stressed that Palestine and the creation of a Jewish state would become one of the main issues of post-war world politics.

But in the second half of 1946, Stalin took a position of active opposition to the activities of international Jewish organizations and British-American policy on the Palestinian question - he was irritated by the demands of Soviet Jews to improve their living conditions when they returned from evacuation. At this time, an anti-Zionist campaign began to unfold in the country. This, of course, primarily affected the Jews. "Purges" began in the party apparatus, the diplomatic service, the military leadership and intelligence. The campaign culminated in the "Doctors' Plot" and accusations of Jewish doctors of Zionism. This campaign was a repetition of the "purges" of the 1930s, another Stalinist maneuver to reshuffle the entire party and Soviet apparatus in order to replace the old leadership - Molotov, Mikoyan, Beria and others with new people who would not threaten his position as the sole ruler of the country. . In October 1946, the bogey of Jewish bourgeois nationalism was raised for the first time as a threat to communist

ideology. Abakumov, who had just been appointed Minister of State Security, in a letter to the leader accused the leaders of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee of nationalist propaganda, of

that, in his opinion, they put Jewish interests above the interests of the Soviet country. Such an accusation sounded like a serious warning. Heifetz, who excelled in obtaining information on the atomic bomb and managed to establish high-level contacts in the American Jewish community, fell out of favor. He continued to work in the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee as Secretary for Foreign Relations, but was forced to cut off his contacts with the American Jewish community. In the letter, Abakumov accused the committee of taking upon itself the functions of representing the interests of the Jewish population at the end of the war when returning property to people who returned to their native lands.

Thousands of Jews during the war fled from Kyiv, Minsk, Riga, Leningrad and Moscow, fleeing from the advancing German troops. The Nazis came under the slogan of liberating the Ukrainians and the Balts from "Jewish domination." This found fertile ground among the nationalists who seized houses, apartments and other property of Jews. When the surviving Jews began to return home in 1945, they saw that their property was in the wrong hands. The chairman of the Jewish Anti-Fascist

Committee, Mikhoels, did his best to protect the interests of Jews in property and housing matters. Abakumov, on the other hand, sought to prove that the committee's attempt to protect the interests of Jewish refugees was a manifestation of Jewish bourgeois nationalism. His letter reflected the concerns of local party leaders who had to deal with these issues. The behavior of Mikhoels, speaking on behalf of the Jews returning home, not only alarmed Stalin, but increased his suspicion. And really, just imagine: in the Soviet system, with a strict hierarchy, a person with international prestige and an impeccable reputation suddenly appears and begins to act on his own initiative.

My father became an unwitting witness to anti-Jewish sentiments in the Soviet leadership. "I remember how Khrushchev, then secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine," my father recalled, "called Usman Yusupov, secretary of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan, and complained to him that evacuees during the war in

Tashkent and Samarkand Jews "flock to Ukraine like crows." In this conversation, which took place in 1947, he stated that he simply did not have a place to receive everyone, since the city was destroyed, and it was necessary to stop this flow, otherwise pogroms would begin in Kiev. I was in Yusupov's office at that moment, and he recounted this conversation to me, since I came to him with a request to resettle three thousand Kurds who had fled from Iran to Azerbaijan, led by Barzani. It was extremely dangerous to leave them in the Caucasus, and the leadership decided to resettle the Kurds in Uzbekistan. At that time it was difficult to find housing for the Jewish intelligentsia returning to Kyiv. The problem of their accommodation could not be solved by creating several collective farms, as was done

for the Kurdish refugees. The situation worsened even more. I remember a verbal instruction from Obruchnikov, Deputy Minister of State Security for Personnel, made in the same year 1947, not to accept Jews for officer positions in the state security organs. I could not imagine that such an openly anti-Semitic order came directly from Stalin, and I believed that all this was the work of Abakumov. It became clear to me that the grandiose plan to use the Soviet Jewish intelligentsia to strengthen international cooperation with world Jewry was rejected. Eitingon, who constantly complained about the harassment of his relatives at the university and in medical institutions, was convinced that anti-Semitism was an essential element of state policy. Looking back, I admit that he understood the situation much better than I did.

Beria and Bogdan Kobulov often told me that Stalin loved jokes and anecdotes of an anti-Muslim, and in particular anti-Azerbaijani sense, especially when they were told in the presence of Bagirov, the first secretary of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan, who simply could not stand the mocking intonations of Kobulov, who spoke Russian words with an Azerbaijani accent. This makes me think that the humor directed against this or that national group was to Stalin's liking and he was, in fact, no more an anti-Semite than an anti-Muslim. Stalin and his closest aides showed interest in the Jewish question

in order to extract political dividends in the struggle for power and to consolidate their forces. Thus began the anti-Semitic

"games" in the highest party echelons. After Stalin launched a campaign against the cosmopolitans in 1946-1947, middle-level leadership and rank-and-file party officials began to perceive anti-Semitism as the official line of the party. The term "rootless cosmopolitan" became synonymous with the word "Jew": it meant that Soviet citizens of Jewish nationality, sharing the worldview of the Jews of the West, therefore could not be completely devoted to the Soviet state. To some extent, this was true. The following years proved this. Most of the Jews took part in the so-called "democratic" revolution in Russia, but, of course, not all of them accepted this revolution. Many remained loyal to socialism. But back to the 50s. The campaign against the cosmopolitans coincided with a change in the balance of political power around

Stalin. Malenkov was demoted, and Beria was removed from overseeing any affairs related to state security. Rumors began to circulate that Molotov and Beria surrounded themselves with Jews. Stalin's efforts after the war were aimed at extending the influence of the Soviet Union, first to the countries of Eastern Europe,

located on our borders, and then everywhere where Great Britain competed with the Soviet Union. Stalin foresaw that the Arab countries would turn in our direction, disillusioned with the British and Americans because of their support for Israel. The Arabs therefore had to appreciate the anti-Zionist tendencies in Soviet foreign policy. This was confirmed by the words of Stalin: "Let's agree with the formation of Israel. It will be like an awl in the ass for the Arab states and make them turn their backs on Britain. Ultimately, British influence will be completely undermined in Egypt, Syria, Turkey and Iraq."

The Cold War began in earnest in 1946-1947, when the illusions about the Soviet post-war cooperation with the West. Allied relations during the war with England and America turned into a confrontation. The civil war in China became more and more intense; tensions also rose in Italy and France, where the communists were engaged in a bitter political struggle for power. With the onset of the Cold War, Moscow's hopes for receiving Jewish

capital disappeared. It became clear to the country's leadership that it was no longer necessary to rely on the support of Jewish business circles abroad and

their investments. And the first victim of the change of course was Mikhoels, who was at the very center of discussions on the creation of a Jewish republic in the Crimea. In addition, Stalin received operational materials that Mikhoels allegedly seeks to enlist the support of his son-in-law G. Moroz in order to ensure in the Soviet leadership a solution to the Jewish question that is beneficial to him, to improve the situation of the Jewish population and the development of Jewish culture. The MGB also suspected that through Mikhoels' connections with Zionist organizations in America, some tragic events in the life of the Alliluyevs, Stalin's relatives, became known. Stalin probably feared that Mikhoels' great personal authority might be used by the international Zionist movement for its own purposes. Mikhoels enjoyed worldwide fame and, of course, was a strong, outstanding personality, therefore, under the conditions of the totalitarian regime of that time, there could be no question of using a well-established scheme of arrest and reprisal against him, covered with a fig-leaf trial.

My father said that Mikhoels was liquidated in the so-called "special order" in January 1948. "To my happiness," we read in

his memoirs, "I had nothing to do with this operation. The details of the murder became known to me only in April 1953. I remember that this operation was directly led by Abakumov's deputy Ogoltsov and the Minister of State Security of Belarus Tsanava. Mikhoels and Golubov, who accompanied him, were lured to Tsanava's dacha on the pretext of meeting with leading Belarusian actors, they were given a fatal injection and thrown under the wheels of a truck in order to stage a gangster run-in on the outskirts of Minsk. An employee of the transport department of the Ministry of State Security for the Belarusian Railway was driving the truck. Golubov was an MGB agent among the creative intelligentsia, which Mikhoels, of course, did

not know. In that situation, however, he turned out to be an unwanted witness, since it was with his help that Mikhoels was brought to the dacha.

The news of the death of Mikhoels aroused suspicions in my soul, about which I did not tell anyone. However, I could not imagine that Ogoltsov himself would go to Minsk to personally direct the operation. The murder was committed, as I believed, by some anti-Semitic bandit who was told in advance where and when he could find a person who imagined himself to be a spokesman for Jewish interests. For many months in 1948, my father was preoccupied with even more acute problems, namely the Berlin crisis and the creation of a Kurdish

underground network in Iran, Iraq and Turkey with the aim of overthrowing the government of Nuri Said and Faisal in Iraq, as well as Czechoslovak affairs. Together with Zubov, he flew to Prague to try to neutralize the supporters of President Benes during the transfer of power to the new government headed by Gottwald (this has already been discussed). In 1947, our mother became seriously ill and was soon forced to retire. Back in 1940, according to her father, she showed enough wisdom to move away from operational work and was appointed senior teacher of special disciplines at the Higher School of the NKVD (later

the MGB). From time to time she took part in operational affairs - she contacted female agents representing the leadership of the counterintelligence department, but for the most part she tried to keep a low profile and not draw attention to herself. Her illness coincided with a campaign to "cleanse" Jews in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of State Security and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. She retired with the rank of lieutenant colonel in 1949 and went through the lists of personnel under her maiden name Kaganova. In 1949 and 1950, when my father ~~in 1949~~ <sup>special</sup> made frequent trips to Western Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan and Czechoslovakia, Eitingon performed his duties in the intelligence and sabotage bureau. During this troubled time, he often visited our house, talking with his mother for a long time. His stories were most often connected with the anti-Jewish campaign unfolding in the security agencies, which was gaining momentum and taking on ever greater scope day by day. Eitingon's sister Sonya, a well-known therapist and

head physician of the polyclinic of the automobile plant (now ZIL), was arrested,

Our mother's younger sister, Elizaveta, was expelled from the graduate school at the Medical Institute in Kyiv. Parents tried to somehow help them, using friendly relations with Muzichenko, director of MONIKI in Moscow. In the 1930s he was an illegal NKVD immigrant in France and Austria, but in 1938 he left intelligence and was happy to return to his former profession as a doctor. He hired Aunt Lisa, who, by the way, still works at this institute.

At that time, due to our youth, we, of course, did not know much, we did not always feel those huge experiences that parents got in connection with misfortunes that concerned relatives and friends. Reading about all this in my father's memoirs, I felt all the tragedy of that time, crushing many people whom my father knew, loved, appreciated for their high professionalism and dedication to their work. Here, for example, how he worried about one of the best agents of illegal immigrants Heifetz. "For me," writes my father, "the news of the arrest of Heifetz in 1948 or 1949 was a great blow: here intercession, either mine or Eitingon's, was useless. Both he and I connected this arrest with the anti-Semitic campaign. As a result, almost all members of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee and other figures of Jewish culture were arrested and put on trial on charges of plotting to separate Crimea from the USSR."

The internal struggle for power between 1948 and 1952 caused a new wave of anti-Semitism - the "doctors' cause" arose. Although it was part of an anti-Semitic campaign, it was not limited to Jews alone. Rather, the "doctors' case" was a continuation of the struggle in which old scores were settled in the country's leadership. Stalin, with the help of Malenkov and Khrushchev, wanted to carry out a "cleansing" in the ranks of the old guard and remove Beria from power. Molotov, Voroshilov and Mikoyan, the last of the Mohicans in Stalin's Politburo, were to be the main figures in the notorious "Doctors' Plot". However, the whole truth about the "doctors' case" was never made public, even during the period of Gorbachev's glasnost. The reason is that it was about the dirty struggle for power that unfolded in the Kremlin before the death of Stalin and captured, in essence, the entire leadership.

It is generally accepted that the "doctors' case" began with a hysterical letter to Stalin, in which Jewish doctors were accused of hatching plans to kill the country's leaders with the help of incorrect

treatments and poisons. The author of the letter was Lidia Timashuk, a doctor in the Kremlin polyclinic, who had become notorious. Timashuk's letter, however, was not sent to Stalin in 1952, on the eve of the doctors' arrests, but in August 1948. It claimed that Academician Vinogradov had mistreated Zhdanov and other leaders, resulting in Zhdanov's death. Then Stalin's reaction was expressed in contemptuous "nonsense", and the letter went to the archive. There it remained without any movement for three years, until it was removed at the end of 1951. The letter was needed as a tool in the

struggle for power. All members of the Politburo knew about the letter—they also knew about the Stalinist reaction. However, the most important thing is that Timashuk did not accuse anyone of conspiracy. In the letter, she only signaled the shortcomings and omissions that had taken place, half invented, in providing treatment to the leaders of the party and state. For this reason, the text of the letter has not yet been published, it sets out, in essence, the mutual claims of the medical staff to each other, as a rule, of a quarrelsome nature. According to my father, Colonel Ludwigov, Beria's assistant for the Politburo and the Council of Ministers, told him about this already in the Vladimir prison. "I always believed that Abakumov started the 'doctors' case' as a continuation of the campaign against cosmopolitans," my father wrote in his memoirs. - However, in 1990, when I got to the military prosecutor's office, where I was called as a witness in connection with a new investigation into the Abakumov case in the post-war years, I learned something else. It turned out that he was not the initiator of the "doctors' case", on the contrary, Abakumov, who was arrested in 1951, was accused of hiding data about a conspiracy aimed at killing Stalin. He did this ostensibly in order to seize power. At the same time, Abakumov, according to his accusers, relied on Jewish doctors and Jewish employees in the apparatus of the Minister of State Security, in particular on Eitingon. Malenkov and Beria undoubtedly sought to eliminate Abakumov,

and both were ready to use any means to achieve their goal. Sukhanov, an assistant to Malenkov, in the spring of 1951, received in the reception room of the Central Committee the investigator of the Investigative Unit for Especially Important Cases of the MGB, Lieutenant Colonel Ryumin, known for his



anti-Semitism. The result of this meeting became fatal for the fate of the Soviet Jewish intelligentsia. At that time, Ryumin was afraid of being fired from the state security agencies due to a reprimand he received for leaving a folder with the investigation materials on the official bus. In addition, he hid from the party and the state security personnel department that his father was a fist, that his brother and sister were accused of stealing, and that his father-in-

law served in Kolchak's army. We must pay tribute to Abakumov: he was well aware that Ryumin's earlier attempts to present the arrested doctors as terrorists were just a prelude to the "doctors' case." For several months in 1950, he somehow managed to keep Ryumin in check. In order to save his career and give vent to his anti-Semitic sentiments, Ryumin willingly met Sukhanov's demand to write a letter to Stalin exposing Abakumov. In this letter, sent on June 2, 1951, addressed

to Stalin, Lieutenant Colonel of the Investigative Unit for Particularly Important Cases M. D. Ryumin accused the leadership of the MGB and, above all, Minister Abakumov of a "Jewish conspiracy", that he "covered up" the terrorist plans of Jewish nationalists and enemy agents directed against the Soviet leadership and Comrade Stalin personally. Because of this, the MGB violates socialist legality and, grossly ignoring the requirements set forth in the decree of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of November 17, 1938, deliberately do not record all interrogations of those under investigation. In addition, Ryumin reported that Minister Abakumov unscrupulously enriched himself by embezzling trophy property and showed immodesty in everyday life. "Thirty years after the

events described," my father recalled, "my relative, who worked as a typist in Malenkov's secretariat (Sukhanov was his immediate superior), told me that Ryumin was so uneducated and illiterate that he rewrote his letter eleven times with accusations against Abakumov. Sukhanov kept him in the waiting room for about six hours, while he himself negotiated with Malenkov about the content of the letter to Stalin. Only Sukhanov knows why Ryumin was chosen to accuse Abakumov of conspiracy. However, he didn't say anything about that side.

cases when he appeared on Russian television in July 1992 in a program about the history of the "conspiracy of doctors".

In his letter accusing Abakumov (at the suggestion of Malenkov), Ryumin stated that he had ordered the Investigative Unit not to proceed with materials on a Zionist conspiracy directed against the leaders of the Soviet state. By this time, a number of well-known Jewish

doctors had already been arrested for anti-Soviet Zionist propaganda. Perhaps the most famous of them, the world-famous specialist Etinger, tragically died in prison during interrogation. This happened even before Abakumov's arrest. Ryumin accused Abakumov of being responsible for Etinger's death, as he deliberately placed him in a cold cell in the Lefortovo prison in order to remove one of the participants in the "plot of doctors" and thereby prevent him from betraying other Zionist conspirators. To make these accusations more convincing, Timashuk's letter was extracted from the archive. Abakumov, more experienced in such intrigues than Ryumin, was afraid to exaggerate the "Zionist conspiracy" by resorting to too obvious falsifications. He foresaw

that Stalin might demand real evidence in this highly risky provocative game. In addition, Abakumov knew perfectly well that in cases where the initiative belonged to the top leadership, it was not supposed to show one's own. Some of the arrested physicians were Stalin's attending physicians. Many of them were connected with members of the Politburo at times not only by professional, but also by trusting relationships. Considering all the circumstances, Abakumov was not eager to expand the scope of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee to the level of a world conspiracy. He knew that such accusations would certainly cause tension at the top, especially Voroshilov and Molotov, who were

married to Jewish women, and Kaganovich, who was himself a Jew. The caution shown by Abakumov played a fatal role in his fate.

Energetic Ryumin, meanwhile, was appointed head of the Investigative Unit for Particularly Important Cases, and then Deputy Minister of State Security for investigative work. This unleashed him

hands for juggling materials against Abakumov in order to, after eliminating him, to freely promote the case of the "conspiracy of doctors" and the leading employees of the MGB participating in it - Jews on nationality.

The Ryumin investigators demanded that Abakumov name the members of his cabinet of ministers, which he allegedly intended to create after the overthrow of Stalin. He was also accused of hiding the treacherous plans of Molotov's wife, Polina Zhemchuzhina, in particular her contacts with the Israeli politician Golda Meir. Abakumov vehemently denied his guilt, arguing that he did not hide any

materials about the "conspiracy of doctors" and, moreover, was not its leader or inspirer and did not involve subordinate Jewish employees from the Ministry of State Security in the "conspiracy". He continued to completely deny the charges against him, even under torture; they never made a "confession" from him. Thus, the "conspiracy" case at the Ministry of State Security depended on the confessions of Colonel Shvartsman, a journalist by profession. While working in the Investigative Unit, he, as a rule, did not interrogate himself, but mainly edited falsified testimonies torn from prisoners. When Stalin ordered the arrest of the head of the Investigation Department, Leonov, and his deputies, Shvartsman, a Jew by nationality, was one of those arrested. He testified that he was Abakumov's assistant in the Zionist terrorist organization, which included all the top officers of the MGB. During interrogation, he "confessed" that he allegedly received from Abakumov the task of creating a group of Jewish conspirators in the Ministry of State Security to develop terrorist actions against members of the government. Shvartsman also "confessed" that, as a homosexual, he was in an intimate relationship with Abakumov, his son and the British ambassador to Moscow. According to him, he used his homosexual contacts with American double agents Gavrilov and Lavrentiev to receive instructions and orders for Jewish conspirators through these people embedded in the US Embassy.

Shvartsman knew well how the investigative machine worked, and in order to prove his cooperation, he brought one charge after another against Jewish officials. At the same time, he invented the most incredible stories, such as this: he was assisted in terrorist activities by the Zionist "soup", which his aunt cooked according to old recipes. He also told investigators that he slept with his stepdaughter and at the same time had a homosexual relationship with his son. He sought to be sent for a psychiatric examination - and such a proposal was made by the deputy military prosecutor, Colonel Uspensky. When the accusations made by Shvartsman against thirty employees of the Ministry of State Security of Nationality involved in terrorism were reported to Stalin, he told Ignatiev and Ryumin: "You are both Jews. This bastard is just wasting time. No expertise. Arrest the entire group immediately." (Ludwigov told me about this when we were both in prison.)"

By order of Stalin, all Jews were arrested - responsible employees of the central apparatus of the Ministry of State Security. This is how Eitingon, Raikhman, the Deputy Ministers of State Security, Lieutenant General Pitovranov and Selivanovsky ended up behind bars. They also arrested retired colonel Maklyarsky, who by that time had become a very famous screenwriter, specializing in scenarios from the life of intelligence officers: Shvartsman mentioned him in his testimony. The son of the first head of the Soviet state Sverdlov, Colonel Andrei Sverdlov, was also thrown into prison. Together with these people, their immediate subordinates, Russians by

nationality, were also arrested. In the MGB and the Investigative Department, new faces from party bodies appeared. They, as a rule, were distinguished by complete incompetence. In the wake of the growing anti-Semitic campaign and hysteria, the leadership of the Investigative Unit for Particularly Important Cases of the MGB was strengthened by special decisions of the Central Committee of the CPSU in 1951-1953 by Konyakhin and Mesyatsev. The latter had extensive experience during the war years as the head of the investigative department in the front-line bodies of the military counterintelligence SMERSH. In the 1960s and 1970s, Mesyatsev became chairman of the USSR State Radio and Television, then ambassador to Aus

Of all the arrested "conspirators in the MGB" only Abakumov, Eitingon, Pitovranov and Matusov did not admit to anything guilty.

The Jewish doctors arrested by Ryumin, who were under investigation, were accused of carrying out the tasks of Abakumov. The crimes attributed to the members of the Doctors' Plot seemed incredible to my father. One of these "terrorists", Professor Alexander Feldman, treated our entire family, enjoyed our full confidence, and my father and mother always congratulated him on the holidays and sent him flowers.

According to Ryumin's scenario, Eitingon's sister Sonya, who allegedly maintained contact between medical scientists and her brother, who planned the assassination of the country's leaders, was supposed to play the role of a liaison between doctors and "conspirators in the MGB".

The arrests were not publicly reported at that time, and no one immediately realized the extent of this "purge" in the MGB. Father later remembered:

"I felt the seriousness of the threat when I made an attempt to contact Colonel Shubnyakov, Deputy Head of the Main Counterintelligence Directorate. The attempt was unsuccessful, although at that moment I urgently needed a certificate of verification for one important agent. Only he could give the information that I needed, and Shubnyakov seemed to have sunk into the water. Meanwhile, no one wanted to clearly explain where he had gone, although due to my official position (head of the Special Bureau for Intelligence and Subversion) and rank (lieutenant general), I had the right to do so. Outraged, I contacted Pitovranov, head of the counterintelligence service, but it turned out that he could not be contacted either: he mysteriously disappeared. Then it dawned on me that the same thing that happened during the period of mass arrests in the pre-war years was being repeated. Both Shubnyakov and Pitovranov were already in Lefortovo prison by that time. In 1951, when Abakumov was

arrested, I got a call from Ryumin, who had just been appointed head of the Investigative Department of the MGB. He stated that he had in his possession serious incriminating material on Eitingon and his sister. Eitingon at that moment was on a three-month business trip in Lithuania. I

I asked them to bring these materials to me: I wanted to get acquainted with them personally. An hour later, Ryumin appeared with a skinny dossier. There was no evidence against Eitingon, but against Sonya there were excerpts from undercover reports that she refused medical assistance to the Russians, and treated and advised only Jews. I told Ryumin that this did not convince me at all and Eitingon, in my eyes, still remains a reliable and trustworthy responsible officer of the security agencies. Rumin replied:

But the Central Committee found these data quite convincing. - And then, snatching the folder from my hands, he left with an angry look. The

situation in the Ministry of State Security was confusing and extremely uncertain. Minister Abakumov was under arrest in Matrosskaya Tishina. However, his place remained vacant - no successor was appointed. When I called Deputy Minister Ogoltsov to discuss with him the situation with Eitingon's sister, he replied: "This is a political matter, and it can only be

considered in the Central Committee." parties.

According to him, until a new minister is appointed, he will not sign any papers or give any orders.

After the conversation with Ogoltsov, there was only one thing left for me: to call Ignatiev, the then secretary of the Central Committee of the party, who oversaw the work of the MGB-MVD. He was a member of the Central Committee commission created by Stalin to reorganize the ministry after Abakumov's arrest. I have already been called to one meeting, and, I confess, I criticized the leadership of the ministry for mistakes in conducting intelligence and counterintelligence operations abroad, as well as in Western Ukraine and Central Asia. Ignatiev then said that he was ready, if necessary, to discuss this or that urgent issue with me. When I called him, he seemed happy to accept me at the Central Committee in Staraya Square.

When I met him, I said that I was troubled by attempts to slander Eitingon and his sister by attributing nationalist views to them. Ignatiev summoned Ryumin to his office with materials on Eitingon and his sister. In my presence, Ryumin, opening a folder, began to read extremely unintelligible testimony against

Eitingon and his sister, which stated that they both show hostility towards the Soviet state. This time, intelligence reports that Sonya refused to treat the Russians were not even mentioned.

“As members of the Party, we are obliged,” I said, “to evaluate people not by rumors, but by their deeds. Here is the work of Eitingon: the organizer of the action to eliminate Trotsky in Mexico, the creator of a successfully operating intelligence network abroad, and finally, he is one of the key figures in providing our country with secret information about atomic weapons. Rumin was silent.

Ignatiev interrupted

me: “Let's leave Eitingon and his family alone. After meeting with Ignatiev, my heart was relieved:

I thought,

that nothing bad would happen to Eitingon and his sister.

About a month later, Ignatiev was appointed Minister of State Security. And in October 1951, it was on his direct instructions that Eitingon was arrested when he returned to Moscow from Lithuania, where he managed to neutralize the leadership of an anti-Soviet underground organization. His stepdaughter Zoya Zarubina told me that Eitingon was arrested in front of her at Vnukovo airport.

Eitingon's arrest put an end to Zoya Zarubina's service in our intelligence agencies. She successfully worked with materials on atomic weapons, at the Yalta and Potsdam conferences, but was forced to leave the bodies after his arrest. Her excellent knowledge of English helped her become one of the leading teachers at the Institute of Foreign Languages, and later she supervised the training of translators for the United Nations. A few days after Eitingon's arrest, I had the opportunity to meet with Ignatiev

at a meeting of the leadership of the ministry. Taking me aside, he reproachfully said:

“You were wrong about Eitingon. What do you think of him now? I still remember

my answer: - My assessment is based on the specific results of the work people and on the party line.

Here I must dwell a little on my illusions. I have always viewed the "Doctors' Plot" and the "Zionist conspiracy" as

sheer fiction spread by criminals like Ryumin, who then reported the "results" of the investigation to incompetent people like Ignatiev. Every time I met Ignatiev, I was amazed at how incompetent this person was. Each agent's message was perceived by him as the discovery of America. He could be convinced of anything: as soon as he read any document, he immediately fell under the influence of what he read, not trying to double-check the facts.

Ignatiev was completely unsuited for the work entrusted to him. Once, while holding a meeting on operational issues in his office in the morning, which was attended by more than ten people, he suddenly fell into a real hysteria because of a phone call from General Blokhin, head of the commandant's office of the MGB. I remember how he literally shouted into the

phone: - You are obliged to act according to the law. No one gave you the right to drag me into your affairs!

Hanging up, he explained: "I can't stand these calls from Blokhin. Always asking me to sign death warrants. He says that there is an instruction for this. Why should I have anything to do with all this and sign these papers?! There is the Supreme Court, let Blokhin act according to the law. No one answered. There was an awkward silence in the office. Ignatiev easily started criminal cases against innocent people. Later I

realized that he did not act on his own initiative, but carried out orders received from above - from Stalin, Malenkov and others. When TASS announced that well-known doctors and medical scientists in the country were

accused of organizing a Zionist plot to kill Stalin and the entire Politburo through improper treatment, I considered this a provocation, a continuation of an earlier anti-Semitic campaign. When materials with accusations against Eitingon came to me, I learned that he allegedly trained the doctors of the conspirators to conduct terrorist actions against Stalin and members of the Soviet government. In this regard, the indictment stated, Eitingon kept in his office mines, explosive devices disguised as ordinary



electrical appliances. Meanwhile, everyone knew very well that these were samples of operational equipment, which was constantly at our disposal. In

those days, Moscow was literally flooded with rumors, one worse than the other: Jewish doctors and pharmacists were trying to poison ordinary Soviet people. There was also talk of possible pogroms. I was overcome with anxiety when the children—they were ten and twelve years old then—returned from school and told us about these rumors. My wife and I found ourselves in a very difficult position: it was extremely risky for the children of high-ranking state security officials to speak out against brazen anti-Semitic statements, since any dispute would simply draw attention to them and their parents. This would certainly have become known at the top - the party organs, which controlled all spheres of public life. Our children went to school together with the children of Malenkov and

Kaganovich, which meant that the school was under constant surveillance. Our children could not even afford to say that Lenin and Stalin were always against manifestations of anti-Semitism, since such a statement would immediately be interpreted in a completely different spirit and distorted beyond recognition. My wife and I advised our sons to say that they need to be especially vigilant, that

rumors that are a provocation should not be spread. We all then had to adhere to the official version of events given by the Pravda newspaper, and there was not even a hint of pogroms in it. And spreading rumors is playing with fire, especially dangerous because it plays into the hands of the enemies of the people. Another thing is the feeling of indignation towards traitors and specific terrorists, we taught our children. I wonder how they would say this at a pioneer meeting, I thought. Shortly after this conversation, the director of the school called and thanked for the excellent upbringing of children. According to him, he was in a rather difficult situation: after all, many Jewish children studied at the school. The director told his wife: Your children's speech at the pioneer meeting that the spread of rumors is a provocation caused a roar of approval and defuse the tense situation.

Gradually, the campaign that was inflated around the "Zionist conspiracy" began to clearly get out of the control of its organizers. Ryumin and Ignatiev supported the accusations of the Minister of State Security of Georgia Rukhadze against Beria that he concealed his Jewish origin and secretly plotted against Stalin in Georgia. Beria was first on Stalin's list for destruction.

By August 1952, the so-called "Crimean case", which had been dragging on since 1948, ended - all the arrested members of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee, except for Lina Stern, and the former Deputy Foreign Minister Lozovsky were shot. In my father's opinion, Kheifetz was left alive only so that he could testify against Beria and Molotov when the time came to charge them with establishing links with the circles of international Zionism, under whose dictation the proposal to create a Jewish republic in the Crimea was initiated.

The father's opinion, as he said, was based on reading the materials of the Abakumov case, which he met in the military prosecutor's office forty years after the events described, and Kirill Stolyarov's book "Golgotha", dedicated to the circumstances of Abakumov's death. My father

always believed that Ryumin was investigating the "doctors' case" until Stalin's death. But Stalin turned out to be far-sighted enough to understand: the conspiracy, as Ryumin painted it, was too primitive and one could hardly believe in it. Ryumin gave only a bare outline of the "conspiracy" but could not fill it with convincing details that would make this fiction look plausible. On November 12, 1952, Stalin ordered Ryumin to be dismissed from the MGB as having failed in his duties and seconded to the reserve of the Party Central Committee. Ryumin was appointed to the modest position of an accountant, which he held before starting work in the authorities. And before that, Ryumin worked as an accountant in the Arkhangelsk consumer cooperation. Thus, since January 1953,

when the TASS report about the "conspiracy of doctors" was published, the Minister of State Security Ignatiev, his first deputy

Goglidze, Deputy Personnel Officer Epishev, heads of the Investigation Department Konyakhin, Grishaev, Months

and others. Those who came to leading work in the state security organs during this especially terrible period by decision of the Central Committee - Ignatiev, Epishev, Mesyatsev - not only were not held accountable, but, on the contrary, in the 50-70s received high appointments to responsible party and Soviet work. Goglidze was made the scapegoat as an accomplice of Beria and the illiterate pathological anti-Semite Ryumin. Father recalled

how at the end of February 1953, a few days before Stalin's death, he noticed a growing uncertainty in Ignatiev's behavior. Intuition told my father that the entire anti-Semitic campaign was about to bog down and its organizers would become unwanted witnesses and be arrested. And indeed, after the death of Stalin, Beria accused Ignatiev of deceiving the party and sought to bring him to criminal responsibility, but did not receive support from the Presidium of the Central Committee.

Among those who were interrogated in the case of the so-called "Zionist conspiracy" was Mairanovsky, head of the toxicology "Laboratory-X". In 1951, he was arrested - he was immediately made a key figure in the "Zionist conspiracy" in the MGB, since he knew all the accused academic doctors and worked closely with them. Later, they wanted to make him a participant in the "conspiracy of doctors." According to Ryumin,

Mairanovsky acted in accordance with the instructions of Eitingon - in order to eliminate the entire top leadership of the country. Ryumin did not realize what shaky ground he was stepping on: in fact, in his top-secret work, Mairanovsky carried out the orders of Stalin himself. During interrogations, the head of "Laboratory-X" confessed to everything that was asked of him. True, Ignatiev soon felt that Ryumin had gone too far, and decided to separate Mairanovsky from the case of the "conspiracy of doctors." Stalin's death put an end to the "cause of doctors", but anti-Semitism continued to be a very formidable force.

The "doctors' case" seriously undermined the prestige of doctors in society and caused a wave of distrust towards people in this profession. After the false conspiracy was exposed, the rivals

groups in scientific medical circles were in a difficult position. A friend of our family, Professor Muzichenko, the rector of the Moscow Regional Scientific Institute of Clinical Research (MONIKI), told my father that influential people in the government are always involved in one way or another in the medical dispute, since it is on them that funding for scientific research depends. The "doctors' cause" taught officials to avoid any professional disputes, since it is never possible to predict which of the conflicting parties will receive support at the top, and which will be a political loser and even require the intervention of security agencies. This created an unfavorable atmosphere for scientific disputes and delayed the adoption of government decisions on appropriations for health care. Fears still persist that conflicts over medical and other professional issues may end up in an investigation at the Lubyanka.

Now they say that on the eve of Stalin's death there was a plan for the deportation of Jews from Moscow. If such a plan really existed, references to it can be found in the archives of the state security agencies and the Moscow Committee of the Party, because in its scope it certainly required a lot of preliminary preparation. In this case, there must have been some kind of directive approved by the government at least a month before the start of such an action. Rather, we are talking only about a rumor, possibly based on the statements of Stalin or Malenkov, who found out the attitude of society towards Jews in connection with the "doctors' case".

Despite the atmosphere of intolerance towards Jews that arose under Stalin and continued under Khrushchev, the so-called selective approach to their intelligentsia was observed, according to which individual small groups of creative intelligentsia and highly qualified professional specialists were allowed to occupy a prominent position in society. The "Zionist conspiracy" and the elimination of Beria put an end to the admission of Jews to responsible positions in the intelligence service and the Central Committee of the party. From

the point of view of Soviet thinking, the intention to create a Jewish republic with support from abroad was seen as gross interference in our internal affairs. Foreign participation is unheard of in our closed society.

Father recalled: "When at one time I probed Harriman's attitude towards the creation of a Jewish republic, I followed the instructions received from Beria. I knew that such probing often leads to no results, and is just a common intelligence gathering practice. At that time, I could not even imagine that the mere fact of participating in such a discussion could threaten me with a death sentence. The tragedy was that in a closed society, which was the Soviet Union, the creation of the State of Israel in 1948 was perceived as an undesirable existence for the Jews, as it were, of a second homeland. And that was it.

## Chapter

# 22 STALIN'S LAST YEARS

In 1946, Stalin appointed Abakumov Minister of State Security, and this changed the balance of power in his entourage. At that time, he carefully concealed his true goals, and even his close associates thought that the new appointments in the Kremlin tops (Zhdanov was transferred from Leningrad to Moscow, Kuznetsov was introduced to the Secretariat of the Central Committee, Rodionov became the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Russian Federation) were just ordinary insignificant rearrangements. But it wasn't. Stalin once again brought new people into the leadership to emphasize his superiority over rival factions in the Kremlin.

In 1946–1948, Zhdanov had the second voice after Stalin in making party and government decisions. Two episodes shed new light on the struggle for power. The first is the case of concealing the facts of the production of low-quality products in the aircraft industry; the second, connected with the first, is the resignation of Marshal Zhukov and other heroes of the

war. It all started with the accusation of Air Chief Marshal Novikov and People's Commissar of the Aviation Industry Shakhurin of hiding defects on aircraft, which caused plane crashes. Abakumov, as head of military counterintelligence in 1945, reported letters from pilots complaining about the poor quality of aircraft. When he was appointed Minister of State Security, he initiated a criminal case against the leaders of the aviation industry and Novikov, the commander-in-chief of the Air Force, on Stalin's instructions, for allegedly concealing these problems. Stalin was furious when his son Vasily, an Air Force general, and Abakumov reported that top officials of the aviation industry deliberately concealed equipment defects in order to receive bonuses and awards. Malenkov, according to his position in the Politburo, was responsible for industry and received a gold medal and

the title of Hero of Socialist Labor for outstanding work in organizing the production of military products.

The investigation showed that the number of air crashes with tragic consequences was distorted. Basically, all these cases were attributed to the mistakes of the pilots, and not to the shortcomings of the equipment. Before the war, failures were severely punished. When Valery Chkalov, a pilot who made a non-stop flight over the North Pole to America, died in a plane crash in 1938, the employee responsible for Chkalov's safety was arrested and shot for negligence that led to the death of a national hero.

When Stalin, at a meeting of the highest officials of the MGB in July 1946, asked Abakumov: "The guilt of Novikov and Shakhurin has been proven. What kind of punishment do you propose? - he immediately answered: "Shooting." - "It's easy to shoot; harder to get it to work. We must make them work," Stalin said unexpectedly.

Novikov and Shakhurin were arrested, and Stalin demanded confessions from them in order to expose the military leadership. Their confessions were filed in the files of Marshal Zhukov and other generals and posed a serious threat to Malenkov. Stalin used these confessions to remove Marshal Zhukov from the post of his deputy and commander-in-chief of the ground forces in 1946. An order dated June 9, 1946, signed by the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, accused Zhukov of "lack of modesty", "excessive personal ambitions" and "attributing to himself a decisive role in carrying out all major combat operations during the war, including those in which he did not play at all no role." Zhukov was demoted and appointed commander of the Odessa Military District. The order also stated that "Marshal Zhukov, feeling embittered, decided to gather around him losers, commanders who were relieved of their posts, thus becoming in opposition to the government and the High Command."

These accusations were based on the confessions of Marshal Novikov, who, under duress, was forced to testify against Zhukov. In a letter to Stalin, he spoke about Zhukov's ambitions and said that he had "anti-Stalinist conversations" with him, and also helped to hide his origins from the family of the royal policeman.

The removal of Zhukov had far-reaching consequences. This was the beginning of a campaign to debunk a number of military leaders - heroes of the Great Patriotic War. So Stalin wanted to get rid of potential rivals. Soon, Admiral Kuznetsov, commander of the Navy, was removed, and as a result of the reshuffle, Bulganin became the Minister of the Armed Forces. But he was unable to cope with serious problems in the Armed Forces and avoided responsibility for making decisions. Letters demanding an immediate response went unsigned for months. The entire Secretariat of the Council of Ministers was horrified by this style of work, especially when Stalin, having left for the Caucasus on vacation, entrusted Bulganin with the duties of Chairman of the Council of Ministers. Beria personally turned to Stalin with a request to expedite the

passage of documents on the atomic bomb, which were in Bulganin's secretariat. Stalin allowed his deputies to sign the most important decrees, bypassing Bulganin. Thus, a precedent arose in the Council of Ministers for the creation of bureaus for various areas of government work. Bulganin, in my father's opinion, had not the slightest political principles - an obedient slave of any

leader. Stalin, for his loyalty, appointed Bulganin First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers, and Khrushchev, for the same reason, made him Chairman of the Council of Ministers to replace Malenkov. Later, in 1957, when Bulganin, together with Malenkov, Molotov, Kaganovich and Voroshilov, tried to remove Khrushchev, Nikita Sergeevich at a meeting of the party activists put forward an original accusation against him: "He was a Stalinist informer. For this, Stalin made him Marshal of the Soviet Union. Of course, after we uncovered his anti-Party treacherous behavior, we will strip him of his rank and demote him." This was told to my father by his former deputy, Colonel Studnikov, who was present at that meeting.

By appointing Bulganin, whom the military did not respect, as Minister of the Armed Forces, Stalin achieved his goal and became the arbiter of the destinies of both real commanders - such as Vasilevsky, Zhukov, Shtemenko, Konev, Rokossovsky and Bagramyan - and Bulganin himself. Bulganin would never have taken responsibility for



any serious decision, even within his competence, although no one could do anything without his resolution. Thus, none of the parties - neither the true leaders, nor the puffed up figure - could act independently of each other. This encouraged hostility and rivalry between the military.

Abakumov arrested generals close to Zhukov in Germany on charges that at first seemed non-political: embezzlement of funds and removal of valuables, furniture, paintings and jewelry from Germany and Austria for himself. From the recently published archival materials it is clear that testimonies about the anti-Stalinist statements of G.K. Zhukov were beaten out of these people.

In 1944, during the war, Stalin ordered that Bogdan Kobulov, Beria's deputy, install listening devices in Zhukov's Moscow apartment. Listening to the apartments of Zhukov and Admiral Kuznetsov did not give the results that were so hoped for. However, some well-known marshals and generals were imprisoned, and some of them were shot for anti-Stalinist statements recorded by eavesdropping devices, or in connection with testimony that was forced out of them by Abakumov's people.

Zhukov and Kuznetsov, retaining their dignity, openly admitted their mistakes. Zhukov "repented" that he awarded the famous singer Ruslanova with the Order of the Red Star. Although during the war he had such a right, in peacetime only the Supreme Council could award.

Marshal Kulik and General Rybalchenko were shot in 1950. The rest were in prison; they were released after Stalin's death. Novikov and Admiral Kuznetsov were reinstated in 1951-1953, and after Stalin's death, all charges were dropped from them. Zhukov remained in the post of commander of the military district, in 1952 Stalin introduced him to the Central Committee. Only after March 1953 was he recalled back to Moscow and appointed First Deputy Minister of Defense.

Zhukov, of course, was hostile to the entire apparatus of the Ministry of State Security. He didn't care who gave orders to follow him - Beria, Abakumov or Bogdan Kobulov; they all climbed into his personal life. Listening to Zhukov's apartment was stopped in 1953, after Stalin's death, but

resumed by Khrushchev in 1957, and Brezhnev continued to audition until Zhukov's death in 1974. Even in retirement, Zhukov remained a potential threat to Khrushchev and Brezhnev, a military hero who could lead the military opposition if he were nominated by the military. Viktor Abakumov was born in 1908. He served as Minister of State Security from

1946 to 1951. Despite the fact that he had no education, he, thanks to his innate intelligence and firmness of character, climbed to the very top. His work in the Cheka began with the technical support of operations, he did not deal with agents and was engaged in safe houses, cars. Later, during the "purge" of the 1930s, he made a name for himself under Bogdan Kobulov, Beria's deputy. Shortly before the war, Abakumov was promoted: he became deputy people's commissar of internal affairs. When Mikheev, head of military counterintelligence, shot himself while surrounded by Kiev, Stalin replaced him with Abakumov, then only thirty-four years old. In his new position, Abakumov was responsible for the political reliability of the troops and the fight against German espionage in the Armed Forces; at the same time, he gained experience in intelligence and counterintelligence matters. He could not be compared with Beria in terms of professional abilities, but his business acumen greatly distinguished him from the rest of the apparatchiks. In December 1945, Beria was relieved of the post of People's Commissar of Internal Affairs, which he had held since the end of 1938. He no longer supervised the security agencies, if it did not directly concern his main work: he led the Special Committee on Problem Number One - the atomic bomb and fuel and energy

complex.

When Abakumov was appointed Minister of State Security instead of Merkulov in 1946, he was not close to Beria. On the contrary, Stalin instructed Abakumov to collect dirt on everyone in whose hands was power, including Beria. Abakumov was able to prove that Malenkov was well aware of the concealment of problems in the aircraft industry, and in 1947 he was reprimanded, removed from his post and temporarily exiled to Kazakhstan. He was removed from the Secretariat of the Central Committee, and his duties passed to Kuznetsov, a protégé

Zhdanov. Abakumov and Kuznetsov established the closest friendly relationship.

However, two months later, Stalin appointed Malenkov Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers. Beria at that time supported Malenkov and did not hide the fact that they often met. Abakumov, for his part, informed Stalin that Malenkov and Beria were repressed leaders of the aviation industry and the military.

sympathize

The alignment of forces in Stalin's entourage was as follows: both Beria and Malenkov maintained close working relations with Pervukhin and Saburov, who dealt with economic issues. They were all part of the same group. They promoted their people to positions of power in government. The second group, later called the Leningrad group, included Voznesensky, First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers and

head of the State Planning Commission, Zhdanov, Second Secretary of the Central Committee of the Party, Kuznetsov, Secretary of the Central Committee, responsible for personnel, including the state security agencies, Rodionov, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Russian Federation, Kosygin - Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers for Light Industry and Finance, nominated during the preparation and implementation of the monetary reform, and after the "Leningrad case" transferred to a low-prestige job in the Ministry of Light Industry.

The second group appointed its people to the posts of secretaries of district party organizations. Kuznetsov in 1945 nominated Popov, the former director of an aircraft factory, as secretary of the Moscow Party Organization, and Popov became a member of the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee and secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks at the same time. Zhdanov encouraged his attempts to control the ministers through elections to the Moscow Party Committee. Zhdanov and Kuznetsov exercised dual control over members of the government through Popov and through the Central Committee.

Yeltsin tried to do something similar when he became secretary of the Moscow Party Committee. This is one of the reasons for his conflict with the apparatus of the Central Committee. Thus,

members of the government could be manipulated without the intervention of Beria, Malenkov and Pervukhin. When Zhdanov died in 1948, Popov demanded that the ministers

as party members, obeyed him as head of the Moscow Party Committee. Malenkov, seeking to remove Popov, interpreted his demand as evidence of a "conspiracy" and the emergence of an "independent" center of power in the Moscow Party organization. Malenkov's opinion was supported by the ministers, who complained to Stalin that Popov constantly interfered in their work. Stalin

encouraged this rivalry; he knew that his power would not suffer. In addition, Stalin was aware that the struggle for power within his old guard gave him the opportunity to get rid of them all at the first opportunity. He could always replace them with young party workers from the field who had no experience of intrigue at the top. A year after Churchill

delivered his famous speech at Fulton in 1946 and the Cold War began, a chill in all aspects of Soviet intellectual life immediately followed, so-called scientific discussions arose in biology, literary criticism and linguistics, philosophy, political economy. Both Kremlin groups used this campaign to their own advantage, trying to find ideological sins in their opponents. It was not just a confrontation between Jews (cosmopolitans) and orthodox communists; the essence of the campaign, rather, was a radical shuffling of personnel in scientific and creative circles in the interests of the ruling elite.

Everyone knows the "case of biologists": the disputes over genetics that arose in the 1930s quickly moved from the field of science to the field of politics. On one side were world-famous biologists who justified the need to fund further research in genetics. They were opposed by a group of careerists in science, headed by Trofim Lysenko, who speculated on Marxist ideology. He presented the government with a picture of an uninterrupted food supply based on the achievements of Marxist biology, promised a new era of abundance in ten years, openly fought against geneticists, arguing that they were putting sticks in the wheels of progress. His promises turned out to be a bluff. A new debate began, articles in scientific journals criticized Lysenko and his followers. Prominent scientists wrote to the Central Committee exposing the serious mistakes of the Kremlin biologist.

Zhdanov nominated his son Yuri, who at one time was married to Stalin's daughter Svetlana, to the post of head of the Department of Science of the Central Committee of the CPSU. Yuri Zhdanov supported Lysenko's critics. This used information from Abakumov from scientific biological circles, obtained from trustworthy sources, that Academician Lysenko was trying to deceive the government by unfoundedly reporting on his achievements in agrobiolgy, which are actually absent. In their letters, scientists said that Lysenko's reign in agrobiolgy since the 1930s and his rejection of any research on genetics were detrimental to scientific progress. Ludvigov, head of Beria's secretariat in the Council of Ministers, told my father how

Zhdanov used this situation to increase his influence in scientific circles. He was not a supporter of the freedom of scientific activity, he was not interested in the actual scientific issues - he was rather worried about the expansion of his influence. The speeches of scientists against Lysenko helped him appoint his people to posts that control science and industry.

After Zhdanov's death, the official line in science again began to lean towards Lysenko's support and rejection of genetics. Unfortunately, published works on the fate of genetics in the 1940s hardly mention that the sudden changes in the official attitude towards genetic scientists coincided with and were largely caused by cardinal changes in the party leadership responsible for science.

The line of Stalin and his associate Malenkov was to constantly move high-ranking party leaders and state security officials, not allowing them to stay in the same place for more than three years in a row, so as not to get used to power. However, Stalin and Malenkov preferred not to punish betrayed high-ranking officials, and the Central Committee did not always take action on facts of bribery, "corruption" and similar signals coming from the Party Control Commission and security agencies. If the "guilty" were ranked as rivals, then this compromising evidence was immediately used for their dismissal or repression.

The leadership knew about the costs of almost every major ideological campaign, but the goal, as Malenkov said, justified these costs. In the last years of

Stalin's rule, Malenkov, Bulganin, Khrushchev and Beria were in a small circle of leaders, and Stalin did his best to kindle rivalry among them. In 1951, Beria fell out of favor. Stalin ordered listening devices in Beria's mother's apartment, deciding that neither Beria nor his wife would allow any anti-Stalinist remarks, but his mother, Marta, who lived in Georgia, could well express sympathy for the persecuted Mingrelian nationalists.

Beria was a Mingrelian, and the Mingrelians did not get along with the Gurians, whom Stalin trusted most of all. The Mingrelian case was essentially based on trumped-up charges of conspiring to secede from the Soviet Union. Stalin started this business, wanting to get rid of Beria. He demanded that Beria destroy his most loyal comrades.

In 1948, four years before the Georgian "purge", Stalin appointed General Rukhadze as Minister of State Security of Georgia. During the war, he headed the military counterintelligence in the Caucasus. His anti-Beria sentiments were well known. By personal order of Stalin, Rukhadze, with the help of Ryumin, who was notorious, collected dirt on Beria and his entourage. At first, there was just daily surveillance of his Georgian relatives. Beria did not conceal from either Stalin or Molotov that his wife's uncle, Gegechkori, was Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Menshevik government of Georgia in Paris; did not hide the fact that his nephew collaborated with the Germans, being a prisoner during the war. In the late 1930s, and then after the war,

Soviet intelligence dealt with Georgian emigrants in France. The most successful in this regard was the work of the NKVD officer Vardo Maksimalishvili, Beria's former secretary. At that time, there were rumors in government circles that Beria's son Sergo

was going to marry Svetlana Alliluyeva after her divorce from Zhdanov's son. Nina Teimurazovna, Beria's wife, and Lavrenty Pavlovich himself were strongly against

this marriage. Beria knew that his opponents from

The Politburo uses this marriage in the struggle for power, that Stalin's forces are no longer the same, and if Beria binds himself to Stalin with family ties, then in the event of Stalin's death, he will be doomed. The situation gave rise to their mutual dislike, and from this point of view it is possible to explain why in 1951 Stalin ordered General Rukhadze to continue the investigation into the bribery of Mingrelian Georgian officials. It should be noted that in Georgia there was a very significant layer of Mingrelians in the security agencies and in

leadership work. Stalin ordered Rukhadze to find evidence and look for evidence of foreign connections of the Mingrelians of Georgia, then he could sum up: "These Mingrelians cannot be trusted at all. I don't want to be surrounded by people with dubious connections abroad." This was enough to make Rukhadze realize that he must fabricate a conspiracy. Shortly after this meeting, Rukhadze attended a dinner party, where, after drinking heavily, he boasted that he was close to Stalin and that he was instructing him to carry out sabotage and kidnappings in Turkey and France. The dinner was also attended by Georgian Interior Minister Bziava, a Mingrelian, who the next day wrote a letter to the newly appointed Minister of State Security, Ignatiev, in Moscow, reporting on Rukhadze's behavior at the dinner. Ignatiev reported this to Stalin. Stalin ordered to show this letter to Rukhadze and to destroy the letter in his presence. Ignatiev warned Rukhadze that, although he still enjoys the favor of Stalin, "you must not allow yourself to be dismissed."

Rukhadze's next step was the arrest of the former Minister of State Security of Georgia Rapava, Prosecutor General Shonia and Academician Sharia, a member of the mandate commission of the Council of Nationalities of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, who for some time worked as deputy head of foreign intelligence of the NKVD. All of them were accused of having links with emigrant organizations through the NKVD agent Gigelia, who returned from Paris with his French wife in 1947. Gigelia and his wife, despite her French nationality, were arrested on the orders of Stalin, they were tortured to force them to act according to a preconceived scenario.

Thus began the "purge" of the Georgian leadership, close to Beria. Anti-bribery campaign in Georgia escalated into allegations of

conspiracy to separate the Mingrelians from the Soviet Union. Stalin launched this campaign in 1951, shortly after Beria's notable rise in popularity in connection with his successful work on the atomic problem and the second test explosion of the atomic bomb. The owner knew that this was a special achievement because the Soviet nuclear device did not copy American designs of the atomic bomb. But instead of encouraging the success of his protégé, Stalin wanted a person more dependent on him to do this business now. The Politburo invited Beria to head a party commission investigating the case of the "Mingrelian deviators", sending him to Tbilisi to expose "Mingrelian nationalism" and fire his closest ally, the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia, Charkviani, who, on Stalin's orders, was replaced by Beria's longtime enemy Mgeladze. Beria, in addition, had to close the Mingrelian

newspapers.

Stalin sent a group of investigators to Tbilisi to the arrested Mingrelians in order to obtain confessions that would discredit Beria and his wife. The Mingrelians confessed nothing. They spent a year and a half in prison, they were not allowed to sleep, they were tortured. Beria released them only after Stalin's death. Eight months before his death, Stalin arrested Rukhadze, who became an unwanted witness for him. Officially, he was accused of deceiving the party and the government. Father in his memoirs describes, in particular, the situation in which he

found himself in Georgia in 1952, when Ignatiev ordered him to leave for Tbilisi: "I had to assess the capabilities of the local Georgian intelligence service and help them prepare the kidnapping of the leaders of the Georgian Mensheviks in Paris, Beria's wife, Nina Gegechkori. I had to report personally to Ignatiev. I was informed that the initiative to carry out this operation came from Tbilisi, from General Rukhadze, and Stalin personally approved it. Rukhadze insisted that Georgian agents take over this operation. With this idea, he arrived in Moscow and went to an appointment with Ignatiev. Departing back to Tbilisi, he invited me to fly with him. I preferred to travel by train. What I saw in Tbilisi shocked me deeply. The only able and well-connected agent in Gigelia's France, sat in



prison on charges of espionage and Mingrelian nationalism. Rukhadze's agents could not be trusted; they even refused to speak Russian to me. Deputy Rukhadze, who planned to go to Paris, had never been abroad. He was sure that if he brought the Georgian emigrants a barbecue and a basket of Georgian wine, arranged a feast in the most famous restaurant in Paris, he would win their favor. It was also proposed to send a delegation of cultural figures to Paris, but everyone understood that these grandiose plans masked Rukhadze's desire to send his wife to Paris. She was a modest woman and a good singer, but she could only represent the Tbilisi Conservatory in the delegation. She had no idea about her husband's plans.

Meanwhile, a group of investigators from Moscow dealing with the Mingrelian case happily informed Rukhadze that they had almost established a connection between the Beria family and the arrested nationalists. Then, in Rukhadze's office, I noticed under the glass on the table a portrait of young Beria, one of his sworn enemies. Rukhadze became an ally of Abakumov, who back in 1946 tried to compromise first Beria's former subordinates in the intelligence service, and then his himself.

Rukhadze's amateur adventurism frightened me, and I hurried back to Moscow to report everything to Ignatiev. He and his first deputy Ogoltsov listened attentively to me, but noted that "it is not for us, but for the 'instances' to judge this case, since Rukhadze personally corresponds with Stalin in Georgian. Stalin, however, understood that Rukhadze and Ryumin were becoming dangerous: instead of simply extracting confessions of treason, during the investigation they showed great interest in intrigues in the party and government elite. Abakumov wrote from prison to Beria and Malenkov on October 11, 1952, that Ryumin was interested in internal relations in the Politburo, using information from top secret reports sent by the MGB to Stalin.

The Kremlin intrigue continued to spin. Stalin decided to sacrifice Ryumin and Rukhadze. Rukhadze was soon imprisoned in Lefortovo; Ryumin was removed from the post of Deputy Minister of State Security and dismissed from the authorities in November 1952. After

Stalin's death, he was arrested, but even if Stalin were alive, he would still destroy him. After Stalin's death, Beria

did not release Rukhadze from prison, but Rukhadze's victims were released. Rukhadze and Ryumin, both under arrest, bombarded Beria with letters asking for release, addressing him as a "Great Man". Three months later, when Beria was arrested by Khrushchev and Malenkov, these letters implicated them in a conspiracy supposedly orchestrated by Beria. Thus, Rukhadze was shot in Tbilisi in 1955, along with his former victims, who were again arrested for their connection with Beria.

"Hidden motives and ambitions in the late 40s and early 50s played a much more important role in political events than it seemed at that time and seems to be now," my father recalled. - We, who saw all this and suffered from it as a result, later came to the conclusion that the Stalinist party elite used the "struggle against cosmopolitanism", and the Khrushchevite - with the "consequences of the cult of personality" - only to get their opponents out of the way and opponents. Their goal was to achieve absolute power or introduce new figures into their environment. Both of them expected that the Party Control Committee and the security agencies would constantly supply them with compromising materials. The general rule was to collect incriminating facts against everyone, and, if necessary, use this information. I was both a tool and a victim of this system."

After Zhdanov's death, the delicate balance of power was upset. According to the "Leningrad case", all the people of Zhdanov and the rivals of Malenkov and Beria were convicted and shot. However, in 1949 it became known only that Kuznetsov and Voznesensky were removed from their posts, because they were involved in falsifying the results of party elections at the Leningrad City Party Conference. For idealistic communists, the most terrible party crime of a statesman was treason, but the falsification of party elections was no less a crime. The cause was sacred, and high-ranking of the party or in particular intra-party elections by secret ballot, which were considered the most effective intra-party instrument of the Participants

democracy.

The "Leningrad case" was accused of trying to split the Communist Party by organizing an opposition center in Leningrad. All this was fabricated and caused by the ongoing struggle among Stalin's assistants. The motives that forced Malenkov, Beria and Khrushchev to destroy the Leningrad group were clear: to strengthen their power. They were afraid that the young Leningrad team would replace Stalin.

Now it is already known that the results of the counting of votes during the secret ballot in Leningrad in 1948 were indeed falsified, but the convicts had nothing to do with this. The Politburo in full force, including Stalin, Malenkov, Khrushchev and Beria, unanimously adopted a decision obliging Abakumov to arrest and try the Leningrad group, but, no matter what they wrote in school textbooks on the history of the party and no matter what Khrushchev wrote in his memoirs, the initiator of the case was not Abakumov. Indeed, his subordinates under his leadership fabricated this case, but Abakumov acted in accordance with the order received. At first, all those arrested were charged with crimes of moderate gravity. For

example, Voznesensky - in the loss of documents from the secretariat and in nepotism: his younger brother and sister held responsible positions in Moscow and Leningrad. Mikoyan was also indirectly affected: one of his sons married Kuznetsov's daughter. The "Leningrad case" remained a secret even after Stalin's death, and even my father, although he was the head of an independent service of the MGB, did not know about the fate of those who died in obscurity. The head of the Leningrad MGB, General Kubatkin, was repressed and shot after a closed trial. Now the documents of the "Leningrad case" have been partially published. The hands of all who were members of the Politburo at that time are covered in blood, because they signed the death warrant for the defendants three weeks before the start of the trial in Leningrad.

The "Leningrad case" also coincided with the sharp debunking of Molotov, who, although he remained a member of the Politburo, was removed from his post as Minister of Foreign Affairs in March 1949. Vyshinsky replaced him. Molotov took the arrest of his wife, Polina Zhemchuzhina, a Jewess, very hard; at first she was accused of abuse of power and the loss of secret documents (which could be stolen and at the direction

Stalin). By order of Stalin, under duress by investigators, in order to compromise Zhemchuzhina in the eyes of her husband and the Politburo, two of her subordinates were forced to slander her and admit that they had been intimate with her. She spent a year in prison, and then she was sent to Kazakhstan. Stalin hoped to get dirt on Molotov from Zhemchuzhina. My

father said that the arrest of Molotov's wife was kept secret and he only found out about it just before Stalin's death, when Fitin, who at that time was the Minister of State Security of Kazakhstan, complained to him how difficult it was to personally answer for Zhemchuzhina. Ignatiev asked about her all the time, trying to find out about her connections with the Zionists and the Israeli ambassador to the USSR, Golda Meir. In January or February 1953, Fitin was summoned by Goglidze, the First Deputy Minister of State Security, and ordered that Zhemchuzhina be transferred to the Lubyanka. Fitin realized that the main purpose of all this was to accuse Molotov of links with the Zionists, and became worried that changes in leadership might affect those who worked with Molotov, including

At that time, Stalin openly opposed Molotov and Mikoyan at the Plenum of the Central Committee. Stalin declared them conspirators. He accused Molotov of succumbing to blackmail and pressure from imperialist circles, implying that Zhemchuzhina had to do with the Zionist conspiracy and secret ties with Golda Meir. Immediately after the Plenum, Molotov was required to return to Stalin's secretariat the original documents on the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, which included secret protocols. From that day until they were published in 1992, they were kept in the secret archives of the Politburo. Perhaps Stalin was going to charge Molotov with pro-German sympathies or fawning over Hitler during these secret negotiations. In September 1950, Drozdov, Deputy Minister of State Security of Ukraine, was

transferred to Moscow. Drozdov was put in charge of Special Bureau No. 2 of the USSR Ministry of State Security, which was supposed to deal with secret surveillance and kidnapping of Stalin's enemies inside the country - both real and fictional.

Father recalled this episode as follows: "At first, Abakumov and Ogoltsov decided that my sabotage and intelligence bureau would be involved in such operations, both in the country and abroad, and

Drozdov will be my deputy, since Eitingon has fallen out of favor. This did not suit Abakumov, he organized the work in such a way that Drozdov was entrusted with internal operations. Drozdov had no connections in Moscow, but he was entrusted with these

delicate matters. His first task was to check the reliability of the eavesdropping system and make sure that our "bugs" were not detected. It was then that I learned from Drozdov that in 1942 Stalin ordered Bogdan Kobulov, Beria's deputy, to install listening equipment in the apartments of Voroshilov, Budyonny and Zhukov. Later, in 1950, the names of Molotov and Mikoyan were added to this list. There were grandiose plans to secretly eavesdrop on all telephone conversations in the leadership of the Central Committee, but this was carried out only during the Brezhnev era, when the technology reached the required level.

Drozdov was glad that he was not involved in any kidnappings ordered by Stalin, but his subordinates twice had to work for the Main Counterintelligence Directorate: they had to talk on the street with foreign diplomats who met with Russian writers and start brawls. The first thing Beria did when he became interior minister after Stalin's death was to fire Drozdov because he knew too much about internal intrigues and because he was on bad terms with Bogdan Kobulov. The dismissal of Drozdov at the age of fifty was simply a salvation for him, although it seemed then a collapse: otherwise he would have been arrested along with Beria. In July 1951 Abakumov was arrested. In his last year as minister,

especially in the last nine months, he was absolutely isolated from Stalin. The Kremlin list of visitors shows that after November 1950, Stalin did not receive Abakumov. Stalin believed that Abakumov knew too much. He was accused of dragging out the investigation of important crimes and concealing information that Gavrilov and Lavrentiev (homosexuals who were introduced into the American embassy) were double agents of the CIA and the MGB. Of course, Abakumov had fabricated confessions and false testimonies given under torture on his conscience, but it is also true that first the

prosecutor's office, and then Ryumin, accused him of crimes that

he didn't do it. He was never a politician and could not organize a conspiracy to seize power; he was absolutely devoted to Stalin and believed in him.

At first it seemed that the party leadership wanted to correct serious mistakes in the work of the MGB. The Politburo commission, which included Beria, Malenkov, Ignatiev, and Shkiryatov (head of the Party Control Commission), from the very beginning seemed interested in testing the effectiveness of intelligence and counterintelligence operations. It soon became clear, however, that Abakumov's arrest was the beginning of a new "purge." As a result, Malenkov's position strengthened, as Stalin appointed his former secretary, later head of the department of leading party and Soviet bodies of the Central Committee, Ignatiev, to the post of Minister of State Security. In the absence of Abakumov and the "Leningrad group", Malenkov and Ignatiev, in alliance with Khrushchev, formed a new center of power in the leadership.

Ignatiev and his new first deputy Goglidze planned to start liquidating the heads of émigré groups in Germany and Paris in order to report these high-profile cases to Stalin. They did not care that it was much more profitable to influence the activities of emigration. They were going to use two agents, a married couple, to deal with the retired general Kapustiansky, a Ukrainian nationalist who received this rank from the tsar himself. He was over seventy, he had retired from politics and was not dangerous, but Ignatiev wanted to quickly report on his liquidation in order to impress the government. My father was categorically

opposed and persuaded Ignatiev and his deputy Yepishev not to do this, since the death of Kapustyansky would deprive us of access to his mail, which was the most important source of regular information about the situation in exile. My father later recalled

the extreme precariousness of his position at that time: "My wife and I were worried about frequent arrests among MGB workers. Both in the anti-Jewish campaign and in the intra-government intrigues, growing tension was noticeable. My wife felt that she and I were following the testimonies of those who had been arrested—Raikhman, Eitingon, Matusov, Sverdlov. For the first time in my life, I spoke with my wife about the prospects and the possibility of finding another job. As head of the service

an incompetent minister with deputies like Ryumin, adventurers and careerists, I was bound to find myself in a difficult position. I had just received my diploma from the Military Academy, and this gave me hope for a new job in the military or party sphere. In 1952, Stalin did not go, as usual,

on vacation to the Caucasus. It seems that then Malenkov called us and said that the Central Committee entrusted me with an important task, the details of which Ignatiev will dedicate to me. Soon I was invited to his office, where, oddly enough, he was alone. After saying hello, Ignatiev said: "At the top, they are very concerned about the possibility of forming an "Anti-Bolshevik bloc of peoples" headed by Kerensky. This initiative of American reaction must be resolutely suppressed, and the top of the bloc beheaded." I was ordered to prepare without delay a plan of action in Paris and London, where Kerensky was supposed to visit. A week later, however, I reported to Ignatiev that difficulties had

arisen in the preparation of the operation, since our man in Paris, Khokhlov, who could find approaches to Kerensky, fell into the field of view of the enemy counterintelligence. The last time he crossed the border, the Austrian police became interested in his documents, and his fake passport was seized for verification. Our illegal battle group in Paris was led by Prince Gagarin, whose task was to find

approaches to NATO headquarters in Fontainebleau in order to destroy communication and alarm systems in the event of an escalation of the situation or the outbreak of hostilities. The existence of this combat group was reported on various occasions to both Stalin and Malenkov. I asked Ignatiev if we should redirect these agents to the liquidation of Kerensky. Ignatiev, who never took risks, said that this should be decided at the top. A day or two later, I read a

TASS report that the Ukrainian nationalists and Croatian émigrés did not agree to the creation of an "Anti-Bolshevik Bloc" chaired by Kerensky - they did not want to have a Russian at the head of this organization.

The next morning, I sent a report to Ignatiev on the work of the battle group, attaching information from TASS so that he would understand that Kerensky no longer posed a threat to the Soviet Union. Ignatiev called in

office of me, Rzasny and Savchenko. He began with reproaches that they proposed the liquidation of Kerensky without understanding the internal strife in the anti-communist groups. Ignatiev emphasized that Comrade Malenkov was especially concerned that we should not deviate from the main action, the struggle against the main enemy, the United States.

After the meeting, Ignatiev suggested that we prepare proposals for the reorganization of intelligence work abroad. This reorganization was personally led by Stalin. On his initiative, at the end of 1952, the Main Intelligence Directorate was created in the MGB, which later became the famous First Main Directorate of the KGB of the USSR. The head of intelligence took the position of deputy minister, which meant an increase in costs and an increase in the prestige of conducting intelligence operations abroad. I was not invited to the Kremlin meeting on this issue, which was chaired by Stalin, but

Malenkov officially announced at a meeting in the MGB the decision, which he described as a plan to create a powerful intelligence agent network abroad. At the same time, Malenkov quoted Stalin: "Work against our main enemy is impossible without the creation of a powerful intelligence and sabotage apparatus abroad. It is not necessary to establish residencies directly in the US, but we must act decisively against the Americans, primarily in Europe and the Middle East. We must use the new opportunities that have opened up for us in connection with the intensification of Chinese emigration to the United States. America's vulnerability lies in the multiethnic structure of its population. We must look for new opportunities to use national minorities in America. No non-Native American who works for us should be forced to work against the country of origin. We must make the most of the immigrants from Germany, Italy and France in the United States, convince them that, in helping us, they are working for their homeland, humiliated by American domination. 1953 began. Father, as he writes in his memoirs, was very concerned about personnel changes in the MGB. These rearrangements took place on the initiative of Stalin, and therefore no one

could not influence them.



The father knew that his name was also on the list of 213 people. The list included the names of leading officials of the highest rank, who were subjected to the testimony of those who were repressed in connection with the "Leningrad case", the case of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee and the "conspiracy of doctors." Using these materials, Malenkov dismissed or even removed many employees from Moscow. He wanted to attract new people to the apparatus who would be little familiar with the mechanisms of the Kremlin's power "... and would carry out any order without the slightest hesitation."

This new purge was no different from the previous ones. There were forced confessions, scuffle, blackmail, blood. One of the first to be humiliated was Lieutenant General Vlasik, head of the Kremlin guard. At first he was sent to Siberia to the post of head of the camp, but there he was secretly arrested. Vlasik was charged with concealing the famous letter of L. Timashuk, which Ryumin used to promote the "doctors' case", "in suspicious ties with foreign intelligence agents and in secret collusion with Abakumov." After the arrest, Vlasik was mercilessly beaten and tortured. His desperate

letters to Stalin about his innocence went unanswered. Vlasik was forced to admit that he abused his power, that he allowed suspicious people to attend official receptions in the Kremlin, Red Square and the Bolshoi Theater, where Stalin and members of the Politburo were, who, thus, could be exposed to terrorist attacks. Vlasik remained imprisoned until the amnesty that followed in 1955. As a result, he was condemned for embezzlement of funds for holding the Yalta and Potsdam conferences. Despite the support of Marshal Zhukov, his requests for rehabilitation were denied.

The dismissal of Vlasik did not mean at all that Beria could now change people in Stalin's personal guard. In 1952, after the arrest of Vlasik, Ignatiev personally headed the Kremlin Security Directorate, combining this position with the post of Minister of State Security.

My father said that all the gossip that Beria's people killed Stalin was unfounded: "Without the knowledge of Ignatiev and Malenkov, no one from Stalin's entourage could get access to Stalin. He was an old, sick man with progressive paranoia, but before his

the last day he remained an all-powerful ruler. Twice he openly announced his desire to retire, the first time after the Victory celebrations in the Kremlin in 1945 and again at the Plenum of the Central Committee in October 1952, but these were just tricks to reveal the alignment of forces in his environment and inflame rivalry within the Politburo.

In the last months of Stalin's life, my father continued to carry out his orders, given by him personally or through his inner circle. "In January 1953, Malenkov and Ignatiev," he says in his memoirs, "ordered me to prepare proposals on how to use the feedback of our adviser in China, who reported to Stalin about the directive of the Chinese leadership to recruit agents from among the Soviet specialists who worked there. Comrade Stalin, according to Malenkov, decided to send a copy of this message to Mao Zedong, announcing that we were recalling our adviser because we had full confidence in the Chinese leadership. Kovalev, in my opinion, that's his last name, was immediately appointed Stalin's assistant in the apparatus of the Council of Ministers. Malenkov ordered

me to consult with Kovalev about the creation of a new intelligence network in the Far East in order to obtain reliable information about China. At the same time, he emphasized that this network should not have links with old sources that may have been known to the Chinese since the time of the Comintern.

The atmosphere was tense. At the end of February 1953, I was summoned to Ignatiev's office, where Goglidze, his first deputy, and Konyakhin, deputy head of the Investigation Department, were staying. Ignatiev said that we were going to the "instance". It was a late hour - Ignatiev, Goglidze and Konyakhin entered Stalin's office, and I remained in the waiting room for about an hour. Then Goglidze and Konyakhin left, and they

asked me to come in. I was very excited when I entered the office, but as soon as I looked at Stalin, this feeling disappeared. What I saw amazed me. I saw a tired old man. Stalin has changed a lot. His hair had thinned a lot, and although he had always spoken slowly, he now clearly pronounced the words as if through force, and the pauses between words became longer. Apparently, the rumors about the two strokes were t

he endured one after the Yalta Conference, and the other on the eve of his seventieth birthday, in 1949.

Stalin, according to his father, began the meeting with a discussion of the planned reorganization of foreign intelligence. Ignatiev asked if there was a need to leave two independent intelligence centers in the Ministry of State Security: the Bureau of Subversion Abroad and the Main Intelligence Directorate. The father was invited to comment on this. "I explained," my

father said, "that in order to carry out operations against American strategic bases and NATO bases that surrounded our borders, we must constantly cooperate with the intelligence of the MGB and the Ministry of Defense. The rapid deployment of forces to carry out special tasks, such as sabotage, requires cooperation. I stressed that the success of our sabotage

operations against the Germans depended to a large extent on the quality of the intelligence network spread in the immediate vicinity of the bases that would have to be destroyed, adding that we were ready, in accordance with the directive of the Central Committee, to blow up the American fuel depots in Innsbruck, in Austria. We didn't just send a task force there. Our agents had direct access to the facilities, but Abakumov's unexpected order to cancel an operation that would have severely hindered American air travel to Berlin baffled us.

Stalin did not answer. There was an awkward pause for several minutes. Then he said: "The Bureau of Subversion Abroad should be preserved as an independent apparatus with direct subordination to the Minister. It will be an important tool in the event of war to cause serious damage to the enemy at the very beginning of hostilities. Sudoplatov should also be made deputy head of the Main Intelligence Directorate. He needs to be aware of all our undercover capabilities in order to use all this for sabotage purposes. Stalin asked me if I knew Mironov, Epishev's assistant,

deputy minister of the MGB for personnel. and proposed that Mironov head the Main Intelligence Directorate of the MGB. I replied that I had met with Mironov only once, when, by order of the minister, I told him about the main tasks of the bureau.

There was another awkward pause. Stalin handed me a handwritten document and asked me to comment on it. It was a plan to assassinate Marshal Tito. I have never seen this document before, but Ignatiev told me that the initiative came from Ryzhenko and Savchenko, deputy ministers of state security, and that Pitovranov is aware of this action.

By the way, according to the story of his father, Pitovranov stood out sharply with his intellect and outlook among the leadership of the MGB. In the initial period of the war, he became head of the NKVD department in Gorky. For some time, Ryumin managed to put him behind bars on charges of "Abakumov's conspiracy." In 1952 he was released. He was friends with his father's deputy, Eitingon, but, ironically, was forced, under orders, to organize his arrest in October 1951. Two days later, he himself ended up in Lefortovo and sat in a cell opposite Eitingon. Later, my father says, he heard that Pitovranov wrote

a letter from prison addressed to Stalin, where he accused Ryumin of provocative disruption of the plans of active operations of our counterintelligence. He was released, he returned to his former place, after a month of treatment in Arkhangelsk, in a military sanatorium for

high command.

Then we talked about one responsible matter - the elimination of Tito. "I told Stalin that the document proposed naive methods for the elimination of Tito, which reflected a dangerous incompetence in the preparation of the plan. The letter to Stalin read: "The Ministry of State Security of the USSR asks for permission to prepare and organize a terrorist attack against Tito, using an illegal agent "Max" - comrade. Grigulevich I.R., citizen of the USSR, member of the CPSU since 1950 (certificate attached). This is Max's story. He was

transferred by our special services on a Costa Rican passport to Italy, where he managed to gain confidence and relatively easily enter the circle of diplomats of South American countries, prominent Costa Rican figures and businessmen who visited Italy.

Using his connections, Max, on the instructions of the Center, achieved the appointment to the post of Envoy Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Costa Rica in Italy and at the same time in Yugoslavia. Fulfilling their

diplomatic duties, he visited Yugoslavia twice in the second half of 1952, where he was well received, had access to circles close to Tito, and received his promise of a personal audience. The position occupied by Max at that time, in general, made it possible to use his capabilities to carry out active operations against Tito.

In early February 1953, Max was summoned by the intelligence leadership to Vienna, where a meeting was organized with him in secret conditions. During the discussion of Max's capabilities, he was asked how he could be most useful, given his position. Max suggested that some effective action be taken personally against Tito.

In connection with this proposal, a conversation was held with him about how he imagines it, as a result of which, as follows from the document, the following possible options for carrying out a terrorist attack against Tito were revealed:

"1. Instruct Max to obtain a personal audience with Tito, during which he will have to release a dose of pneumonic plague bacteria from a silently operating mechanism disguised in clothes, which guarantees the infection and death of Tito and those present in the room. Max himself will not know about the essence of the drug used. In order to save his life, Max will be pre-vaccinated with anti-plague serum.

2. In connection with the expected trip of Tito to London, send Max there, using his official position and good personal relations with the Yugoslav ambassador to England, Velebit, to get to a reception at the Yugoslav embassy, which Velebit is expected to give in honor of Tito. The attack is carried out by a

silent shot from a mechanism disguised as a personal item with the simultaneous release of tear gases to create panic among those present in order to create an environment conducive to Max's departure and hiding traces. 3. Take advantage of one of the official receptions in Belgrade, to which the wives of the diplomatic corps are invited.

The act of terrorism should be carried out in the same way as in the second option, instructing him

Max himself, who, as a diplomat accredited to the Yugoslav government, would be invited to such a reception.

In addition, instruct Max to develop a variant and prepare the conditions for the presentation through one of the Costa Rican representatives of Tito's gift in the form of some jewelry in a box, the opening of which will activate a mechanism that ejects an instantly acting poisonous substance. Max was asked to think again and make suggestions on how he could carry out the most effective

measures against Tito. Methods of communication are stipulated with him and it is agreed that additional instructions will be given to him.

We would consider it expedient to use Max's capabilities to carry out a terrorist attack against Tito. Max, by his personal qualities and experience in intelligence, is suitable for such tasks.

We ask for your consent." Stalin

did not make any notes on the document," recalls the father. — The letter was not signed. In Stalin's office, looking into his eyes, I said that Max was not suitable for such an assignment, since he had never been a terrorist fighter. He participated in the operation against Trotsky in Mexico, against the Okhrana agent in Lithuania, in the liquidation of the leader of the Trotskyists in Spain, A. Nin, but only with the task of ensuring that the militants reached the object of the action. Moreover, it does not follow from the document that direct access to Tito is guaranteed. No matter how we think about Tito, we must treat him as a serious enemy who participated in military operations during the war years and, of course, retain his presence of mind and repel the attack. I referred to our agent Val, Momo Djurovich, a major general in Tito's guard. According to his reports, Tito was always on the alert because of the tense internal situation in Yugoslavia. Unfortunately, Val, due to internal intrigues not so different from ours, lost Tito's favor and is currently in prison. It would be wiser to use the differences in Tito's circle, I noted, feverishly thinking about how to bring into play Eitingon, who was under arrest, so that he would be responsible for the execution of the operation, since Grigulevich greatly appreciated him - they worked side by side abroad for five years.

Ignatiev did not like my remarks, but I suddenly felt confident that the mention of a high-ranking source of information from Tito's security service impressed Stalin. However, Stalin interrupted me and, turning to Ignatiev, said that this matter should be rethought, taking into account the internal "fights" in the leadership of Yugoslavia. Then he looked at me intently and said that, since this task is important for the strengthening of our positions in Eastern Europe and for our influence in the Balkans, it must be approached extremely responsibly in order to avoid a failure similar to the one that took place in Turkey in 1942, when the assassination attempt on the German ambassador von Papen failed. All my hopes of raising the question of Eitingon's release vanished instantly. The next day, the ministry gave me two letter files - "The Vulture" and "Nero", which contained compromising evidence on Tito. There were also weekly reports from our station in Belgrade. The dossier included Molotov's idiotic resolutions to look for Tito's connections with pro-

fascist groups and Croatian nationalists. In the dossier, I did not find any real facts that make it possible to approach Tito's inner circle so that our agents can get close enough to strike. When my father was summoned the next day to Ignatiev's office, four of Khrushchev's men were there—Deputy Minister Serov, Savchenko, Ryasnoi, and Epishev. He, his father said, immediately felt out of place, because before he had discussed such delicate issues only in private with Beria or Stalin. Among those present, he was the only intelligence professional with foreign experience. How could one tell the undersecretaries, he thought feverishly, that their plan

was naive? As he writes in his memoirs, he could not believe his ears when Epishev gave a fifteen-minute lecture on the political importance of the task. Then Ryasnoy and Savchenko joined in a moralizing conversation, saying that Grigulevich was the best fit for such work, and with these words they showed his letter to his wife, in which he spoke of his intention to sacrifice himself in the name of a common cause. Grigulevich,

said the father, apparently forced to write this letter. The organizers had to make sure that in case something happens to avoid responsibility.

The father realized that his warnings would not work, and said that he, as a member of the party, considered it his duty to tell them and Comrade Stalin that no one had the right to send an agent to certain death in peacetime. The plan of the operation must necessarily provide for the possibility of the militant leaving after the action; one cannot agree with the plan in which the agent was ordered to destroy a heavily guarded object without a preliminary analysis of the operational situation.

At the end of the conversation, as my father testified, Ignatiev stressed that everyone should think, think and think again about how to fulfill the directive of the party.

This meeting turned out to be his last business meeting with Ignatiev and Epishev. Ten days later, Ignatiev raised the operational staff and troops of the MGB on alarm and confidentially informed the heads of departments and independent services about Stalin's illness. Two days later, Stalin died, and the idea of an assassination attempt on Tito was finally buried. January 5, 1953, in accordance with the decision of

the Bureau of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU of December 30, 1952, the First Main (Intelligence) Directorate, the Second Chief (Counterintelligence) Directorate, Bureau No. 1 (for intelligence and sabotage), Department "D" ("active measures"), as well as a number of units of the 4th (search), 5th (secret-political) and 7th (operational) departments of the MGB of the USSR were merged into the Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) of the MGB of the USSR. The Directorate for Intelligence Abroad of the GRU MGB was headed by Major General Yevgeny Petrovich Pitovranov.

In practice, the process of reorganization and creation of the GRU MGB of the USSR remained on paper and was not completed. On March 5, 1953, I.V. Stalin died, the MGB and the Ministry of Internal Affairs were merged into a single Ministry of the Interior, headed by L.P. Beria. A new stage of reorganization of

organs has begun. In the meantime, my father's attempts to go to work in the party bodies or the Council of Ministers seemed to be beginning to bear fruit. In 1952, he sent to the Central Committee information received from our residency in Vienna about American plans to kidnap the secretary of the Central Committee



Austrian Communist Party. Father was summoned to the Central Committee to Suslov to discuss these data. A few days later, in the first days of March 1953, they said that he was being considered to fill the vacancy of deputy chairman of the newly formed Foreign Commission of the Central Committee of the CPSU on "illegal" relations with foreign communist parties. My parents were full of hopes that maybe there would be an end to my father's service in the security agencies, which, according to him, were headed by completely incompetent people who committed crimes both out of incompetence and for career reasons.

But rapidly unfolding events radically changed the fate of his father. On March 5, Stalin died, and on the same day, late in the evening, Beria was appointed minister of the expanded Ministry of the Interior, which now included both the police and the security apparatus (MGB). My father later recalled those

days many times: "I was at Stalin's funeral and saw how unprofessionally Serov, Goglidze and Rjasnoy controlled the situation in the city. Before I could get to the Hall of Columns to stand guard for my ministry, a cordon of trucks blocked the way, so I had to make my way through the cabs of the trucks. They did not even think about how to accommodate all the delegations arriving for the funeral. There was some kind of idiotic confusion, because of which hundreds of grieving people, unfortunately, died in the stampede. During Stalin's funeral, my grief was sincere; I thought

that his cruelty and reprisals were mistakes committed because of the adventurism and incompetence of Yezhov, Abakumov, Ignatiev and their henchmen. The day after the funeral, I realized that another era had begun.

Secretary Beria called me at six in the evening and said that the new Boss had left the office and ordered not to wait for his return. From that moment on, I could leave work every day at six in the evening, in contrast to those years when I had to work until two or three in the morning, while Stalin sat at his desk in the Kremlin or in his dacha.

A shake-up of personnel began in the new ministry; Kruglov, who worked with Malenkov in the Central Committee in the 1930s and has been Minister of the Interior for the past seven years, became the first

Deputy Beria in the expanded Ministry of Internal Affairs. Goglidze, who unwittingly turned out to be involved in the "Mingrelian case", ceased to hold the post of deputy minister and headed the military counterintelligence. Bogdan Kobulov, Beria's protégé, whom Abakumov fired from the state security agencies in 1946, returned to the Lubyanka as Beria's deputy. Serov, Khrushchev's man, retained his position and remained Beria's first deputy. Rjasnoy and Savchenko, who, like Serov, worked with Khrushchev in Ukraine, headed the Main intelligence department. Fedotov, always balanced and disciplined, who briefly replaced Fitin in 1946 in the leadership of foreign intelligence, and later worked in the Information Committee, again, as before the war, headed the Main Counterintelligence Directorate. Beria appointed Lieutenant General Sazykin, my former deputy in the department of "atomic" intelligence, head of the Directorate for Combating Ideological Subversion and Nationalism, the future 5th "political" department of the KGB.

Parallel to these quick appointments was the debunking of the accusers in the "Zionist conspiracy" and the "doctors' case." Eitingon, Raikhman, Selivanovsky, Belkin, Shubnyakov and other high-ranking officials who were arrested on charges of concealing a "Zionist conspiracy" or assisting Abakumov in plans to seize power, were released at the end of March 1953. The Zhemchuzhina case was closed by Beria himself on March 23, but she was released the day after Stalin's funeral, on the occasion of Molotov's birthday, March 9. Beria ordered the cases of Eitingon and Reichmann to be reviewed and all the formalities necessary for their release to be quickly settled. Later, according to his father, Eitingon said that he did not expect anything good

when, after the death of Stalin, which he did not know about, he was called to the investigator. To his surprise, he saw Goglidze and Kobulov there, who had been fired from the authorities seven years ago. He knew immediately that a big change had taken place. He was asked only one question: will he continue his service after his release? He did not feel well, but after treatment he was ready to continue working. Then Kobulov told Eitingon that Stalin had died and that he, Kobulov, was speaking on behalf of Beria, who had recently been appointed head of the

expanded Ministry of the Interior, and he is his deputy for investigative work and counterintelligence. Kobulov promised that although the formalities would take several days, Eitingon could safely "rest" in the cell while awaiting release. Eitingon asked to be moved away from the investigative block so that he would not have to hear the screams of prisoners on whom Ryumin was trying "active methods of investigation." Kobulov replied that Ryumin himself was under arrest for the crimes committed, and Beria, having become a minister, with the very first order forbade beatings and torture of those under investigation at Lubyanka and Lefortovo. Then Kobulov called for an escort, and an escort entered the investigation room to escort Eitingon to his cell.

Showing off in front of Kobulov, the guard ordered Eitingon: "Hands behind your back!" - the usual treatment of prisoners. Kobulov immediately cut him off and ordered that Eitingon be treated with due respect, as with a major general of state security, since he was no longer under investigation, but under administrative arrest. This finally convinced Eitingon that everything that was happening was not a game.

In turn, Beria ordered his father and other generals to check the trumped-up charges of the "Zionist conspiracy." What struck the inspectors the most, according to the father, was that Zhemchuzhina, Molotov's wife, allegedly established secret contacts through Mikhoels and Jewish activists with her brother in the United States. Her letter to her brother, dated October 1944,

had nothing to do with politics.

"As an intelligence officer," my father recalled this incident, "I immediately realized that the leadership allowed her to write this letter in order to establish a formal secret channel of communication with American Zionist organizations. I could not imagine that the Pearl was capable of writing such a letter without proper authorization. I remembered my contacts with Harriman about the creation of a Jewish republic in the

Crimea. From Zhemchuzhina's testimony, I realized that the sounding of the American representatives on this issue was carried out not only through me, but also in other directions, in particular through Mikhoels. This convinced me that my communication with Harriman was only one of the few attempts to discuss how

to use the Jewish question in the broader context of Soviet-American relations.

When I began to discuss with Beria the role that Zhemchuzhina could play in renewing informal contacts with the international Jewish community, he cut me off, saying that this issue in intelligence operations was closed once and for all. Instead, father testifies, Beria pointed to

Maisky, who, according to him, was a much more important figure and an ideal candidate for sounding out our new initiatives in the West. As a prominent diplomat, he was able to establish personal contacts at a high level in order to carry out our policy that has changed dramatically since Stalin's death.

Academician Maisky, a former ambassador to London and deputy minister of foreign affairs, was already close to seventy at the time. Once he was one of the Menshevik leaders, opponents of Lenin, but later made a dizzying career in the Soviet diplomatic service. Nevertheless, in 1952 he was also accused of a "Zionist conspiracy." Incredible, most likely even absurd accusations were made against him. Namely, they claimed that Jewish organizations abroad wanted to appoint him as Minister of Foreign Affairs in the new government after "Abakumov

seize power."

"Beria told me," writes my father, "... since you knew Maisky during the war, even before Yalta, and your wife became friends with his wife, you should prepare to work with him in the future."

The head of counterintelligence, Fedotov, who was "reviewing" Maisky's case, advised his father not to meet with him for the time being. "Pavel Anatolyevich," he told him confidentially, "from my very first meeting with him, when I officially announced to him: 'You are under the jurisdiction of the head of counterintelligence, General Fedotov, who is instructed to consider the absurd accusations leveled against you and the circumstances of your illegal arrest', he began to admit that he was a Japanese spy, then an English one, and then an American one." One can understand the actions of Maisky, who was ready to say

anything, to admit his guilt in all mortal sins, if only

avoid beatings and torture. He refused to believe that Stalin had died and was buried in the Mausoleum; he said it was another provocation.

Fedotov then suggested to his father that all discussions on important diplomatic and intelligence issues be postponed with him for two or three weeks. By order of Beria, he transferred him from the cell to the rest room behind his office. There Maisky was able to see his wife, where he was shown documentary footage of

Stalin's funeral. The three-week delay almost became fatal, because the Maisky case, unlike the others, then, in May 1953, was not officially closed. When Beria was arrested, Maisky, treated badly by Malenkov and Molotov, was living in the Lubyanka with his wife, in a room behind Fedotov's office. Now Maisky was accused of conspiring with Beria to become foreign minister under him and was sent back to prison, where he suffered a nervous breakdown.

Later, my father said, our mother met with his wife in Butyrok's waiting room, where both Maisky and father were sitting. Maiskaya said she was leading a fantastic life: although all of Maisky's money and all government bonds were confiscated, her personal bonds of the last five years remained with her, and one of them won 50 thousand rubles on a government loan (then one ruble was equal to four American dollars) . When she met our mother in prison, where they both brought food parcels for their husbands, Maiskaya couldn't immediately remember where they met. "In Paris, in London, or at a reception in the Kremlin?" she asked. Mom then reminded her that it was at the dacha of Emelyan Yaroslavsky and in his own apartment in the center of Moscow. After spending four years in

prison, Maisky finally appeared before the military collegium of the Supreme Court on charges of complicity with Beria to seize power and maintaining links between Beria and British intelligence. He denied all accusations, and the military board could not find evidence of his guilt. Gorsky (the NKVD resident in London at the time Maisky was ambassador there) was summoned to testify about Maisky's treacherous connection with Beria, but he changed his initial testimony and did not support the prosecution. The guilt was reduced to exceeding the powers of the ambassador, since Maisky sent telegrams from London not only to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but also to the NKVD Beria - suddenly he

blamed the standard requirements for sending special messages to ambassadors. He was also accused of criminally admiring the Western way of life and cultivating Western manners in the Soviet embassy in London. Maisky was sentenced to ten years in prison, four and a half of which he had already served, and soon he was amnestied. He was rehabilitated only in 1964. In his published memoirs, he never mentioned the misfortunes and unfortunate acquaintances with the Soviet prison.

The case of the "Zionist conspiracy" in the security agencies was finally closed in mid-May 1953, when Andrei Sverdlov and Matusov, high-ranking officials of the MGB, were released. Beria appointed Sverdlov to the post of head of the department responsible for investigations and verification of anonymous letters. His colleague Matusov, from whose notes one can learn a very interesting chronology of the "purges" from 1930 to 1950, was released in 1953, but not reinstated. He died in the late 60s. My mother used his legal advice to support requests for my father's release. Matusov was soon expelled from the party and deprived of his MGB pension for his involvement in the repressions. Relying on the support of Sverdlov, he constantly appealed to the CPC under the Central Committee of the CPSU.

In 1963, Matusov and Sverdlov were summoned by the deputy chairman of the Party Control Committee Serdyuk, Khrushchev's protégé, who demanded that they stop writing letters to the Central Committee, otherwise the party would punish them both for spreading gossip, and moreover, for the illegal persecution of the famous writer Alexander Solzhenitsyn.

Sverdlov and Matusov protested vehemently, claiming that they had not fabricated the case. Solzhenitsyn's letter, criticizing the Soviet system and Stalin personally for military failures, was intercepted during the war by military censorship, which began the case against Solzhenitsyn. In war conditions, criticism of the military command was regarded, at least, as suspicious. Serdyuk interrupted them and said that, according to the evidence available to the Party Control Commission, Solzhenitsyn had always been a die-hard Leninist, and showed them the letter Solzhenitsyn had written to Khrushchev.

Sverdlov was reprimanded on the party line, but continued to work as a senior researcher at the Institute of Marxism-

Leninism under the Central Committee of the CPSU, where he was transferred after the arrest of Beria. Matusov was expelled from the party "forever". It was officially announced that this decision would never be reviewed, but he was left alone and allowed to pursue literary activities. Together with Sverdlov, he wrote a number of detective stories.

Abakumov was not released. As my father gloomily joked, Beria and Malenkov had a big sharp tooth against him. He was accused of falsifying the Zhemchuzhina case.

Father wrote in his memoirs about this: "At that time I was not interested in Abakumov, I had my own reasons not to love him, but I learned from Reichman that Abakumov denied accusations linking him to the "Zionist conspiracy", despite the fact that Ryumin brutally tortured him Raikhman told me that he behaved like a real man with a strong will. In 1990, I was called as a witness when his case was checked by the military prosecutor's office; I changed my mind about him, because whatever crimes he committed, he paid the price in prison. He had to endure incredible suffering (he spent three months in a refrigerator in shackles), but he found the strength not to submit ... He fought for his life, categorically denying the "conspiracy of doctors." Thanks to his firmness and courage in March and April 1953, it became possible to quickly release all those arrested, implicated in the so-called conspiracy, since it was Abakumov who was charged with being their leader.

However, Beria and Malenkov decided to put an end to Abakumov. At a meeting in his office, Beria officially announced that although Abakumov's allegations of conspiracy were unfounded, he still remained under investigation for squandering government funds, abuse of power and, more seriously, for falsifying a case against the former leadership of the Ministry of Aviation Industry, command Air Force, against Polina Zhemchuzhina, for the murder of Mikhoels. Until the very arrest of Beria, my father was on official duty in his

office and once took advantage of this opportunity for a personal request: "As soon as Eitingon was released on March 23, 1953, he was immediately admitted to the hospital due to an ulcer and

general exhaustion. He asked me to expedite the release of his sister Sonya, who was arrested with him in 1951 and sentenced to ten years in prison "for refusing to treat Russian patients and aiding the Zionist conspiracy." Sonya was initially sentenced to eight years, but prosecutor Daron, an ethnic Jew who oversaw the investigation at the MGB, fearing accusations of sympathy for Jews, insisted on a longer term. I took advantage of my next meeting with Beria to give him a letter from Eitingon, who asked for my sister. Fortunately for Sonya, first deputy Beria Kruglov was also in the office then. When I tried to explain what the matter was, Beria interrupted me, handed the letter to Kruglov without signing it, and said: "Organize her release immediately."

I followed Kruglov to his office, where he dictated a short presentation to the Supreme Court: "The verification of the charges against Sonya Isakovna Eitingon undertaken by the Ministry of the Interior showed that the case was fabricated, and the evidence of her guilt was falsified. The Ministry of Internal Affairs enters the Supreme Court with a proposal to cancel the verdict, and to dismiss the case against Eitingon S.I. for lack of corpus delicti." Signature: "S. Kruglov, First Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR."

I saw to it that the letter was submitted to the Supreme Court and tried to expedite the formalities necessary for her release. The decision of the Supreme Court was signed only three weeks later, but it took another week for the administration of the camp where she was imprisoned to receive it. I personally called the head of the camp, asking for her speedy release, but he replied that she was in the hospital and she would be operated on. Using my position, I gave the order to immediately release her from the camp and transfer her to the local hospital as soon as the operation was done.

She was lucky that Kruglov, and not Beria, signed the letter of her release. A few weeks later, Beria was arrested, and his resolution in a letter would have given her no chance of getting out of prison for at least two years, when all the other prisoners who were serving time on charges of "Zionist conspiracy" and agitation were released. The case of Eitingon's sister was one of the first in a wave of rehabilitation launched by Beria after Stalin's death.



The new Charter of the Communist Party was approved at the 19th Congress of the CPSU in 1952. According to this Charter, there was only one ruling body - the Presidium of the Central Committee, greatly expanded. The Politburo, which had only eleven members, was abolished. The new Presidium had twenty-five members, including the old guard—Molotov, Kaganovich, and Voroshilov—and relatively young men like Brezhnev, Chesnokov, and Suslov.

However, the real power was concentrated in the Bureau of the Presidium, unknown to the general public, which was chosen at the last Plenum of the Central Committee in October 1952, where Stalin presided. The Bureau included Stalin, Malenkov, Beria, Khrushchev, Voroshilov, Kaganovich, Bulganin, Saburov, Pervukhin. It did not include Molotov and Mikoyan, influential figures of the old guard, who by this time had been deprived of real power. The new Bureau was ruled by Stalin and the younger generation. At the Plenum of the Central

Committee on April 2, 1953, when not even a month had passed since Stalin's death, Beria made public the facts that Stalin and Ignatiev had abused their power by fabricating the "doctors' case".

Ignatiev was Malenkov's man. His removal after Stalin's death as secretary of the Central Committee, who oversaw the security agencies, suited Beria and Khrushchev, but did not suit Malenkov, who was losing his support in the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the party. For Malenkov, this was especially dangerous, since in April 1953 he retired from work in the apparatus of the Central Committee of the CPSU, having been relieved of his post

as secretary of the Central Committee. The materials of the April 1953 Plenum contain basically all those sensational accusations with which Khrushchev surprised the world in 1956 in his revealing

report at the 20th Party Congress. Without going into an assessment of the motives for Beria's initiatives in April-June 1953, one cannot help but admit that his proposals for the liquidation of the Gulag, the release of political prisoners, and the normalization of relations with Yugoslavia contained all the main measures "to eliminate the consequences of the personality cult" implemented by Khrushchev during the "thaw".

During the last years of Stalin's rule, Khrushchev used the alliance with Malenkov and Beria to increase his influence in the party and state. He won the rare honor of addressing the XIX

Congress of the CPSU with a separate report on the Party Rules. Having defeated his rivals through intrigue, he placed his people in positions of influence. It is rarely noticed that Khrushchev managed in the last year of Stalin's rule to introduce four of his henchmen into the leadership of the MGB-MVD: Serov, Savchenko, Ryzanov and Epshin became deputy ministers. The first three worked with him in Ukraine. The fourth served under him as secretary of the regional committee in Odessa and Kharkov. Immediately after the Plenum of the

Central Committee in April 1953, Malenkov lost his leading position in the apparatus of the Central Committee of the CPSU. Thus, his position in the leadership now depended entirely on an alliance with Beria. He did not understand this and exaggerated his authority, still thinking that he was the second person after Stalin in the party and state and that everyone around him, including the Presidium of the Central Committee, was interested in good relations with him. However, after Stalin's death, the behavior of members of the Soviet leadership became more independent and everyone wanted to play their own role. Thus, a new situation arose that opened the way for Khrushchev's ascent to the heights of power.

Within a day of Stalin's death, the Ministry of State Security and the Ministry of the Interior, as mentioned above, were united under the unified leadership of Beria. On March 10, 1953, four groups were created in the ministry to check and revise the falsified cases: the Doctors' Plot, the Zionist Plot, the Mingrelian Affair, and the MGB Affair.

The message of the Ministry of Internal Affairs for the press about the release of the arrested doctors differed significantly from the decision of the Central Committee of the CPSU. In this message, Beria used stronger language to condemn the illegal arrest of doctors. However, his proposals for the rehabilitation of the executed members of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee were rejected by Khrushchev and Malenkov. Members of the JAC were rehabilitated only in 1955. Beria's proposals for the rehabilitation of doctors and JAC members gave rise to false rumors about his Jewish origins and his connections with Jews. In early April 1953, Khrushchev sent a closed letter to party organizations demanding that they not comment on the message of the Ministry of Internal Affairs published in the press and not discuss the problem of anti-Semitism at party meetings.

On April 2, 1953, Beria sent a memorandum to the Council of Ministers of the USSR, in which he stated that Mikhoels was slandered and villainously killed on the orders of Stalin by a group of MGB workers headed by Ogoltsov and Tsanava, which included five more operatives. He proposed to cancel the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on awarding these persons with orders, and to arrest Ogoltsov and Tsanava, as the perpetrators of the villainous action, on charges of murder. However, Tsanava was arrested only six months later, not for participating in the murder of Mikhoels, but as a "member of the Beria gang." Ogoltsov and his group were deprived of their awards, but they were not put on trial. Ogoltsov was expelled from the party only in 1954. So, no one really answered for the murder of Mikhoels, except for the fact that several people had to return their orders.

By the way, Beria spoke at the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU and presented for discussion a draft of a broader amnesty for political prisoners. However, these proposals were not accepted either. The decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on amnesty applied to all persons, including political prisoners, sentenced to up to five years. This decision turned out to be ill-conceived: over a million ordinary criminals - thieves, rapists, swindlers, hooligans - were simultaneously released from

the camps. Cities and towns were literally flooded with punks and hooligans, the situation became dangerous and tense. In this regard, Beria transferred the apparatus of the ministry to work in an enhanced mode, ordered his deputies and heads of departments to ensure public order in the capital. The troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs were sent to patrol Moscow and massive searches of attics and basements. Order was quickly restored. There is no doubt, however, that the rampant crime caused by the amnesty shook the prestige of Beria, which had risen after the release of the doctors. It is significant that Beria decided to transfer the Gulag from the Ministry of Internal Affairs to the Ministry of Justice and raised the question of its liquidation. After the arrest of Beria, this decision was canceled. My father, at that time often meeting in the service with Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria, noted: "In April 1953, I began to notice some changes in Beria's behavior: talking on the phone in my presence (and sometimes several other senior state security officers) with Malenkov, Bulganin and Khrushchev,

he openly criticized the members of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the party, addressed them familiarly, like "you." Once, in the presence of Sazykin, head of the Ideological Counterintelligence Department, he began to recall how he had saved Ilya Ehrenburg from Stalin's wrath.

According to him, in 1939 he received an order from Stalin to arrest Ehrenburg as soon as he returned from France. At the Lubyanka, Beria was waiting for a telegram from the NKVD resident in Paris, Vasilevsky, in which he highly appreciated Ehrenburg's political contribution to the development of Soviet-French relations and his anti-fascist activities. Instead of following Stalin's order, Beria showed Vasilevsky's telegram at the next meeting with him. In response, Stalin muttered: "Well, if you love this Jew so much, work with him and

further.

One day, when I went into Beria's office, I heard him arguing on the phone with Khrushchev: "Listen, you

yourself asked me to find a way to eliminate Bandera, and now your Central Committee is preventing the appointment of competent workers in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, professionals in the fight against nationalism.

Beria's cheeky tone in dealing with Khrushchev puzzled me: after all, he had never allowed himself such liberties when his subordinates were nearby.

In May 1953, Grigulevich was recalled to Moscow. This was done for two reasons: it was necessary to make sure that Orlov (Nikolsky) did not "light up" him in his revealing articles published a month earlier in Life magazine. Secondly, if he remained beyond suspicion, he was supposed to be involved in Beria's plan for the unification of Germany and the settlement of relations with Yugoslavia.

In the spring of 1953, my father's position in the service was uncertain. On the one hand, Beria's deputy Bogdan Kobulov wanted to appoint him head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs inspection, that is, to oversee the execution of orders and instructions from the central apparatus by all territorial state security agencies. This proposal did not suit my father very much, since he had to bear the burden of responsibility for the entire machine of the ministry and deal with the analysis of personnel matters and conflict situations on the ground. Kruppov, the first

Beria's deputy, instead, suggested that Eitingon and his father, while retaining their positions in the Bureau of Intelligence and Subversive Work, be appointed deputy chiefs of the newly created Directorate of Ideological Counterintelligence. Our main task was to be the final defeat of the nationalist underground on the territory of the Soviet Union, mainly in the Baltic republics and in Western Ukraine.

The father accepted this offer, but did not start a new job. Less than a week later, Beria suggested that he replace the head of the Main Counterintelligence Directorate, Fedotov. The next day, when he and Fedotov came to Beria, Kobulov quite unexpectedly offered his father the post of Minister of State Security of Ukraine; then he said that perhaps it would be better if the father became the authorized representative of the Ministry of Internal Affairs for Germany, hinting that for a good job it would be nice to live with the family in more comfortable conditions for a while. Knowing Bogdan Kobulov as a great master of intrigue, the father replied that he could not accept these proposals for personal reasons. In addition, he referred to the state of health of our mother and named as a possible candidate for work in Germany Amayak Kobulov, at that time the head of the department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs for prisoners

of war. "I think," my father said about this incident, "Bogdan Kobulov just wanted to get rid of me in the central apparatus of the ministry, because I knew too much about the operations that he and Beria carried out against Georgian emigrants in Paris. I also knew that the nephew of Beria's wife, a certain Shavdia, was captured by the Germans and acted as our double agent, collaborating with the Gestapo in Paris. In 1945 he returned to Moscow and then left for Tbilisi. In 1951, Stalin ordered his arrest for collaborating with the Nazis and as one of the Mingrelian nationalists. Shavdia was sentenced to twenty-five years in strict regime camps. Beria did not release him from prison when he headed the Ministry of Internal Affairs. However, the family connection with the convicted criminal remained a dark spot in his biography and fraught with potential danger. Beria also disagreed with these proposals, saying that Sudoplatov could not leave Moscow. And yet within a week

father was appointed to the post of head of the newly created 9th department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, reporting directly to the minister. The 9th department, better known as the Bureau of Special Assignments, had under its command a brigade of special forces for conducting sabotage operations abroad. Although no one directly spoke about the nature of the tasks that the brigade was supposed to perform, the father's new work corresponded to Stalin's earlier recommendation - he actually became deputy head of the Main Intelligence Directorate of State Security and was able to mobilize all intelligence forces and means in case of emergencies. After Stalin's death, a revision of the main tasks in the work began.

abroad and within the country. Beria took the initiative into his own hands.

My father was among those whom he instructed to prepare memorandums with a detailed list and analysis of the mistakes made by party organizations and state security agencies in the fight against the nationalist underground in Lithuania and Ukraine. Beria considered it necessary to promote local cadres to leadership positions, but to people of nationalities. In these notes, prepared in the department of his father, in particular, cases of positions deputies assign Slavic unjustified deportations and repressions against ethnic groups that were not engaged in anti-Soviet activities were noted.

Beria strongly insisted on the development of national traditions in the field of culture and language. He was very concerned about the problem of educating a new generation of national intelligentsia, for whom socialist ideals would be truly close. And it was not panache, as if to please new trends. He was convinced of this, at least it was felt by many who worked with him.

"I remember," my father said, "his proposal to introduce their own orders and awards in the republics - this, he believed, would raise a sense of national pride." But these proposals were so unusual that they were not understood at all at

the top. All this created sometimes awkward situations. For example, the newly appointed Minister of the Interior of Lithuania naively sent a memorandum in Lithuanian to Beria's secretariat, causing a real stir - no one in the center, of course, knew

Lithuanian. In addition, when the minister came to Moscow to meet with Beria, he could not explain the details of a very delicate operation - a radio game with British intelligence. The reason this time was that he had lost his briefcase with documents in the hotel of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in Kolpachny Lane. Later there was a rumor that he lost his documents on purpose. A former party functionary, and then chairman of the executive committee of Vilnius, he had no desire to work in the state security agencies. He achieved his goal - he was given a job in the planning and economic department of the republic.

"Unfortunately," my father recalls, "at the time when the note was prepared on the mistakes in national policy in Ukraine, a conflict broke out between the newly appointed Minister of Internal Affairs Meshik and local party officials, as well as employees of the apparatus of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine. Meshik, by all means, sought to expel Khrushchev's protégé Strokach, who was fired from the authorities in 1941 for failing to take out part of the NKVD archive when the Germans surrounded Kiev. In addition, Meshik did not get along with the party leaders of Ukraine Serdyuk and Shelest. Serdyuk tried to take away from the Ministry of Internal Affairs a house that was used as a kindergarten for children of ministry employees: he chose this mansion in Lvov for himself and his family. Serdyuk sent his assistant to the kindergarten, and Meshik posted guards. Shelest, at that time the secretary of the Kyiv regional party committee, took the fire supervision boat for his use for hunting and did not return it. Meshik reported this to the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the government.

Although it was customary to speak Russian at the meeting of the Ukrainian Central Committee, Meshik allowed himself to boldly address those present in Ukrainian, recommending that the shocked Russians, including the first secretary of the Central Committee Melnikov, learn Ukrainian. He was enthusiastically supported by the writer Alexander Korneichuk, who also spoke in Ukrainian and praised Beria, since one of his closest relatives, thanks to Beria, was appointed head of the regional department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and promoted to the rank of general.

Meshik proudly told me about these episodes, which, in his words, testified to the correct line in national politics. I told him that he was a fool if he entered into

conflicts with local authorities. Then I introduced him to Muzichenko, who at one time was our illegal immigrant in Paris and had extensive experience working with real Ukrainian nationalists. We knew that he would be able to distinguish real terrorists from talkers and help Mexico avoid unnecessary clashes. Muzichenko, however, had to postpone his trip to Kyiv, because at that time Beria, at the request of Khrushchev, ordered the delivery to Moscow of the Bandera sisters, exiled to Siberia. Here they were settled in a safe house, where they were under house arrest, and Muzichenko had to convince them to send a message to Bandera in Germany in order to force him to go to a meeting with our representative. Muzichenko was in Moscow when Beria and Meshik were arrested.

Since he had not yet been confirmed in the new position of Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs of Ukraine, this saved him from arrest. He, according to his father, simply stopped coming to work in the state security agencies and resumed his former medical activities at MONIKI. He was interrogated twice at the prosecutor's office regarding alleged plans in the Meshik case to revive bourgeois nationalism in Ukraine. But he was experienced enough and replied that he did not know anything, since he had not started a new job.

Abakumov remained in prison all this time, despite the fact that almost all the state security officers arrested in the same case were released, except for the head of his secretariat and the heads of the SMERSH Investigative Unit for Particularly Important Cases and the former MGB.

Beria also put an end to the investigation of the so-called "Mingrelian case", begun two years ago on Stalin's orders. He released the secretaries of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia, Baramia and Sharia, and the former Minister of State Security, Rapava, who, despite torture, remained adamant and did not make false confessions. However, the main organizer of the "Mingrelian case" Rukhadze, who, on Stalin's orders, fabricated it, and also installed listening devices in the apartments and dachas of Beria and his mother in Abkhazia and Tbilisi, remained in prison.

Khrushchev helped Beria put an end to the "Mingrelian case", formalizing this by the decision of the Central Committee of the CPSU. Beria personally



after the charge of nationalism was dropped from the Georgian party organization. Mgeladze, the main opponent of Beria, who weaved intrigues against him, was removed from the post of first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia. With the blessing of Khrushchev, Beria appointed the former head of his secretariat in Moscow, Mamulov, to the place of the member of the Bureau of the Central Committee for Personnel of the Communist Party of Georgia. A

large-scale "purge" was taking place in the Republican Communist Party. "Later, Mamulov told me," my father writes in his memoirs, "that it was not Beria, but Khrushchev, who ordered him to carry out this bloodless campaign without arrests. The irony of fate was that Mamulov had to get rid of those who deceived Stalin and wrote slanderous letters to Moscow about the connection of Beria and Malenkov with the Georgian Mensheviks and nationalists, although it was Stalin who ordered such letters to be written in Georgian in order to have dirt on Beria. Later it became known that Stalin, Rukhadze and Mgeladze discussed at dinner

denunciations. The Mingrelian origin of Beria had hindered his career before, but in the end it turned out to be fatal. The cordial friendship between Beria and Malenkov came to an end in May 1953. The well-known playwright Mdivani, who personally knew Beria, handed over to the head of his secretariat, Lyudvigov, a letter in which he accused Malenkov, who had just become Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, of allegedly using material from the speech of the tsarist Minister of Internal Affairs in his report at the 19th Party Congress. Bulygin in the State Duma, when he said that new Gogols and Shchedrins were needed to raise the spiritual atmosphere in society. The accusation of such borrowing - it was about party documents - was a serious matter, especially during the struggle for power, which escalated after Stalin's death. Beria indignantly ordered Ludwigov to write off this letter and stop communicating with the "Georgian bastard." However, in May 1953, a letter from Beria's secretariat was forwarded to Malenkov's secretariat - the "cordial friendship" came to an end.

These intrigues took place just at the moment when Beria embarked on another initiative, this time it concerned the area of my father's work. According to his memoirs,

At a meeting of the chiefs of intelligence services of the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Beria sharply criticized Rzasny, the head of foreign intelligence of the MGB, Khrushchev's nominee for primitive and ineffective methods: Stalin's directives on the destruction of elderly emigrants (Kerensky) and minor figures, according to him, had no practical meaning.

Beria said that now the main task is to create a powerful base for intelligence operations. In Germany, for this you need to use what is left of the former agent network of the "Red Chapel" in Hamburg. In countries bordering the United States of America, it was necessary to strengthen the position of illegal immigrants. It is also necessary, he continued, to prepare a government decision obliging the Foreign Ministry, the Ministry of Foreign Trade, TASS and other Soviet agencies abroad to expand support for Soviet intelligence operations abroad. He also noted the expediency of the existence of two parallel intelligence services - in the Ministry of Internal Affairs and in the Ministry of Defense. The first was to collect intelligence information of the usual type, and the second was to conduct special operations in the event of a danger of unleashing a war. His arguments, in essence, were a repetition of Stalin's guidelines, with the only difference being that from now on, preparations for sabotage and the liquidation of persons objectionable to the government were suspended until further notice. Beria instructed his father to prepare within a week, together with the head of military intelligence, General of the Army Zakharov and Golovanov, a special marshal of long-range bomber aviation, a report on measures to neutralize American strategic air superiority and conduct sabotage at nuclear and strategic facilities of the United States and NATO. Beria ordered the presentation of a plan to disable the US Air Force and Navy supply base in Europe. The father spoke about this episode as follows: "The next Week, in Beria's spacious office in the Kremlin, where a meeting was held, Admiral Kuznetsov, commander of the Navy, thanked Beria for rehabilitating his assistant Vice Admiral Goncharov, who died in 1948 during interrogation. Abakumov accused him, along with Kuznetsov, of anti-Stalinist views. Almost all substitutes

Kuznetsov were arrested in 1948, and Kuznetsov himself was demoted to rear admiral and appointed commander of the Pacific Fleet. Three years later, Kuznetsov wrote a letter to Stalin with proposals for the strategic rearmament of the Navy and for the construction of a large submarine fleet and the creation of nuclear submarines. Kuznetsov's plan provided for a significant change in the ratio of surface and submarine ships in the Navy. Stalin supported Kuznetsov's proposals and reinstated him as commander of the naval forces, although his former deputies remained in prison.

I knew that my father always treated Kuznetsov with great respect and considered him, like many others, an outstanding military leader, highly valued in the circles of our intelligence. And this time Kuznetsov, as always and everywhere, set the tone for the work of the meeting.

Father reported on a plan for the creation of illegal stations that would be able to regularly monitor approximately one hundred and fifty major Western strategic installations in Europe and the United States of America. Admiral Kuznetsov presented another option for consideration. In his opinion, special operations and sabotage should be developed in accordance with the requirements of modern warfare. Current military conflicts are fleeting, he said, and must end quickly and decisively. Kuznetsov suggested discussing the possibility of delivering preemptive strikes, calculated due to our limited resources to destroy three or four US aircraft carriers. In his opinion, this would give our submariners great advantages in deploying operations against enemy sea lanes. It would make sense, he continued, to sabotage the naval bases and ports of Europe to prevent the arrival of reinforcements for American troops in Germany, France and Italy. General of the Army Zakharov, later chief of the General Staff, noted that the question of a pre-emptive strike against enemy strategic targets was fundamentally new in the art of war and

should be seriously worked out. Marshal Golovanov did not agree with us. He noted that in a war, with limited resources, it would be more realistic

to assume that we will be able to inflict no more than one or two blows on strategic installations to the enemy. And in this case, it is necessary not to attack the ships at the bases of the enemy, but, first of all, to destroy at the airfields part of his powerful air force, capable of inflicting a nuclear strike on our cities. "I supported

Zakharov," my father said, "by citing examples from the practice of the Second World War and our little experience gained in the Korean War, then our legal residencies were only able to monitor US military bases in the Far East. As for the experience of the last war, it was limited to the capture of individual objects, as well as persons in possession of the most important operational and strategic information. The new requirements under the conditions of a supposed nuclear war brought to life the need to revise our entire system of sabotage operations. I said that we need not only individually trained agents, but also mobile strike teams that could be deployed by all major illegal residencies. Their task should include an attack on nuclear weapons depots or bases where aircraft with nuclear weapons are located. Our offensive tactics worked well against the Germans in 1941-1944. However, our successes were partly due to the fact that the Germans were operating in hostile territory, and we had a strong intelligence network at our disposal.

I also pointed out that the experience of the Second World War and the Korean War shows that the disruption of enemy supply lines, especially when they are extended over long distances, can be operationally much more important than direct attacks on military targets. It is true that with direct strikes there is a panic in the ranks of the enemy and outwardly this is very effective, but the destruction of supply lines is more significant, and its effect is long-term. In addition, military installations are under heavy guard and in the event of an attack one cannot count on disabling more than two or three structures. The plan put forward by the

father at this meeting to use sabotage operations instead of the limited possibilities of air and naval strikes seemed to the military leadership

convincing. All those present at the meeting with the father agreed.

Beria listened attentively to everyone. He noted his father's speech, but he still had no idea how the reorganized sabotage service with broader rights should build its work. "Maybe," he asked, "we are talking about a combined reconnaissance and sabotage group of all types of troops?" If so, wouldn't it be as bad as the Information Committee that was set up? In 1947-1949, the committee, when developing operations, proceeded primarily from the needs of the foreign policy course and overlooked military issues.

During the discussion, General Zakharov suggested that sabotage operations of the special services be carried out through all branches of the Armed Forces and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. However, in his opinion, the priority in intelligence work should belong to a special service, namely the one headed by my father.

"At the same time," Zakharov clarified his thought, "there should be a permanent working group for coordination at the level of deputy heads of military intelligence departments, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the intelligence services of the Navy and Air Force.

Beria agreed and closed the meeting. A month later, all participants in the meeting were to submit a detailed plan with proposals for coordinating sabotage work abroad. Beria promised to help with resources and personnel, especially experts in the field of armaments, oil refining, transport and supply.

"The next day," my father recalls, "Beria called Kruglov and me and ordered me to allocate additional staff and funds. We decided to form a special purpose brigade to carry out sabotage. The same brigade was under my command during the war years and was disbanded by Abakumov in 1946. Beria and Krugloye approved my proposal to involve our specialists in intelligence and partisan operations in active work in the organs. Vasilevsky, Zarubin and his wife, Serebryansky, Afanasiev, Semyonov and Taubman, dismissed from the authorities, were again returned to the Lubyanka and occupied high positions in the expanded 9th department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, but three months after my arrest they again

fired, and Serebryansky was arrested shortly after me, and he died in prison. In the meantime, I consulted

with Marshal Golovanov about the possibilities of launching an air strike on NATO bases in Western Europe. I proposed to carry out a test flight of aircraft capable of attacking strategic targets and see if they would be detected by enemy radars. The fact is that we have already received a pilot officer seconded to NATO headquarters, a special device - an aircraft radio transponder and an interrogator ("friend or foe"), which determines the identity of the aircraft on from our agent, Dutch the radar screen. Our reconnaissance bomber, equipped with this device, took off from Murmansk at the end of May 1953 and flew along the northern tip of Norway, and then Great Britain, approached NATO strategic targets at a distance sufficient to deliver a bombing strike. The flight was not recorded by NATO air defense. We coordinated the test flight with the strategic aviation command. Our liaison officer with the General Staff, in my opinion, Colonel Zimin, reported the success of the operation to me, and I - Beria. Generals Shtemenko and Zakharov, I was told, were greatly impressed by the success of this reconnaissance operation. In May of the same year, Beria, using his position as first deputy head of government, without prior agreement with Malenkov and Khrushchev, ordered the preparation and testing of the first hydrogen bomb.

Beria's intentions with regard to Germany and Yugoslavia reflected the confusion that reigned under Malenkov among the leaders of the country. The idea of German unification did not belong to Beria at all: in 1951, Stalin proposed the idea of creating a united Germany, taking into account the interests of the Soviet Union (the problem was discussed until the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961). Even before Stalin's death, Ignatiev approved a special probing questionnaire of our special services abroad on this problem.

Just before May Day 1953, Beria instructed his father to prepare secret intelligence measures to probe the possibility of German reunification. He said that

a neutral united Germany with a coalition government will strengthen our position in the world. East Germany, or the German Democratic Republic, would become an autonomous province of the new unified Germany. The united Germany was supposed to become a kind of buffer between America and the Soviet Union, whose interests clashed in Western Europe. This would mean concessions on our part, but the problem could be solved by paying us compensation, although this would be more like a betrayal.

Beria's plan provided for the use of German contacts of Olga Chekhova, Prince Janusz Radziwill and Grigulevich's connections: they were supposed to spread a rumor in the Vatican that the Soviet Union was ready to compromise on the issue of German unification. We needed to test the reaction of the Vatican and American political circles, as well as influential people from the circle of West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer. After such a sounding, Beria hoped to start negotiations with the Western powers.

Father recalled that Colonel Zoya Rybkina, head of the German department of the First Main Directorate, was also involved in this case. She was to go to Berlin and Vienna and conduct a sounding through Olga Chekhova, which, it was hoped, would lead to negotiations, similar to what happened in Finland in 1944. Beria warned me that this plan was top secret and the Molotov apparatus, like the entire Ministry of Foreign Affairs, would only get involved in the case at the second stage, when negotiations would begin. Events in East Germany soon spiraled out of control, in part because of Beria's initiative. In May, General Wollweber, the Minister of State Security of the GDR, was summoned to Moscow, who reported a serious split in the leadership after Walter Ulbricht's statement that the main goal of the GDR was to build a socialist state of the proletarian dictatorship. Ulbricht's statement caused heated discussions and greatly disturbed Moscow, since the mood of the Western public and politicians had to be reckoned with. The Soviet political adviser under Ulbricht, former ambassador to China Yudin, received a scolding. Molotov suggested that the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Party take a special decision that the course towards the accelerated construction of socialism in Germany, as the main goal, was erroneous. But Beria, drawing his line and speculating

the slogan of a democratic, united and neutral Germany, said: the USSR does not need a constantly unstable socialist Germany, the existence of which depends entirely on the support of the Soviet Union.

Molotov sharply objected, and soon a commission consisting of Beria, Malenkov and Molotov was created to develop a political line on the German question. The commission was to prepare the terms of the German unification agreement, taking into account the ten-year extension of reparations in the form of equipment for the restoration of industry and the construction of roads and railways in the USSR, which would solve transport problems and, in case of war, quickly transfer troops to Europe.

Reparations amounted to approximately ten billion dollars - this is the amount that Moscow previously expected to receive in the form of loans from international Jewish organizations to restore the national economy. The plan called for the strengthening of the Soviet position both in East Germany and in Poland, where the raging economic crisis at the time forced thousands of Poles to flee to West Germany. The question of German reunification was acute, because the USSR had to supply raw materials and foodstuffs at cheap prices to both East Germany and Poland before collective agriculture and the restored industry in these countries could bear fruit. On June 5, 1953, Semyonov, the newly appointed High Commissar, arrived in Germany to oversee the implementation of

Moscow's directives not to force the course of socialist construction and to seek the reunification of Germany. Semyonov later told Zoya Rybkina that the German leaders begged for two weeks to justify a change in political course. Semyonov insisted on a speedy response, arguing that the GDR would become an autonomous region within a united Germany. Therefore, starting from June 5, the government of the GDR was in a state of complete paralysis - there were rumors that Ulbricht's days were numbered.

Meanwhile, in Moscow, General Wollweber and Colonel Fadeikin, deputy Soviet resident in Berlin, told the leadership about the growing discontent in Germany caused by economic



difficulties and inaction of administrative structures. Ulbricht, along with other leaders of the GDR, was summoned to Moscow in early June, where they were informed about our new political course towards East Germany, approved by the Presidium of the Central Committee of the party on June 12. In connection with Molotov's statement that at present the accelerated construction of socialism in Germany seems futile, the Presidium adopted a decision "On measures to improve the political situation in the GDR." This document obliged Wilhelm Pieck and Walter Ulbricht to change the direction of their policy and to some extent reflected the views of Beria (today there are references to this decision in a number of official publications, but the document itself has not been made public).

At a meeting with a delegation from East Germany, which included Beria, Malenkov, Khrushchev, Molotov, Semyonov, and General Grechko, commander of the Soviet forces in Germany, Ulbricht voiced serious objections to Moscow's plan. Therefore, Beria, Malenkov and Khrushchev decided to remove him. The outbreak of

strikes and protests in the GDR on June 17, 1953, was probably provoked by its instigators, who believed that the government was unable to take retaliatory steps and was about to fall under pressure from Moscow. Another version was that the riots were provoked by Ulbricht himself, who refused to comply with the demand of the striking workers for an increase in wages. Clearly, both factors were at play. There was a misconception in East Germany that the Ulbricht government was not supported by the Russians and would not oppose the strikers.

When these events took place, Beria ordered Grechko and Semyonov to restore order with the help of military force. The result was tragic - thousands of people died. However, Beria did not abandon the idea of German reunification. The show of force, he hoped, would only increase the USSR's chances of reaching a compromise with the Western powers on the peaceful unification of Germany. The West, he believed, would give up the illusion that the Soviet presence in Germany could be eliminated through mass demonstrations.

Zoya Rybkina arrived in Berlin to sound out the reaction of the West on the issue of German unification. She met with Olga Chekhova and

special communications informed the father that contact had been resumed. My father did not have time to report to Beria about the assignment: on June 26, Beria was arrested in the Kremlin. Father, without explaining anything, ordered Rybkina

to immediately return to Moscow by military plane. But it was easier to order than to carry out an order. The fact is that General Grechko received instructions from Moscow obliging him to detain all employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs who had recently arrived in Germany. Amayak Kobulov, representative of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in Germany, and Goglidze, recently appointed by Beria as head of military counterintelligence, who arrived in Berlin to restore order, were immediately arrested and sent to Moscow under guard. All means of communication were under the control of Grechko. Zoya Rybkina had to turn to him personally with a request to give her the opportunity to fly to Moscow. Fortunately, the general never took the women seriously, especially since she did not report anything about her assignment. The arrest

of Beria was then still kept secret. She said that she had received orders to immediately arrive in Moscow. Grechko had no idea "who Sudoplatov was and who this woman could be - a colonel in the state security service." He allowed her to fly out, however, accompanied by military intelligence officers. She was clearly lucky: these officers knew Rybkina from frequent visits to Germany and managed to persuade Grechko not to detain her. They also knew that for the past five years she had been the head of the German direction in the Information Committee, and then in the Intelligence Directorate of the MGB. And, finally, she was lucky that the secret task was given orally and there were no written confirmations. Beria's sounding about the reunification of Germany was interrupted before it began. On June 29, 1953, the Presidium of the

Central Committee of the CPSU canceled its Decision of June 12 on the German question. A similar story happened with Yugoslavia. Beria convinced Malenkov of the need for reconciliation with Tito. The plan to eliminate Tito was cancelled. Beria offered to send his representative, Colonel Fedoseev, to establish contact with the Yugoslav leadership. He was supposed to inform the Yugoslavs of Moscow's new course for the restoration of cooperation between our countries. The choice fell on F

The intelligence officer already had considerable experience and had recently been appointed to the position of deputy chief of the intelligence headquarters. My father knew him from the war years, when he headed the counterintelligence service in the Moscow city administration of the NKVD and provided very valuable assistance in conducting radio games with German intelligence. Since 1947 he worked in the Information Committee. Since he did not travel to the West, he was not known to foreign intelligence services. Beria approved him as a resident in Belgrade, and Malenkov approved this candidacy, which was documented. Knowing nothing about Fedoseyev's mission,

my father was engaged in conducting a parallel sounding aimed at reconciliation with Tito. Our agent Grigulevich was summoned to Moscow to discuss with Beria options for improving relations with Yugoslavia. And this attempt also did not take place due to the arrest of Beria.

After the publication of Orlov's (Nikolsky's) articles in the American Life magazine, Moscow decided that it was risky to send Grigulevich on this mission, since he might already have been exposed by Western intelligence services. As a result, Grigulevich never returned to Italy, and the government of Costa Rica, whose ambassador he was in the Vatican and Yugoslavia, lost sight of him. In Moscow, he became one of the leading Latin American scholars. Fedoseev, like Grigulevich, never went to Belgrade: when he had to go there, Beria was arrested. Beria's plans included a personnel reshuffle in the Hungarian leadership. He proposed Imre Nagy as a candidate

for prime minister. From the 30s, Imre Nagy was a staff agent of the NKVD (code name Volodya) and was highly valued by our leadership. That is why Beria planned to put him in a key post in the Hungarian government: there was no doubt that Imre Nagy would obediently carry out all the orders of Moscow. In 1956 he led an uprising in Hungary. He was lured into a trap - allegedly for a secret probing conversation with representatives of the Soviet government. He was immediately arrested by a KGB task force led by Serov,

Korotkov and Krokhin. Imre Nagy's collaboration with the NKVD played a fatal role

in his life.

## **Chapter 23**

### **THE ARREST OF THE FATHER AND EVERYTHING THAT HAPPENED TO HIM AND US**

Let me digress and say a few words about myself before turning over the next pages of my father's biography and his memoirs.

I was born into this world in the summer of 1940 as the first child in the family of Pavel and Emma Sudoplatov. Like any child, I begin to remember something about my childhood from the age

of four or five, and then very fragmentarily. At first, I remember, we lived in Moscow on Kropotkinskaya Street, then on Gorky Street, in a house where the Dynamo sports store was located on the ground floor, from here, with my mother and relatives, I left in October 1941 for Kuibyshev, from there to Ufa. After returning from Ufa, we began to live in the famous NKVD house on Bolshaya

Sadovaya Street, on the seventh floor. From the first childhood memories on Sadovaya is the drive of captured Germans in the early summer of 1944. I looked at this tragicomic procession of thousands of prisoners from the balcony, the visibility was excellent. The generals in trousers with red stripes walked in front, then the officers, followed by the soldiers. It was very quiet, people stood on the balconies, stuck out the windows, stood like a wall on both sides of the street. We could hear the clatter of the hooves of the horses on which our soldiers with weapons were sitting. The weather that day was sunny and warm,

as if nature itself was rejoicing at our coming victory. Before the war, my father had a dacha in Zhukovka, then they gave me a dacha in the vicinity of Novogorsk near the village of Gavrilkovo on the Leningrad Highway. The dacha was two-story, with 12 rooms, with running water and other amenities. The house was heated by Dutch stoves; on winter evenings, I liked to warm themselves with them. It was the house of the former priest from the church, the remains of which were outside the dacha. My father liked to cut dry branches from trees, sometimes digging in the ground. But these were rare cases, since he was busy at work for a long time. On

Next to the dacha were the dachas of Yemelyan Yaroslavsky and Stalin's secretary, Dvinsky. There was a pond on the territory of Yaroslavsky's dacha, and my father and I sometimes took walks there. By the way, my parents were friends with the Yaroslavskys all their lives. We had a large flower garden at

the dacha. My mother grew flowers on it. In the flower garden there was always an abundance of phloxes, irises, daffodils, peonies, nasturtiums. The flowers were planted so that when some faded, others began to bloom. In the garden there were bushes of black, white and red currants, gooseberries, raspberries; cherry and plum trees grew under the windows of the main entrance to the house. A long fir alley began with bushes of white roses and, like a tunnel, led

deep into the dacha to a large round arbor-rotunda with a dome, where I liked to read my favorite books alone.

I remember very well how my younger brother, Tolya, was brought to the dacha. He was very small and squeaked something, they put him on the table in the dining room, but then I went into the garden, for me this phenomenon was not significant due to age.

In 1944 we moved from Sadovaya to Markhlevsky Street. At that time, the families of Dekanozov, Apollonov, Fitin, Shlyakhtenko, Nasedkin, Chernyshev, Mamulov, Spektor lived there. As children, my brother and I were entered into all apartments, except for Dekanozov. The children of our house always gathered in the yard.

We lived on Markhlevka until 1961, then the house was transferred under the trade mission of Poland, and we moved to another apartment in Ostankino. I lived there until 1967. When I got married, I started a life independent from my parents and brother. Of the significant events of

childhood - the Victory Parade in June 1945 - my father took me to this parade. My father was in civilian clothes, as always.

I remember the rain, sapper dogs, military equipment, cavalry, and then - silence - and the soldiers, approaching the Mausoleum, threw fascist banners on wet paving stones, in puddles. I remember the fireworks, in the black sky a red flag illuminated by searchlights with a portrait of Stalin. Of course, you need to consider that these are childhood,

not adult memories. Shortly after this parade, I was taken to some park where Marshal Rokossovsky was training on horseback. I stood at the low metal fence, like in a zoo, and looked at

marshal, and more on his horse. It was interesting. Then they took me to the cottage.

Before the war, my father had a big black ZIS, on which he somehow, sitting at the wheel, turned over into a ditch on the Leningrad Highway. He badly damaged his ribs, and my mother had to sew up a wound on her forehead. Since then, my father never drove himself, although he had a driver's license. But he did not like to drive fast. During the war years and after, my father had Emka, Mercedes (small and large), Horch (small and large, like the German Admiral Raeder), Buicks and other foreign cars. The last car was a ZIS-110 without a license plate in front. In the summer

of 1945, I left Moscow for the first time to rest near Riga in Maiori with my aunt Lelya, my mother's sister, then my father came to us. At first we lived in a sanatorium, then we moved to a special dacha. I went to the Riga seaside for several years in a row, I think until 1950. In Riga, at the annual song festival, at a large stadium, my father introduced me to V. Latsis, one of the leaders of Soviet Latvia.

Father was very friendly with the locals, loved children, with genuine respect, sensitivity to the elderly.

Father is a short, stocky man with a handsome face, thick eyebrows and dark brown eyes, beautiful healthy teeth (he lost them later, almost all of them, due to scurvy in prison). Always neatly dressed, with a tie, if you had to go to the theater or visit in the evening, he would definitely shave a second time. I saw very little of him in uniform. Then, as an adult, I realized that the reluctance to often put on a "military uniform" was a business necessity.

Mom, a senior state security officer, did not even have a military uniform at home, and when she needed to be photographed in it, she rented a uniform with lieutenant colonel's shoulder straps from someone.

In life, my father was a great optimist, he never lost heart, he treated everything that happened soberly. He repeatedly told me that a person himself builds his well-being in work, especially such as his, where everything must always be calculated one step ahead.

He said: "I had the main right, not a command one - the moral right to send people to dangerous work, because I learned in my life what illegal labor is."

Father loved his relatives, friends, helped them in any way he could, when he could. Looking ahead, I'll say how surprised my brother and I were that so many people who knew my father passed by his fob in the hospital, took part in the commemoration, saying sincere kind, good words in his honor.

Father at home and at work never raised his voice, he was very delicate; even in a simple request to bring tea, he said: "Do not refuse courtesy, please bring me some tea."

My father never drank vodka, cognac, on holidays all this was always on the table, but for others, he himself drank Georgian wine, and then diluted (a third of a glass is wine, the rest is lemonade).

I never smoked, but my mother smoked for a long time, then she quit this then she suppressed the habit with lollipops.

Father liked to drink cold milk and tea with lemon. In food - unpretentious, what they cook - then they will eat. Our mother's mother, grandmother Fanya (Faina Evseevna), cooked for us.

In his free time, my father constantly read, there were a lot of books in the dacha - the rack occupied the entire wall to the very ceiling. Unfortunately, after the well-known events, the books had to be sold.

In 1947, I went to school, it was close to home, German was taught there, and at home the wife of the same intelligence officer who penetrated Saturn helped me to study it, films were made based on his work: "The Way to Saturn", "End of Saturn". My father introduced me to this at Dynamo, when the 25th anniversary of the Victory was celebrated. At the same time, I was introduced to my father's chief pilot; unfortunately, I forgot his last name.

At Markhlevka and at the dacha we lived as a family, there were only relatives of our parents, their children, among the employees - the Rybkin family, Sobol (Guro), Zubov, Yaroslavsky, my mother's friends from the cultural intelligentsia of Moscow; Elena Stanislavovna from Odessa stayed with us - her real name is the heroine of The Twelve Chairs. We were brought up by our grandmothers

and aunts, since our parents worked, since 1951 my mother retired, having served 25 years. Mom was distinguished by her

analytical mind, strong will, great knowledge of life. She became, in fact, the editor and proofreader of all her father's publications (translations of fiction,

journalism, collections of books). After his release, his mother gave his father a ticket to literary life: he had to earn a pension, and then his father was over 60! Thanks to the efforts of his mother, his father became a writer.

I remember the May 1, 1953 parade. My father drew my attention to a red-haired boy with a woman. They also stood on the stand "A", not far from us. It was Stalin's daughter - Svetlana with her son.

But at the Air Force parade in Tushino, in August 1952, my father introduced me to the Hero of the Soviet Union, General of the Army Maslennikov, this general let me through to the very railings of the open platform so that I could better look at the overflight of aircraft. Later, in 1953, he shot himself after coming home after talking with Prosecutor General Rudenko. I don't know what they were talking about, but, apparently, the "conversation" was tough ...

Life on Markhlevka went on as usual, Shlyakhtenko, Nasedkin, Chernyshov left Life, tenants changed; we went to study in Sokolniki (special school), where I met, as a schoolboy, with Andrey and Yegor Malenkov, the son of the diplomat Malik and other guys from "high-ranking" families. On March 5, 1953, late in the evening, my father

suddenly called from work and told my mother that Comrade Stalin had died. It became somehow quiet in the house, aloof.

After a while, my father arrived. He closed himself in our room (where my brother and I slept and studied) and did not come out for a long time. I decided to enter. Opening the door, I saw that my father was lying on one of the beds and silently crying. I could never imagine that this man, hardened by worldly storms, could shed tears, like all of us are children. I didn't tell anyone at home about it. The second time he cried the same way, when his mother died in the hospital. Father stood at the

coffin of Stalin in the guard of honor, then was on Red Square on March 9 (the pass is still kept by my brother).

We were children, but we understood that something important had happened for the

future of the country. At the beginning of June 1953, my parents sent me and my brother to Ukraine to stay with relatives, while they themselves moved to the dacha. My brother and I were placed in a rest home in Vorzel near Kiev and left under the care of a cousin who was older than us.



We stayed there for two weeks, and then unexpectedly my father's brother came for us - Uncle Grigory, who worked in Kyiv, put us on a train without any special explanations, and the next day we were in Moscow. From the Kievsky railway station we went to the dacha. And on August 21, in the morning, "Victory" arrived at the dacha, a man unknown to me came out of it with a pipe in his mouth, he approached my mother (she was in the yard - she was waiting for the car that her father sent for her), showed a red book that he told her - I don't know, but I heard: "Don't show the children."

During the search, he was correct. Later I learned his last name - lieutenant colonel Gordeev, a copy of the search act was signed by him.

At that time, a ZIS-110 sent by my father arrived, and my mother left for Moscow, where the apartment was also searched. Of course, nothing seditious was found. Yes, and they couldn't, even if my father had to keep something at home, then he, having vast experience as an illegal conspirator, would probably take good care of it. But this is so, by the way. As time and his whole life showed, he really had nothing to hide, and not from anyone. A day or two later, we left the dacha forever, mother, brother,

relatives, servants on the ZIS-110, and I - in the back of a truck with furniture, books and other belongings. During the search, I tried to call my father at work, but the police officer did not allow me.

Then I went to the dacha settlement of the Central Committee and called my father from there, his secretary on duty said that my father was in the city on business. An inexplicable feeling of anxiety and something happened to my father did not leave me, I

called him several times, and every time the answer was the same.

same.

On the morning of August 21, my father was arrested in his office. So from the end of

August 1953 a different life began for us.

We matured, although we remained teenagers in mind and actions.

Much later, after a long fifteen years, my father told us, and then described in his memoirs, how on June 26, 1953, returning from work to his dacha, he saw a column of tanks that filled the entire highway, but thought that these were ordinary exercises, poorly coordinated with the traffic police. When my father came to Lubyanka the next day, he immediately understood that something extraordinary had happened.

"I was called to the conference room," my father recalled, "where all the heads of independent departments and departments and all the deputy ministers had already gathered, except for Bogdan Kobulov. Kruppov and Serov sat in the chairs. Kruglov said that Beria was arrested for provocative anti-state actions and he was appointed Minister of the Interior. Kruglov asked us to continue to work quietly and follow his orders. We were also obliged to report personally to him about all the provocative steps of Beria known to us. Serov interrupted Kruglov, announcing that he would remain at the post of First Deputy Minister. He also reported on the arrest of Bogdan Kobulov, his brother Hmayak, and the head of military counterintelligence Goglidze for criminal links with Beria. In addition to them, Serov said, the Minister of Internal Affairs of Ukraine Meshik, the head of security Beria Sarkisov and the head of his secretariat Lyudvigov were arrested. We were all amazed. Kruglov hastened to close the meeting, saying that he would report to Comrade Malenkov: The Ministry of the Interior and its troops remain loyal to the government and the party.

Without waiting for the end of the working day, I called my wife and arranged to meet. She was more alarmed than I was and believed that the list of those arrested would be replenished, and I would definitely get into it. As the head of a particularly important division of the ministry, well known to Malenkov, Molotov and Khrushchev, I could not escape their close attention. We had to do nothing and bring the children from Kyiv as soon as possible. My wife immediately called my brother, the director of a cannery in Kiev, and asked me to immediately send the children to Moscow through his own channels, and in no case turn to the Ukrainian state security service for help. We decided that my older sister Nadezhda would meet the children at

station and take them to his home if my wife and I are already arrested.

The fact that Beria was arrested by Zhukov and several generals at a meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Party and was kept in the bunker of the headquarters of the Moscow Military District, the father learned a day later two...

A nervous atmosphere reigned in the Kremlin on the day of Beria's arrest. Sukhanov, head of Malenkov's secretariat, ordered that all employees within three hours - while the meeting lasted

Presidium - remained at their workplaces and did not go out into the corridor. More than ten armed generals from the Ministry of Defense appeared in the Kremlin (a completely unprecedented thing!) and were summoned to the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU. By order of Serov and Kruglov, Beria's first deputies, the government guards transferred to them all the powers to carry out combat duty in the Kremlin. Among the generals was Brezhnev, deputy head of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army

and Navy. The struggle for power in the Kremlin has assumed dangerous proportions. Under Stalin, it was strictly forbidden to enter the Kremlin with weapons - the only ones who had weapons with them were the guards. What a precedent the minister of defense, Bulganin, created by bringing in a group of armed officers and generals who secretly carried their weapons! The armed officers did not know anything about the purpose of the call to the Kremlin: the Minister of Defense ordered that they come with their personal weapons, but did not explain anything. But what if the officers with hidden weapons were stopped by guards, someone's nerves could not stand it and shooting began in the Kremlin? The consequences, my father commented, could be tragic. He later learned that Marshal Zhukov had heard about the plan to arrest Beria only hours before it happened. It was clear that Khrushchev was behind the coup in the Kremlin and that Beria was arrested by his military men, who reported directly to Bulganin, who was Khrushchev's man.

It has now been established that Beria did not enter into any conspiracies to seize power and overthrow the collective leadership. For this, he did not have real strength and support in the party state apparatus. The initiatives he took showed that he only wanted to increase his influence in resolving issues of both domestic and foreign policy. Beria used his personal connections with Malenkov and actually put him in a difficult position, isolating him from other members of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the party. However, Beria's position depended entirely on Malenkov and his support. Beria irritated Malenkov: in alliance with Khrushchev, Beria hurried to get rid of Ignatiev, Malenkov's man, who was responsible for party control over the security agencies. Malenkov, in turn, overestimated his own strength; he did not see that Beria's support was decisive for his position in the Presidium of the Central Committee. The thing is

that Beria, Pervukhin, Saburov and Malenkov represented a relatively young generation in the Soviet leadership. The "old men" - Molotov, Voroshilov, Mikoyan, Kaganovich - deprived of real power by Stalin in the last years of his reign, were hostile to this young generation that came to power as a result of the repressions of the 1930s and 1940s. A delicate balance was established between these two age groups in March-April 1953, but the social prestige of the senior leaders was higher than that of Malenkov, Khrushchev and Beria, who in the eyes of the people were Stalin's servants, and not at all favorite leaders.

Khrushchev successfully maneuvered between these two groups - he supported Beria to weaken Malenkov when Ignatiev was compromised after the failure of the "plot of doctors." He supported him even when it was necessary to deprive Malenkov of the power that the post of secretary of the Central Committee gave him. Khrushchev took advantage of the discontent among other leaders, caused by a surge in Beria's activity, in time to eliminate him.

Archival documents show that Khrushchev, after the arrest of Beria, seized the initiative. Under his pressure, the Presidium of the Central Committee removed the Prosecutor General Safonov and appointed Khrushchev's protégé Rudenko to this position. On June 29, 1953, the newly appointed Prosecutor General was assigned to investigate the Beria case.

The accusations against him were based only on "treacherous initiatives" in the field of national politics, steps aimed at normalizing relations with Yugoslavia, and his intentions to unify Germany. The version of the "conspiracy" included Beria's connection with the British Intelligence Service. The prosecutor made this conclusion based on Beria's order to close the investigation into the case of Maisky, our ambassador to Great Britain, who was accused of spying for the British. The indictment alleged that Maisky was to take the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs in the government of Beria. Beria was accused of having ordered the preparation of a test of a

hydrogen bomb without the sanction of the Central Committee. Meanwhile, no one canceled this order after his arrest, and the preparation continued throughout June, when he was already in prison, and the test was carried out in August.

One of the main accusations against Beria was that during the Civil War, in 1919, he was an agent of Musavat nationalist intelligence and allegedly established secret contacts with the British intelligence service in Baku, which introduced him into the Bolshevik organization. The verdict in his case stated that Beria destroyed all witnesses to his treacherous behavior during the Civil War in the Caucasus and slandered the memory of the glorious Bolshevik Sergo Ordzhonikidze, the hero of the Georgian people and a true friend of Lenin and Stalin. However, Ordzhonikidze himself prepared and personally wrote a statement to the Party Control Commission, confirming that Beria was sent by the Communist Party to the organization of Azerbaijani nationalists in order to infiltrate their special services. This document is in "von Beria", in the presidential archive. On August 5, my father recalled, he was summoned to Kruglov's office and ordered to bring the intelligence file of Stamenov, the Bulgarian ambassador to Moscow in 1941-1944, an NKVD agent whom he oversaw. Without any explanation, Kruppov said that they were waiting for us at the "instance" - this meant that we had to go to the Kremlin.

"In Stalin's former office," my father writes in his memoirs, "there were Khrushchev, Molotov, Malenkov, Bulganin and Voroshilov. Khrushchev turned to

me: - Comrade Sudoplatov, you know that we arrested Beria for treacherous activities. You have worked with him for many years. Beria writes that he wants to explain himself to us. But we don't want to talk to him. We have invited you to find out some of his traitorous activities. We think that you will be frank in your answers to the game. "My party duty is to present the

true facts to the leaders of the party and government. - Explaining that I was struck by the exposure of Beria as an enemy of the people, I added: - Unfortunately, I learned about his conspiracy against the government only from an official report. Malenkov demanded that I explain my

participation in Beria's secret attempts in the first months of the war to establish contact with Hitler in order to start peace negotiations on the basis of territorial concessions.

The father of this fact, as we know from his stories, did not reject and replied that at the beginning of the war, Beria really ordered to meet with Stamenov, a longtime agent of our intelligence. My father was instructed to use him to spread misinformation among the diplomatic corps in Moscow. The disinformation boiled down to the fact that a peaceful settlement with the Germans on the basis of territorial concessions was quite possible. Father knew that Beria wanted to meet with Stamenov himself, but V. M. Molotov forbade him to do this. On his own initiative, Stamenov, in order to impress the Bulgarian Tsar, had to convey these rumors, citing a "reliable source at the top." There was no written order to this effect. Father also said that, with the permission of Molotov, he had arranged for Stamenov's wife to get a job at the Institute of Biochemistry of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Khrushchev asked his father to "report" on the secret liquidations that

were being carried out by a unit subordinate to his father. He first spoke about the action against Konovalovs and Trotsky, and then moved on to special operations in Minsk and Berlin during the war years. He also named four post-war actions: with Oggins, Samet, Romzha and Shumsky - and in each case he indicated who gave the order for liquidation, and that all these actions were taken with the approval of not only Stalin, but also Molotov, Khrushchev and Bulganin. Khrushchev immediately corrected his father and, turning to the

Presidium, declared that in most cases the initiative came from Stalin and our foreign comrades. Then he also ended the conversation, turning to his father: - The party has nothing against you, - he said, - has nothing. We

believe you. Keep working. Soon we will ask you to prepare a plan to eliminate the Bandera leadership, which is at the head of the Ukrainian fascist movement in Western Europe, which has the audacity to insult the leaders of the Soviet Union. Father writes in his memoirs that he did not believe a single word of what Khrushchev

told him in conclusion. He was deeply impressed by Malenkov's hostility and Molotov's silence.

And rumors were already circulating in the ministry that the father's office was responsible for the secret massacres committed on the orders of Beria. After two or three days he learned that his name had begun

pop up in the protocols of interrogations of Beria, Kobulov and Mairanovsky. And then came the fatal call from Prosecutor General Rudenko. He demanded to come to him in order to "clarify some well-known significant facts."

"Before I went to the Prosecutor General on Pushkinskaya Street," my father recalled, "I said to myself: I'm not going to shoot myself and I will fight to the end - I have never been either Beria's accomplice, or even a person who was part of his inner circle. From the very beginning, I did not like the tone and the very questions that Rudenko

asked: - When did you receive Beria's criminal order to start probing the possibility of a secret peace

agreement with Hitler? I protested, noting that expressions such as "criminal order" were not used by comrades Malenkov and Khrushchev when

they asked questions and listened to my explanations. I learned about Beria's criminal acts only from an official government report.

With my recorded answers, Rudenko remained very dissatisfied.

I was arrested on August 21, 1953. I was in my office when Major Bychkov, my secretary, appeared and brought in three officers. I knew one of them - it was Lieutenant Colonel

Gordeev, head of the service responsible for arrests, detentions and searches in especially important cases. He produced a warrant for my arrest. Then I suggested not to go through the reception, so as not to cause panic among the employees, but to go out through another door. It was a gross violation of the law, but they agreed. By all rights, I had to sign the act of conducting a search in my office and remain in place until it was completed. My father told me what happened to him next. He was taken to the inner prison, located in the basement of the Lubyanka. Only a few hours later, two guards took him to

the administrative block of the prison, where they searched him, removed the Swiss chronometer watch that his father had bought fifteen years ago in Belgium, and put it in the breast pocket of his jacket. After

was led to the prison car, and at the very last moment one of the guards snatched his father's watch from his pocket. This petty theft shocked him. He could not imagine that the guards of a particularly secret inner prison, people in Chekist uniforms, could behave like pickpockets.

Father was brought to Butyrskaya prison and placed in solitary confinement. The first interrogation took place late in the evening. Interrogated Rudenko and Colonel of Justice Tsaregradsky. Rudenko announced to his father in a rude tone that he had been arrested as an active participant in Beria's conspiracy, the purpose of which was to seize power. What happened next was completely unimaginable. It turned out that the father is Beria's confidant and accomplice in secret deals with foreign powers against the interests of the Soviet state, that he organized a number of terrorist acts against Beria's personal enemies and planned terrorist attacks against the leaders of the Soviet state. Here I am quoting

father almost verbatim.

"After listening to these monstrous accusations," my father recalled, "I began to sharply protest against illegal actions against me as an arrested person: I was not present during the search in my office, they did not give me an inventory of the things seized during the search, and finally, upon delivery under escort to In the Butyrka prison, a warder stole a Swiss wrist watch-chronometer from me.

Rudenko and Tsaregradsky stared dumbfounded at me, not believing their own ears. Finally, Rudenko came to his senses and said that he would order everything to be sorted out. While both were confused, I decided to go ahead and protest that I was interrogated against the law at night. But Rudenko cut me off:

"We will not follow the rules when interrogating sworn enemies of the Soviet regime. You might think that formalities were observed in your NKVD. With you, Beria and with your entire gang, we will do the same.

When I read these words in my father's book, at first I didn't want to believe that this, as he was presented everywhere, the most, most fair prosecutor turned out to be no better than those same OGPU-NKVD investigators who behaved with prisoners like chain dogs.



"The next morning," my father continued, "the officer on duty appeared in the cell with an inventory of the things taken from me during the search, among them was a chronometer watch."

At the second interrogation, which, by the way, took place during the day, Rudenko already politely asked his father about his biography. Answering his questions, the father, like last time, strongly emphasized that he had no ties with Beria before his appointment in 1938 to the central apparatus of the NKVD. Suddenly, Rudenko

invited him to testify against Beria: to tell about his plan of a secret conspiracy with Hitler to conclude a separate peace through the mediation of the Bulgarian ambassador Stamenov, about the involvement of the "English spy" Maisky to establish secret contacts with Churchill, and, finally, about the terrorist attacks being prepared to destroy Soviet leadership with the help of poisons. Rudenko added that Beria also canceled the government's order to kidnap the leaders of the Georgian emigration in Paris, since his wife's uncle was among them. As a result, he declared that his father's help in exposing the villainous plans of Beria was his party duty. What could the father answer to these "delicate" proposals to the prosecutor, who, at the behest of Khrushchev, had

a very specific task - to hide his father (this is at best) in a prison casemate. Father writes about this in his memoirs: "Firstly, I did not know about these monstrous plans, and secondly, Stamenov was our agent, through him, by order of the government, misinformation was launched, designed for diplomatic circles and ultimately for the Germans, about a possible peace treaty with Hitler on the basis of territorial concessions in order to buy time to stop the advance of the German troops. As for Maisky, the last time I spoke with him was in 1946, when Beria was no longer in charge of the state security agencies, but was engaged only in intelligence on atomic weapons, and I have not had any contact with him since then. I also denied participation in terrorist plans against the enemies of Beria: during my thirty years of service in the security forces, I did everything, often risking my life, to protect the government, the state and the Soviet people from our common enemies.

Such a confession of the defendant clearly did not suit the Prosecutor General. He rudely interrupted his father and brought another accusation, allegedly that he did not comply with the order of Stalin and Malenkov to eliminate such worst enemies of the Soviet state as Kerensky and Tito. This was the last meeting between my father and Rudenko. A day later, the interrogations resumed, but they were now led by Tsaregradsky, who formally charged his father with a conspiracy involving Stamenov to conclude a secret separate peace with Hitler; in the creation of a Special Group under the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs to carry out, on the orders of Beria, secret murders of persons hostile to him and leaders of the party and government, in collusion with the "Zionist" Mairanovsky, the former head of "Laboratory-X", to commit these murders using special poisons, which cannot be detected.

To these accusations, he added participation in a conspiracy to seize power in the country and concealment from the government of information about the treacherous actions of the Yugoslav "Tito clique" in 1947 and 1948 and Beria's intention to flee abroad. In particular, they talked about Beria's plan to use a bomber from an air base near Murmansk to escape to the West. "I rejected

these speculations," the father writes further, "and declared: The Air Force was not subordinate to me, and therefore I could not help in the implementation of such a plan. The mention of an air force base near Murmansk clearly showed how the operation to successfully test the NATO air defense system was distorted. The flight of our long-range bomber over military installations in Norway made it possible to determine the vulnerability of the Americans and the British. It is known that Beria, as the first deputy head of government, authorized this flight, but did not report to Malenkov. This very fact was cited as evidence that Beria wanted to use the air base near Murmansk in case his plot failed. Tsaregradsky presented his father with one more absurd accusation that he

had disrupted the operation to eliminate Tito in the "most cowardly and treacherous" way. All the protests and demands of the father to give him the opportunity to refute these accusations were ignored by the investigation. On the contrary, it was literally in front of his eyes.

intentional fabrication of facts. This was done clearly in order to show that he would never be able to refute anything. So they broke the will to resist.

Tsaregradsky incriminated his father and connection with the executed "enemies of the people" - Shpigelglas, Mali and other intelligence officers. He tried to present the case in such a way that his father was their accomplice, stating that Beria knew about the existence of ties incriminating his father with them, but preferred to keep silent about them in order to more reliably recruit him into his organization of conspirators. By deceiving the party and the government, the father allegedly received from the hands of Beria undeservedly high awards for his work. At the same time, he said, Beria not only hid from the Central Committee and the government, that there are many materials compromising his father in the Investigative

Department of the NKVD, but also achieved his appointment as one of the leaders of Soviet intelligence. During the war years, the father, according to Tsaregradsky, following the instructions of Beria, secretly mined government dachas and country residences, and then hid the mining of these objects from the Kremlin Security

Directorate in order to eliminate the leaders of the party and government at the right time for the conspirators. In reality, my father said, the situation was as follows. He was assigned to lead the mining of roads and facilities in Moscow and the Moscow region in order to block the German offensive in October 1941 near Moscow. But after the Germans were beaten off, the mines were removed, and all this was done under strict control according to a detailed plan. Obviously, Khrushchev and Malenkov believed this stunning story about the mining of their dachas, concocted in the prosecutor's office

or obtained at the cost of forced confessions from one of the arrested. Father was not beaten during interrogations. Time seemed to have changed, and the leaders no longer gave orders to conduct interrogation with prejudice. They, after hundreds of people shot on their orders, tried to look like humanists, they didn't beat them, but they deprived them of sleep. The investigative teams of young officers, who succeeded each other, endlessly repeated

the same question until five in the morning: do you admit your participation in the treacherous plans and actions of Beria? "I decided," writes the father

guilt, gradually stop answering questions, gradually stop eating, without declaring a hunger strike every day, throwing part of the food into the bucket. It is guaranteed that after two or three weeks you will fall into prostration, then a complete refusal of food. It would be some time before the prison doctor appeared and diagnosed him with exhaustion; then hospitalization - and force-feeding. The most crucial moment comes when a lumbar puncture is done to check the patient's pain response and bring him out of his stupor. If you manage to endure the terrible pain, any psychiatric commission will confirm that you cannot be interrogated or stand trial. By the end of autumn, I began to lose strength, did not answer the questions that Tsaregradsky asked me. Soon a female doctor appeared in the cell and offered to transfer me to the hospital block of inpatient examination. In the ward, they began to force-feed me. I have the most vague memories of this time,

because I was actually in a semi-conscious state. After a few days in the hospital, I had a puncture - the pain was really terrible, but I still survived and did not scream. My father remained in the psychiatric department of the hospital in Butyrki for more than a year. Mom managed to establish contact, and

then establish friendly relations with the prison hospital nurse, who was constantly on duty in my father's ward. She began to secretly inform her father about all important events in an original way invented by her mother. She began to wrap her book, which the nurse usually read while on duty in the ward, with fresh issues of the Pravda newspaper, placing the most important government messages in a prominent place on

the cover. After all, it was impossible to speak openly in the ward: the room was tapped around the clock. The circle of visitors to our apartment narrowed, but the old comrades-in-arms and friends of my father and mother found time and place to meet with my mother, helped as best they could, in those conditions. We existed on my mother's military pension, and when it was cut in half by Khrushchev (2,300 rubles), my mother learned to sew, supported the house, raised us guys. Relatives also to us

helped.

Although my mother was bullied in every possible way and demanded that she vacate the apartment, she persisted and stated that she would only obey

the court decision. In the winter of 1955, my father was transferred from Moscow to Leningrad, to the psychiatric department of the Kresty prison for further medical examination. Mom, having learned about this, immediately went after her father. At Kresty, my father became disabled. There, he underwent a second lumbar puncture and seriously injured his spine. The prosecutor's office allowed visits only at the end of 1957. In December, she and her mother saw each other seven times.

Investigator Tsaregradsky and two

doctors were present at each meeting. In April 1958, the doctors considered the father's condition to be satisfactory and allowed the investigation to be resumed. For this, the father was transported back to Moscow and imprisoned in the Butyrka prison. Already there, my

father was charged with an indictment. Three of the original accusations remained: the first was a secret conspiracy with Beria to achieve a separate peace with Nazi Germany in 1941 and overthrow the

Soviet government; the second - as a man of Beria and the head of the Special Group created before the war, P. A. Sudoplatov carried out secret murders of people hostile to Beria with the help of poison, passing off their deaths as

accidents; third - from 1942 to 1946, P. A. Sudoplatov observed the work of "Laboratory-X" - a special chamber where the effect of poisons on prisoners sentenced to death was tested.

The indictment did not name a single specific case of killing people. But the father's deputy Eitingon was mentioned, who was arrested in October 1951, Beria was "erroneously and criminally" released after Stalin's death in March 1953 and re-convicted on the same charge - treason - in 1957. The indictment ended with a proposal to hear the case in

camera by the military collegium of the Supreme Court without the participation of the prosecutor and the defense. But on April 30, 1956, the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR was issued on the abolition of the special procedure for a closed trial in cases of state

treason without the participation of protection, and the father managed to find out about this already in prison. However, his official application for the provision of a lawyer was ignored, most likely by order of the "instances", that is, Khrushchev himself, who by this time had become the head of both the party and the government. My father sent more than thirty statements to Khrushchev, Rudenko, Secretary of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR Gorkin, Serov, who became the Chairman of the KGB, and others, demanding that he be provided with a lawyer and protesting about the gross falsifications contained in the charges brought against him. He received no response to any of them. Only at the beginning of September 1958 was my father officially informed that his case would be considered by the military board on September 12 without the participation of the prosecutor and the defense. He was transferred to the Lubyanka inner prison and then to Lefortovo.

The father later described the course of the trial in detail. Here is his description: "I was brought to the building of the Supreme Court on Vorovskogo Street in a prison car. I was not handcuffed, and the KGB escorts who accompanied me were ordered to wait in the waiting room of the deputy chairman of the military collegium, that is, outside the courtroom. They were not allowed to enter the hall contrary to the accepted procedure. I was in civilian clothes. The room I entered didn't look like a courtroom at all. It was a well-furnished office with a desk in the corner and a long conference table, at the head of which was Major General Kostromin, who introduced himself as deputy chairman of the military collegium. The other judges were Colonel of Justice Romanov and Vice Admiral Simonov. There were also two secretaries in the room. I sat at the end of a long table, and at the other end were the judges. The meeting was opened by Kostromin, asking if I would have

any objections and challenges regarding the composition of the court. I replied that I had no objections and challenges, but I protest against the closed session itself and the gross violation of my constitutional rights to provide me with protection, and due to the serious illness that I suffered, I cannot competently carry out my own defense at the court session .

Kostromin was dumbfounded by this statement, then announced that the court was leaving for a meeting to consider my petition, and indignantly noted that I had no right to challenge the procedural form of the hearing. He immediately asked the secretary to escort me to the reception. The judges

deliberated for about an hour, during which time I unexpectedly managed to see those who were supposed to testify against me as witnesses. Academician Muromtsev, who previously headed the bacteriological laboratory of the NKVD-MGB, was the first to appear in the reception room, where bacteriological agents were tested on those sentenced to death until 1950. I barely knew him and never worked with him, except for sending him intelligence materials obtained in the West on the latest developments in the field of bacteriological weapons. Mairanovsky was another witness: pale and frightened, he appeared in the waiting room, accompanied by an escort. He was wearing a worn suit - it was immediately obvious that he had been brought straight from prison. It became clear to me that the work of the toxicological "Laboratory-X" would be one of the main charges in my case. Kostromin announced that my application for the

provision of a defense lawyer and the statement about the illegality of the hearing of the case in a closed session without the participation of a lawyer was personally rejected by the chairman of the Supreme Court of the USSR. This order has just been received by the government telephone. In the event that I persist and refuse to answer the court's questions, the hearing will continue without me. The Supreme Court, he noted, as the highest court has the right to establish any procedure for hearing cases of particular importance to the interests of the state. He asked me if I plead guilty. I categorically denied all the accusations against me.

Kostromin further stated: the court was not convinced by Beria's testimony during the preliminary investigation of his case that you were not his confidant, but only carried out orders that he transmitted on behalf of the government. Moreover, Kostromin said, the court believes that Beria was trying to hide the fact of high treason, and the evidence available in your investigative file does not matter to the court.

The episode with Stamenov was only mentioned. Kostromin emphasized the fact of undoubted treason, adding that new data indicating that Beria discussed the issue of contacts with Stamenov and other members of the government would be reported to the Supreme Court and, possibly, a private ruling would be issued to government authorities. I vehemently denied that I had made any attempts to establish secret contacts bypassing the government, since Molotov not only knew about these contacts, but also sanctioned them, and government-sanctioned sounding for intelligence purposes cannot be classified as a fact of treason. However, my application was ignored by the court. Moreover, I said, Comrade Khrushchev personally assured me five years ago, on August 5, 1953, that he did not find any criminal violation of the law in my actions or guilt in the episode with Stamenov.

Turning pale, the chairman forbade me to mention Khrushchev's name. The secretaries immediately stopped taking minutes. I felt blood rush to my face and, unable to restrain myself, shouted

out: "You are judging a man sentenced to death by the fascist OUN, a man who risked his life for the Soviet people!" You judge me in the same way as your predecessors, who brought the heroes of Soviet intelligence under execution. I began to list the names of my dead

friends and colleagues - Artuzov, Shpigelglas, Malli, Serebryansky, Sosnovsky, Gorozhanin and others. Kostromin was stunned; Vice Admiral Simonov sat as pale as chalk.

After a short pause, Kostromin pulled himself together and said:

- No one has sentenced you to death in advance. We we want to establish the truth.

Then the witness Muromtsev was called. To the surprise and displeasure of the judges, Muromtsev declared that he did not remember any facts of my involvement in the work of a secret bacteriological research laboratory.

Then Mairanovsky was called. He testified that he had never been subordinate to me on the job and that the experiments in question were in fact combat operations, and orders for destruction